



United States Department of State
*Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs*

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

Volume I

**Drug and Chemical
Control**

March 2023



United States Department of State

**Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs**

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Common Abbreviations

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AFRICOM	U.S. Military Command for Africa
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATS	Amphetamine-Type Stimulants
CARICC	Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center
CARSI	Central America Regional Security Initiative
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBSI	Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
DARE	Drug Abuse Resistance Education
DEA	U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
INCSR	International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
INL	U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
JIATF-S	Joint Interagency Task Force South
JIATF-W	Joint Interagency Task Force West
MAOC-N	Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics
MLAT	Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NIDA	National Institute of Drug Abuse
OAS	Organization of American States
OAS/CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
NPS	New Psychoactive Substances
SELEC	Southeast European Law Enforcement Center
SIU	Special Investigative Unit
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Military Command for the Caribbean, Central and South America
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNTOC	United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
UTC	Universal Treatment Curriculum for Substance Use Disorders
WACSI	West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative
Ha	Hectare
HCL	Hydrochloride (cocaine)
Kg	Kilogram
MT	Metric Ton

International Agreements

1988 UN Drug Convention – United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)

UN Single Drug Convention – United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol)

UN Psychotropic Substances Convention – United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)

UNCAC – UN Convention against Corruption (2003)

UNTOC – UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and its supplementing protocols:

Trafficking in Persons Protocol – Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Migrant Smuggling Protocol – Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Firearms Protocol – Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Parties to UN Conventions

(with dates ratified/acceded)

As of 11 January, 2023

<i>Country</i>	<i>Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime</i>	<i>1988 UN Drug Convention</i>	<i>Convention Against Corruption</i>
1. Afghanistan	24 September 2003	14 February 1992	25 August 2008
2. Albania	21 August 2002	27 June 2001	25 May 2006
3. Algeria	7 October 2002	9 May 1995	25 August 2004
4. Andorra	22 September 2011	23 July 1999	
5. Angola	1 April 2013	26 October 2005	29 August 2006
6. Antigua and Barbuda	24 July 2002	5 April 1993	21 June 2006
7. Argentina	19 November 2002	28 June 1993	28 August 2006
8. Armenia	1 July 2003	13 September 1993	8 March 2007
9. Australia	27 May 2004	16 November 1992	7 December 2005
10. Austria	23 September 2004	11 July 1997	11 January 2006
11. Azerbaijan	30 October 2003	22 September 1993	1 November 2005
12. Bahamas	26 September 2008	30 January 1989	10 January 2008
13. Bahrain	7 June 2004	7 February 1990	5 October 2010
14. Bangladesh	13 July 2011	11 October 1990	27 February 2007
15. Barbados	11 November 2014	15 October 1992	
16. Belarus	25 June 2003	15 October 1990	17 February 2005
17. Belgium	11 August 2004	25 October 1995	25 September 2008
18. Belize	26 September 2003	24 July 1996	12 December 2016
19. Benin	30 August 2004	23 May 1997	14 October 2004
20. Bhutan		27 August 1990	21 September 2016
21. Bolivia	10 October 2005	20 August 1990	5 December 2005
22. Bosnia and Herzegovina	24 April 2002	1 September 1993	26 October 2006
23. Botswana	29 August 2002	13 August 1996	27 June 2011
24. Brazil	29 January 2004	17 July 1991	15 June 2005
25. Brunei Darussalam	25 March 2008	12 November 1993	2 December 2008
26. Bulgaria	5 December 2001	24 September 1992	20 September 2006
27. Burkina Faso	15 May 2002	2 June 1992	10 October 2006
28. Burundi	24 May 2012	18 February 1993	10 March 2006

29. Cambodia	12 December 2005	7 July 2005	5 September 2007
30. Cameroon	6 February 2006	28 October 1991	6 February 2006
31. Canada	13 May 2002	05 July 1990	2 October 2007
32. Cape Verde	15 July 2004	8 May 1995	23 April 2008
33. Central African Republic	14 September 2004	15 October 2001	6 October 2006
34. Chad	18 August 2009	9 June 1995	26 June 2018
35. Chile	29 November 2004	13 March 1990	13 September 2006
36. China	23 September 2003	25 October 1989	13 January 2006
37. Colombia	4 August 2004	10 June 1994	27 October 2006
38. Comoros	25 September 2003	1 March 2000	11 October 2012
39. Congo		3 March 2004	13 July 2006
40. Cook Islands	4 March 2004	22 February 2005	17 October 2011
41. Costa Rica	24 July 2003	8 February 1991	21 March 2007
42. Cote d'Ivoire	25 October 2012	25 November 1991	25 October 2012
43. Croatia	24 January 2003	26 July 1993	24 April 2005
44. Cuba	9 February 2007	12 June 1996	9 February 2007
45. Cyprus	22 April 2003	25 May 1990	23 February 2009
46. Czech Republic	24 September 2013	30 December 1993	29 November 2013
47. Democratic People's Republic of Korea	17 June 2016	19 March 2007	
48. Democratic Republic of the Congo	28 October 2005	28 October 2005	23 September 2010
49. Denmark	30 September 2003	19 December 1991	26 December 2006
50. Djibouti	20 April 2005	22 February 2001	20 April 2005
51. Dominica	17 May 2013	30 June 1993	28 May 2010
52. Dominican Republic	26 October 2006	21 September 1993	26 October 2006
53. Ecuador	17 September 2002	23 March 1990	15 September 2005
54. Egypt	5 March 2004	15 March 1991	25 February 2005
55. El Salvador	18 March 2004	21 May 1993	1 July 2004
56. Equatorial Guinea	7 February 2003		30 May 2018
57. Eritrea	25 September 2014	30 January 2002	
58. Eswatini	24 September 2012	3 October 1995	24 September 2012
59. Estonia	10 February 2003	12 July 2000	12 April 2010
60. Ethiopia	23 July 2007	11 October 1994	26 November 2007
61. European Union	21 May 2004	31 December 1990	12 November 2008
62. Fiji	19 September 2017	25 March 1993	14 May 2008
63. Finland	10 February 2004	15 February 1994	20 June 2006

64. France	29 October 2002	31 December 1990	11 July 2005
65. Gabon	15 December 2004	10 July 2006	1 October 2007
66. Gambia	5 May 2003	23 April 1996	8 July 2015
67. Georgia	5 September 2006	8 January 1998	4 November 2008
68. Germany	14 June 2006	30 November 1993	12 November 2014
69. Ghana	21 August 2012	10 April 1990	27 June 2007
70. Greece	11 January 2011	28 January 1992	17 September 2008
71. Grenada	21 May 2004	10 December 1990	1 April 2015
72. Guatemala	25 September 2003	28 February 1991	3 November 2006
73. Guinea	9 November 2004	27 December 1990	29 May 2013
74. Guinea-Bissau	10 September 2007	27 October 1995	10 September 2007
75. Guyana	14 September 2004	19 March 1993	16 April 2008
76. Haiti	19 April 2011	18 September 1995	14 September 2009
77. Holy See	25 January 2012	25 January 2012	19 September 2016
78. Honduras	2 December 2003	11 December 1991	23 May 2005
79. Hungary	22 December 2006	15 November 1996	19 April 2005
80. Iceland	13 May 2010	2 September 1997	1 March 2011
81. India	5 May 2011	27 March 1990	9 May 2011
82. Indonesia	20 April 2009	23 February 1999	19 September 2006
83. Iran		7 December 1992	20 April 2009
84. Iraq	17 March 2008	22 July 1998	17 March 2008
85. Ireland	17 June 2010	3 September 1996	9 November 2011
86. Israel	27 December 2006	20 May 2002	4 February 2009
87. Italy	2 August 2006	31 December 1990	5 October 2009
88. Jamaica	29 September 2003	29 December 1995	5 March 2008
89. Japan	11 July 2017	12 June 1992	11 July 2017
90. Jordan	22 May 2009	16 April 1990	24 February 2005
91. Kazakhstan	31 July 2008	29 April 1997	18 June 2008
92. Kenya	16 June 2004	19 October 1992	9 December 2003
93. Korea, Republic of	5 November 2015	28 December 1998	27 March 2008
94. Kiribati	15 September 2005		27 September 2013
95. Kuwait	12 May 2006	3 November 2000	16 February 2007
96. Kyrgyz Republic	2 October 2003	7 October 1994	16 September 2005
97. Lao Peoples Democratic Republic	26 September 2003	1 October 2004	25 September 2009
98. Latvia	7 December 2001	24 February 1994	4 January 2006
99. Lebanon	5 October 2005	11 March 1996	22 April 2009

100. Lesotho	24 September 2003	28 March 1995	16 September 2005
101. Liberia	22 September 2004	16 September 2005	16 September 2005
102. Libya	18 June 2004	22 July 1996	7 June 2005
103. Liechtenstein	20 February 2008	9 March 2007	8 July 2010
104. Lithuania	9 May 2002	8 June 1998	21 December 2006
105. Luxembourg	12 May 2008	29 April 1992	6 November 2007
106. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.	12 January 2005	13 October 1993	13 April 2007
107. Madagascar	15 September 2005	12 March 1991	22 September 2004
108. Malawi	17 March 2005	12 October 1995	4 December 2007
109. Malaysia	24 September 2004	11 May 1993	24 September 2008
110. Maldives	4 February 2013	7 September 2000	22 March 2007
111. Mali	12 April 2002	31 October 1995	18 April 2008
112. Malta	24 September 2003	28 February 1996	11 April 2008
113. Marshall Islands	15 June 2011	5 November 2010	17 November 2011
114. Mauritania	22 July 2005	1 July 1993	25 October 2006
115. Mauritius	21 April 2003	6 March 2001	15 December 2004
116. Mexico	4 March 2003	11 April 1990	20 July 2004
117. Micronesia, Federal States of	24 May 2004	6 July 2004	21 March 2012
118. Moldova	16 September 2005	15 February 1995	1 October 2007
119. Monaco	5 June 2001	23 April 1991	
120. Mongolia	27 June 2008	25 June 2003	11 January 2006
121. Montenegro	23 October 2006	23 October 2006	23 October 2006
122. Morocco	19 September 2002	28 October 1992	9 May 2007
123. Mozambique	20 September 2006	8 June 1998	9 April 2008
124. Myanmar (Burma)	30 March 2004	11 June 1991	20 December 2012
125. Namibia	16 August 2002	6 March 2009	3 August 2004
126. Nauru	12 July 2012	12 July 2012	12 July 2012
127. Nepal	23 December 2011	24 July 1991	31 March 2011
128. Netherlands	26 May 2004	8 September 1993	31 October 2006
129. New Zealand	19 July 2002	16 December 1998	1 December 2015
130. Nicaragua	9 September 2002	4 May 1990	15 February 2006
131. Niger	30 September 2004	10 November 1992	11 August 2008
132. Nigeria	28 June 2001	1 November 1989	14 December 2004
133. Niue	16 July 2012	16 July 2012	3 October 2017
134. Norway	23 September 2003	14 November 1994	29 June 2006

135. Oman	13 May 2005	15 March 1991	9 January 2014
136. Pakistan	13 January 2010	25 October 1991	31 August 2007
137. Palau	13 May 2019	14 August 2019	24 March 2009
138. Panama	18 August 2004	13 January 1994	23 September 2005
139. Papua New Guinea			16 July 2007
140. Paraguay	22 September 2004	23 August 1990	1 June 2005
141. Peru	23 January 2002	16 January 1992	16 November 2004
142. Philippines	28 May 2002	7 June 1996	8 November 2006
143. Poland	12 November 2001	26 May 1994	15 September 2006
144. Portugal	10 May 2004	3 December 1991	28 September 2007
145. Qatar	10 March 2008	4 May 1990	30 January 2007
146. Romania	4 December 2002	21 January 1993	2 November 2004
147. Russia	26 May 2004	17 December 1990	9 May 2006
148. Rwanda	26 September 2003	13 May 2002	4 October 2006
149. St. Kitts and Nevis	21 May 2004	19 April 1995	
150. St. Lucia	16 July 2013	21 August 1995	25 November 2011
151. St. Vincent and the Grenadines	29 October 2010	17 May 1994	
152. Samoa	17 December 2014	19 August 2005	18 April 2018
153. San Marino	20 July 2010	10 October 2000	
154. Sao Tome and Principe	12 April 2006	20 June 1996	12 April 2006
155. Saudi Arabia	18 January 2005	9 January 1992	29 April 2013
156. Senegal	27 September 2003	27 November 1989	16 November 2005
157. Serbia	6 September 2001	12 March 2001	20 December 2005
158. Seychelles	22 April 2003	27 February 1992	16 March 2006
159. Sierra Leone	12 August 2014	6 June 1994	30 September 2004
160. Singapore	28 August 2007	23 October 1997	6 November 2009
161. Slovakia	3 December 2003	28 May 1993	1 June 2006
162. Slovenia	21 May 2004	6 July 1992	1 April 2008
163. Solomon Islands			6 January 2012
164. Somalia			11 August 2021
165. South Africa	20 February 2004	14 December 1998	22 November 2004
166. South Sudan			23 January 2015
167. Spain	1 March 2002	13 August 1990	19 June 2006
168. Sri Lanka	22 September 2006	6 June 1991	31 March 2004
169. Sudan	10 December 2004	19 November 1993	5 September 2014
170. Suriname	25 May 2007	28 October 1992	18 November 2021

171. Sweden	30 April 2004	22 July 1991	25 September 2007
172. Switzerland	27 October 2006	14 September 2005	24 September 2009
173. Syria	8 April 2009	3 September 1991	
174. Tajikistan	8 July 2002	6 May 1996	25 September 2006
175. Thailand	17 October 2013	3 May 2002	1 March 2011
176. Tanzania	24 May 2006	17 April 1996	25 May 2005
177. Timor-Leste	9 November 2009	3 June 2014	27 March 2009
178. Togo	2 July 2004	1 August 1990	6 July 2005
179. Tonga	3 October 2014	29 April 1996	6 February 2020
180. Trinidad and Tobago	6 November 2007	17 February 1995	31 May 2006
181. Tunisia	19 July 2003	20 September 1990	23 September 2008
182. Turkey	25 March 2003	2 April 1996	9 November 2006
183. Turkmenistan	28 March 2005	21 February 1996	28 March 2005
184. Tuvalu			4 September 2015
185. UAE	7 May 2007	12 April 1990	22 February 2006
186. Uganda	9 March 2005	20 August 1990	9 September 2004
187. Ukraine	21 May 2004	28 August 1991	2 December 2009
188. United Kingdom	9 February 2006	28 June 1991	9 February 2006
189. United States	3 November 2005	20 February 1990	30 October 2006
190. Uruguay	4 March 2005	10 March 1995	10 January 2007
191. Uzbekistan	9 December 2003	24 August 1995	29 July 2008
192. Vanuatu	4 January 2006	26 January 2006	12 July 2011
193. Venezuela	13 May 2002	16 July 1991	2 February 2009
194. Vietnam	8 June 2012	4 November 1997	19 August 2009
195. Yemen	8 February 2010	25 March 1996	7 November 2005
196. Zambia	24 April 2005	28 May 1993	7 December 2007
197. Zimbabwe	12 December 2007	30 July 1993	8 March 2007

*Not included on this list is the “State of Palestine,” which, according to the United Nations, has purportedly acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption (2014), to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2015), and to the 1988 UN Drug Convention (December 29, 2017). The Government of the United States of America notified the United Nations, in its capacity as depositary for these Conventions, that it does not believe the “State of Palestine” qualifies as a sovereign state and does not recognize it as such. Therefore, the Government of the United States of America believes that the “State of Palestine” is not qualified to accede to the Conventions and does not believe that it is in a treaty relationship with the “State of Palestine” under the Conventions.

Introduction

Overview

While the public health crisis of COVID-19 and its concomitant effects on drug trafficking, control, and use abated in 2022, the crisis of substance use continued, though it did not intensify to the same degree as in the past two years. Provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control indicate there were nearly 108,000 drug overdose deaths in the United States during 2021 (the most recent figures available), an increase of almost 15 percent from 2020. While the total is devastating by any measure, the increase was half of the number from 2019 to 2020, when overdose deaths rose 30 percent. Overdose deaths due to synthetic opioids (mostly fentanyl) accounted for 66 percent of the total, although deaths from other illicit drugs as well as prescription pain medication also increased.

Synthetic opioids, especially fentanyl, remain a devastating threat to the United States and globally due to both their extreme lethality and the ease with which drug traffickers can produce them. There is no need for large or elaborate infrastructure; a lab can be set up in one's home and synthetic drugs are often easily trafficked through the mail. They are so potent that even small amounts can be fatal. They are often mixed with heroin or cocaine or added to counterfeit tablets and ingested unknowingly, with deadly results. They are cheap to produce and result in enormous profits to traffickers. A paramount goal of the United States is to confront this threat on multiple fronts, and robust engagement with international partners is essential to this aim.

The United States is not alone in confronting the human tragedy of substance use. Illicit drug use is a global trend, increasing in nearly every region, with levels of consumption in many countries similar to those in the United States. In addition to undermining the health and resilience of the individuals who use drugs, substance use weakens the very foundations of society: public health, economic growth, national security, and the rule of law. Communities where it is allowed to flourish are plagued by drug trafficking, violence, lethal overdoses, and illness – negative forces that in turn fuel corruption, economic decline, and hopelessness.

These global challenges require sustainable global solutions and a multi-faceted strategy to reduce both the supply of illicit drugs and the demand for them, rather than emphasizing one to the exclusion of the other. To this end, the President's 2022 National Drug Control Strategy outlines a whole of government approach. It recognizes that while dismantling organized criminal groups and reducing drug production is critical, reducing the demand for drugs and addressing the treatment needs of those suffering from substance use disorders can and must be addressed in tandem as part of a balanced and mutually reinforcing strategy.

International drug demand reduction efforts advance a broad range of U.S. objectives. The National Drug Control Strategy emphasizes “meeting people where they are” to provide care and services. Substance use disorders are major public health threats that are preventable and treatable diseases with success rates on par with other chronic conditions like diabetes and heart disease. Substance use treatment correlates with reductions in drug use and suicide attempts and with interruptions in the intergenerational cycle of drug use, violence, and crime. It reduces levels of crime and thus supports the rule of law. It contributes to national security and secure borders by addressing the recruitment of child soldiers, insurgents, and suicide bombers through the use of drugs. Additionally, it enhances economic development by supporting opportunities

for persons in longer-term recovery. While the issue is complex, proven public health strategies can achieve results, including implementing evidence-based prevention programs and policies; improving treatment quality and adherence to international standards; training and professionalizing the addiction workforce; adopting a systems approach to address gaps and barriers to treatment; supporting populations with special clinical needs; and building recovery networks.

The United States will continue to address these challenges in partnership with other countries, and international cooperation on counternarcotics was robust in 2022. The United States led and participated in a number of multilateral efforts, especially those addressing precursors, synthetic drugs, and new psychoactive substances. The United Nations (UN) Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) voted unanimously to add six substances to international control under the 1988 UN Drug Convention, including three fentanyl precursor chemicals requested for international control by the United States. Additionally, the CND adopted by consensus a U.S.-sponsored resolution that urged committed governments to intensify their efforts to address the diversion of non-scheduled precursor chemicals. The United States also secured high-level commitments from G7 and European Union ministers to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this area and continued to highlight the global threat of synthetic drugs through participation in high-level meetings and expert discussions under the auspices of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), an independent, treaty-based body that assists states to achieve the aims of the UN drug control treaties, launched a new Pre-Export Notification Online Light system, including with U.S. support, that enables exporting governments to voluntarily exchange information about planned exports of precursors used in illicit drug production that are not under international control but may be nationally controlled.

Global efforts supported by the United States also included the UN Toolkit on Synthetic Drugs, which provides guidance to the international community aimed at implementing comprehensive solutions to the threats posed by synthetic drugs, bringing together cross-cutting resources and tools from across the UN system. In 2022, it had over 30,000 registered users from 200 countries. A new U.S.-funded module on "Prevention" was added, bringing the platform to a total of ten interactive modules available in five languages. With U.S. support, the INCB expanded its activities to disrupt illicit synthetic drug trafficking networks by providing training, increasing private sector coordination, and enhancing global participation in its data sharing platforms and multilateral operations.

The Western Hemisphere remains a top concern as the source of the majority of drugs that reach the United States. That said, many countries in the region made significant progress. The United States' holistic counterdrug strategy, incorporating in equal measure disruption of criminal organizations, reduction in the supply of drugs, and prevention and treatment of substance use aligned in important ways with that of many Western Hemisphere governments, where recent political shifts resulted in movement toward multi-dimensional approaches emphasizing economic equality, alternative livelihoods, rural development, combating corruption, and interdiction, with somewhat more uncertain prospects for forced crop eradication.

Mexico is the source of the vast majority of the methamphetamine, heroin and illicit fentanyl seized in the United States and a key transit point for cocaine from South America. Fentanyl precursors from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are used to manufacture fentanyl in Mexico. Mexican criminal organizations have a significant and expanding global presence not only in the Western hemisphere but also Europe, Africa, and Asia. In 2022, the United States identified Mexico as the sole significant source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States. The U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, adopted in 2021, committed both countries to broadening security cooperation. In 2022, the United States and Mexico committed to implement a joint action plan to address the manufacture, distribution, and consumption of illicit synthetic drugs. The joint plan brings in additional entities – regulatory agencies, health- and trade-focused agencies, and the private sector – to build the capacity needed to disrupt the broader synthetic drug supply chain. However, the volume of dangerous drugs entering the United States from Mexico, and violent crime in Mexico fueled by transnational criminal organizations, remain alarmingly high. The United States and Mexico are committed to continued collaboration on counterdrug measures but must redouble efforts to disrupt the production, trafficking, and use of illicit fentanyl and other illicit drugs.

In the Andean region, Colombia remains a committed U.S. partner, but also the source of 97 percent of cocaine that enters the United States, with Peru the second highest producer. Coca cultivation in both countries slightly decreased in 2021 from 2020 levels but was still near record highs. Colombian authorities achieved the second-highest level of non-aerial eradication on record in 2021, while Peru slightly exceeded its eradication goal, and illicit drug seizures were very high in both countries. In 2022, Colombia eradicated approximately 70,000 hectares, a shortfall of roughly 30,000 hectares compared to both eradication efforts in 2021 and the goal for 2022 established by the previous Colombian administration. Colombia continues to be a strong regional leader, including in training counterdrug forces in neighboring countries, but still lacks sufficient state presence in the remote areas where most illicit drug production takes place. In Peru, competing government priorities, driven in large part by unprecedented political upheaval (even apart from the impeachment and removal of President Castillo) distracted from counterdrug efforts despite near record levels of coca cultivation and cocaine production. Evidence of new coca cultivation in Venezuela and Honduras was also troubling. And, as in past years, drug-related criminal activity in the Andean region contributed to ongoing instability and crime in Central America as well, where many governments lack resources and institutional capacity.

Ecuador was an especially welcome bright spot in the region as one of the most committed U.S. partners. In the face of alarming increases in violent crime driven by the drug trade, the government displayed formidable political will in combating drug trafficking, including by declaring a national security emergency that enabled the Lasso administration to access additional resources. Ecuador's near record level drug seizures remained steady in 2022, with 201 metric tons (MT) seized, 179 MT of which were cocaine. Ecuador also more than doubled its drug destruction in 2022 over the previous year, due to its pioneering use of encapsulation to destroy drugs by mixing them with concrete, which is cheaper, faster, and more environmentally friendly than incineration.

The United States once again determined that Bolivia and Venezuela failed demonstrably to adhere to their obligations under international drug control agreements, a troubling status also accorded to Afghanistan and Burma in 2022. This designation has applied to Venezuela since 2005, Bolivia since 2008, and Burma from 2003 (the first year the designation was required) to 2017 and now again in 2022. However, the United States granted national interest waivers for all four countries allowing foreign assistance to continue. The Taliban's ban on opium poppy cultivation and Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts were encouraging signs, although both situations will require close monitoring. In contrast, the Maduro regime in Venezuela took no meaningful action to stem the tide of illicit drug trafficking.

As foreshadowed in the March 2022 INCSR, the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in 2021 and instability in Burma resulting from the 2021 military coup had profound effects on anti-drug efforts in 2022. The effect of the Taliban takeover continued to reverberate throughout Central Asia and Europe, with significantly increased seizures reflecting an apparent upswing in heroin and methamphetamine production. The military coup in Burma was followed by record-breaking spikes in methamphetamine production and trafficking to South and Southeast Asia, facilitated by the import of precursor chemicals from the PRC.

The chemical industries in the PRC and India pose significant challenges. Both countries are major sources of precursor chemicals, especially for synthetic drugs. Some chemical companies, particularly in the PRC, continue to alter precursor chemicals and mislabel cargo shipments to circumvent controls. While the United States enjoys strong collaboration with India and robustly pursues collaboration with the PRC, both countries must do more to enforce chemical controls, prevent the diversion of chemical precursors to illicit manufacturers, and improve regulation of online drug sales.

The United States, in partnership with committed allies, will continue to lead multiple global lines of effort to help governments reduce the demand for illicit drugs, treat those who suffer from substance use disorders, strengthen institutions, dismantle criminal organizations, investigate and prosecute traffickers, combat corruption, and control the supply of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. Further progress will require concerted action bilaterally, in multilateral and regional bodies, and with the private sector on all these fronts to advance coordinated international responses and achieve sustainable results.

Legislative Basis for the INCSR

The Department of State's 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is one of the Department's principal public reports on international narcotics control issues. It includes two volumes: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, and Volume II, Money Laundering. It includes reporting requirements established by the Combat Methamphetamine Enforcement Act (CMEA) and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, as described below. This report, released in March 2023, covers calendar year 2022.

The INCSR is one of several annual reports on foreign policy and foreign assistance that the United States Congress has mandated. A number of statutory provisions provide reporting requirements for the INCSR. The broad requirements are set forth in section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended ("FAA," 22 U.S.C. § 2291). Sec. 489 requires, among other things, reporting on countries designated by the President as major illicit drug producing or drug transit countries (the "Majors List") and on countries that have received foreign assistance under Sec. 489. Sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of the FAA and section 804 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, set forth additional matters to be addressed in the report on a range of narcotics control issues.

The Majors List: The Majors List is the President's annual report to Congress of the major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries. This requirement was initially included in section 591 of the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115). It was made permanent by section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228). That section requires that the President submit an annual report no later than September 15 of each year that identifies each country determined by the President to be a major drug transit country or major illicit drug-producing country. The prior INCSR serves as one of the factual bases for the Majors List designations.

In the Majors List, the President must identify any country on the list that has "failed demonstrably . . . to make substantial efforts" during the previous 12 months to adhere to international counternarcotics agreements and to take certain counternarcotics measures set forth in U.S. law. U.S. assistance under the current foreign operations appropriations act may not be provided to any country designated as having "failed demonstrably" unless the President determines that (a) the provision of such assistance is vital to U.S. national interests or (b) that the country, at any time after the President's initial report to Congress, has made "substantial efforts" to comply with the counternarcotics conditions in the legislation. The prohibition of U.S. foreign assistance to a "failed demonstrably" country does not affect humanitarian, counternarcotics, and certain other types of assistance that are authorized to be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law.

Precursor Chemicals: Congress expanded the requirements of the INCSR in 2007 to include reporting on the five countries that export the largest amounts of methamphetamine precursor chemicals and the five countries importing the largest amounts of these chemicals. This requirement was set forth in the Combat Methamphetamine Enforcement Act (CMEA) (the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act 2005, Title VII, P.L. 109-177), amending sections

489 and 490 of the FAA (22 USC 2291h and 2291), sec. 722. This reporting includes efforts to control methamphetamine precursor chemicals and estimates of legitimate demand for them, prepared by most parties to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Drug Convention) and submitted to the International Narcotics Control Board. The CMEA requires a Presidential determination by March 1 of each year on whether the five countries that legally exported and the five countries that legally imported the largest amount of precursor chemicals (under FAA sec. 490) have cooperated with the United States to prevent these substances from being used to produce methamphetamine or have taken adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the Drug Convention. This determination may be exercised by the Secretary of State pursuant to Executive Order 12163 and by the Deputy Secretary of State pursuant to State Department Delegation of Authority 245-2.

FAA and UN Drug Convention: The FAA requires a report on the extent to which each country or entity that received assistance under chapter 8 of Part I of the FAA in the past two fiscal years has "met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ('Drug Convention')." Although the Drug Convention does not list specific goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations that the parties agree to undertake. Generally speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering; to control chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs; and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends. The relevant statute (FAA sec. 489) specifies actions by foreign countries on the following issues as relevant to evaluating performance under the Drug Convention: illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction.

In attempting to evaluate whether jurisdictions are meeting the goals and objectives of the Drug Convention, the Department has used the best information it has available. The 2023 INCSR covers countries that range from major drug producing and drug-transit countries, where drug control is a critical element of national policy, to small jurisdictions where drug-related issues or the capacity to deal with them are minimal. As a result, the reports vary in the extent of their coverage. Comprehensive reports are provided for significant drug-control countries for which considerable information is available. Where only limited information is available for smaller jurisdictions, reports may be less comprehensive. The United States invites and frequently receives relevant information from the governments of foreign jurisdictions themselves, for potential inclusion after evaluation and analysis by the Department.

The country chapters report upon actions taken – including plans, programs, and, where applicable, timetables – toward fulfillment of Drug Convention obligations. Reports often include discussion of foreign legal and regulatory structures. However, while the Department strives to provide accurate information, this report should not be used as the basis for determining legal rights or obligations under U.S. or foreign law.

Some jurisdictions are not yet parties to the Drug Convention; some do not have status in the United Nations and cannot become parties. The Department has nonetheless considered actions

taken by these jurisdictions in areas covered by the Convention as well as plans (if any) for becoming parties and for aligning their legislation with the Convention's requirements. Other countries have taken reservations, declarations, or understandings to the Convention or other relevant treaties; these are generally not detailed in this report. For some of the smallest jurisdictions that have not been designated by the President as major illicit drug producing or major drug-transit countries, the Department has insufficient information to make a judgment as to whether the goals and objectives of the Convention are being met.

Unless otherwise noted in the relevant country chapters, the Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) considers all jurisdictions with which the United States has bilateral narcotics agreements to be meeting the goals and objectives of those agreements.

Information concerning counternarcotics assistance is provided, pursuant to section 489(b) of the FAA, in the section entitled "U.S. Government Assistance."

Fentanyl and Law Enforcement Units (New in 2023): The President signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law 117-81, into law on December 27, 2021; sections 5102 and 6610 of the Act provide for additional reporting in the INCSR.

Section 5102 provides for a "separate section that contains an identification of all United States Government-supported units funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and any Bureau-funded operations by such units in which United States law enforcement personnel have been physically present."

Section 6610 requires the INCSR to identify the countries, to the extent feasible, that are the most significant sources of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year. This reporting must also include (in summary), whether each of these countries cooperated with the United States to prevent export of fentanyl and its analogues to the United States; has and uses scheduling or other procedures for illicit drugs similar to the procedures under U.S. law set forth in 21 U.S.C. 811 et seq.; is taking steps to prosecute individuals involved in the illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substance analogues as defined under specified U.S. law; and requires registration of tableting and encapsulating machines or other measures similar in effect to those set forth in specified U.S. regulations and has not made good faith efforts to improve regulation of such machines.

Because the 2022 INCSR was nearly finalized at the time the NDAA was enacted in December 2021, it was not possible to include reporting pursuant to NDAA Sections 5102 and 6610 in the INCSR that was delivered to Congress on March 1, 2022. The Department of State therefore supplemented the 2022 INCSR with respect to NDAA Section 6610 (fentanyl) on June 17, 2022. A supplement to the 2022 INCSR with respect to NDAA Section 5102 (law enforcement units) is included in this 2023 INCSR.

Demand Reduction

Drug demand reduction (DDR), which focuses on drug use prevention, treatment, and recovery, is a foreign policy tool for addressing the interconnected threats of drugs, crime, and violence. Effective demand reduction efforts promote a comprehensive, balanced approach to substance use disorders. The INL bureau works closely with international partners to develop and execute capacity building activities, including training, for service providers in drug prevention, treatment, and recovery.

Substance use disorder is a major public health threat. Drug use is a preventable and treatable disease, and that the drug trade threatens country stability. Many countries are requesting U.S.-supported technical assistance to improve and develop effective policies aimed at reducing drug use and its consequences. The INL drug demand reduction program has three strategic components: (1) promote the adoption of recovery-oriented and evidence-based drug policies and internationally recognized standards, (2) support drug data collection and conduct analysis to assure the quality of drug treatment services, and (3) implement programs that effectively prevent and reduce drug use disorders. To achieve these objectives, INL supports the following:

- Developing professional networks of drug prevention, treatment, and recovery educators and practitioners by providing training, mentoring, and credentialing based on evidence-based practices;
- Development of drug-free community coalitions internationally, involving law enforcement and public/private social institutions, aimed at preventing drug use and its consequences;
- Research, development, and outcome-based evaluation efforts to determine the effectiveness of drug prevention and treatment programs.

Significant completed and ongoing INL-funded demand reduction projects for 2022 include:

Universal Curriculum Training and Credentialing: Through international organizations such as the Colombo Plan (CP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Organization of American States (OAS), in 2022 INL trainings helped prevent the initiation of drug use, improve treatment outcomes, and lowered relapse rates, thus generating greater confidence in drug demand reduction and treatment systems. With the adoption of online self-led training, the access to professional level training in drug demand reduction is now global.

Universal Treatment Curriculum (UTC): INL's treatment curriculum, based on the International Standards for the Treatment of Drug Use Disorders developed by UNODC and the World Health Organization, consists of eight basic and 14 advanced courses that provide knowledge and skills development for treatment professionals. As of December 2022, seven UTC self-led online courses are available globally on the ISSUP website. The last course in the basic series, as well as Spanish and Burmese translations, and the online instructor-led Women's Interventions for Substance Exposure courses are scheduled to be completed in 2023. The self-led online UTC will vastly increase access to training and the subsequent use of best practices for

treating those with substance use disorders. To further the improvement in treatment, INL established the International Consortium on Quality Assurance in Substance Use Treatment and will work next year to provide technical assistance to those countries that wish to improve their treatment centers. As a result of the UTC trainings and credentialing program, there are now 1924 credentialed professionals worldwide, 114 tested in 2021.

Universal Prevention Curriculum (UPC): INL's UPC offers innovative evidence-based approaches to substance use prevention in a variety of settings such as family, school, workplace, media, and the community. To greatly expand training opportunities for substance use prevention professionals around the world, the online adaptation of nine UPC courses for Managers and Supervisors and the introductory course for Implementers were completed in Spanish and English in 2022. An evaluation of the impact of school-based prevention programs has been completed and validates the efficacy of these approaches. Online trainer-led versions of three of the Practitioners series of courses that focus on prevention in School, Family, and Monitoring and Evaluation programs will be completed in 2023.

Alternatives to Incarceration: Alternatives to incarceration – including an emphasis on gaining access to drug treatment and care – can occur before an arrest, at an initial court hearing, within the jail, at re-entry, and through community corrections such as probation. In 2021, UNODC trained the ATI Policymakers course in Kenya resulting in the government's interest to pilot alternative to incarceration programming to reduce recidivism. In 2023, INL through the Colombo Plan will train the ATI policymakers course in Peru and OAS/CICAD will train the course in Colombia. UNODC will continue to support Kenya in its work to implement its action plan for ATI and train the ATI course in Nigeria.

Following INL-funded presentation of a new Case Care Management course in Trinidad and Tobago in March 2020 by the Organization of American States' Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), Trinidad and Tobago launched a case management system in the country's probation offices in September 2021, with CICAD support through INL funding. In 2022, INL began work to create indicators to measure the progress of creating ATI systems with the CICAD and intends to refine the tool in 2023.

The International Consortium of Universities for Drug Demand Reduction (ICUDDR): INL continued its support for the ICUDDR, a network of universities working together to promote academic programs in addiction studies, to further the dissemination of evidence-based practices, and to develop the drug demand reduction workforce. In 2022, ICUDDR membership grew to 344 universities in 81 countries. With INL support, in 2022 ICUDDR joined with the Colombo Plan to support eight centers of excellence – International Technology Transfer Centers -- to strengthen drug demand reduction institutions worldwide.

The International Society of Substance Use Professionals (ISSUP): INL continued to support ISSUP, a global professional society for those who work in substance use prevention, treatment, and recovery. In 2022, ISSUP passed the benchmark of over 20,000 members worldwide with over 30 national chapters. ISSUP supports professionals to provide training and share knowledge of evidence-based treatment practices through webinars, online training events, and web forum.

Drug-Free Communities: INL assists civil society and grassroots organizations to form and sustain effective local-level anti-drug coalitions aimed at preventing substance use disorders in their communities, currently in cooperation with the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA). As of January 2022, INL support has resulted in the establishment of over 300 active coalitions consisting of over 11,500 volunteers in 29 countries around the world, some of which have continued to operate following the conclusion of INL funding.

Drug Demand Reduction Evaluation: Building on previous outcome evaluations of individual demand reduction programs, INL launched in May 2022 a comprehensive evaluation of the collective impact of INL's drug use prevention, treatment, and recovery programming on drug consumption and drug related-crime trends for a city-wide population. This evaluation, the most comprehensive study of demand reduction interventions to date, is being implemented in partnership with the Government of Colombia, municipal stakeholders, international organizations, and experts in the cities of Pereira and Dosquebradas.

Major Illicit Drug Producing, Drug-Transit, Significant Source, and Precursor Chemical Countries

Section 489(a)(3) of the FAA requires the INCSR to identify:

- (A) major illicit drug producing and major drug-transit countries;
- (B) major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; or
- (C) major money laundering countries.

Major illicit drug producing and major drug-transit countries, and major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics, are identified below. Major money laundering countries are identified in Volume II of the INCSR.

Major Illicit Drug Producing and Major Drug-Transit Countries

A major illicit drug producing country is one in which:

- (A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;
- (B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or
- (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States. [FAA § 481(e)(2)]

A major drug-transit country is one:

- (A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or
- (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances. [FAA § 481(e)(5)]

The following major illicit drug producing and/or drug-transit countries were identified and notified to Congress by the President on September 16, 2020, consistent with section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228):

Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

Of these countries, **Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela** were designated by the President as having “failed demonstrably” during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. The President determined, however, in accordance with provisions of Section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that continued support for bilateral programs in these countries, including for democracy assistance, is vital to the national interests of the United States.

Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries

The following countries and jurisdictions have been identified to be major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics:

Afghanistan, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.

Information is provided pursuant to section 489 of the FAA in the section entitled "Chemical Controls."

Presidential Determination

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 15, 2022

Presidential Determination No. 2022-13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2023

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

A country's presence on the foregoing list is neither a reflection of its government's counterdrug efforts nor level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or major illicit drug producing country set forth in sections 481(e)(2) and 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Public Law 87–195) (FAA), the reason countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to be transited or produced, even if a government has engaged in robust and diligent narcotics control and law enforcement measures.

Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as having failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts during the previous 12 months to both adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the measures required by section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Included with this determination are justifications for the designations of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B) of the FRAA. I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that United States programs that support Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.

Addressing the ongoing and increasingly staggering toll of the drug addiction and overdose epidemic in the United States, which tragically claimed nearly 108,000 lives in 2021, remains one of the foremost public health priorities of my Administration. Through our 2022 National Drug Control Strategy, my Administration will focus on critical drivers of the epidemic, including untreated addiction and drug trafficking, and will redouble efforts to strengthen foreign partnerships to address drug production and trafficking, particularly to tackle the shared challenge of synthetic drugs. My Administration's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget request calls for \$24.3 billion to support evidence-based prevention and treatment, including harm reduction

and recovery support services, with targeted investments to meet the needs of populations at greatest risk for overdose and substance use disorder. The Budget request also includes significant investments to reduce the supply of illicit drugs originating from beyond our borders.

The United States is committed to working together with the countries of the Western Hemisphere as neighbors and partners to meet our shared challenges of drug production, trafficking, and use, and to counter the deleterious impact of narcotics-related corruption. My Administration is expanding cooperation globally to bolster efforts to address the production and trafficking of dangerous synthetic drugs that are responsible for so many of our overdose deaths, particularly fentanyl, its analogues, and methamphetamine. We will look to expand cooperation with China, India, and other chemical source countries to disrupt the global flow of synthetic drugs and their precursor chemicals. Under the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, we support and encourage Mexican efforts to target clandestine drug laboratories, chemists, and companies involved in chemical diversion; to enact stronger chemical control and accountability frameworks; to increase interdiction of precursor chemicals and finished synthetic drugs in transit; and to arrest key organized crime figures involved in the synthesis and trafficking of fentanyl and methamphetamine and the laundering of drug proceeds. The United States is encouraged by Afghanistan's ban on opium poppy cultivation, production, and trafficking, and will monitor the implementation of this ban. The United States is also encouraged by Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts over the past year, including increased cooperation with international partners. I encourage Bolivia's government to take additional steps to safeguard the country's licit coca markets from criminal exploitation, to reduce illicit coca cultivation that continues to exceed legal limits under Bolivia's domestic laws for medicinal and traditional use, and to continue international collaboration to disrupt drug traffickers. In addition, while the foregoing list is focused by law on drug trafficking and the production of plant-based drugs and synthetic opioids that significantly affects the United States, addressing the global proliferation of other dangerous synthetic drugs remains a key drug control priority of my Administration.

You are authorized and directed to submit this designation, with the Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela memoranda of justification, under section 706 of the FRAA, to the Congress, and to publish this determination in the *Federal Register*.

/S/

Joseph R. Biden

U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

U.S. Department of State FY 2022-2023 Budget Counternarcotics Program Area

\$ in thousands for all items	FY 2022 Request	FY 2023 Request
	406,812	374,679
Africa Total	850	1,100
Liberia	850	850
Nigeria		250
East Asia and Pacific Total	2,805	2,805
Indonesia	875	875
Laos	500	500
Philippines	430	430
Vietnam	1,000	1,000
South and Central Asia Total	27,997	11,517
Afghanistan	21,200	5,000
Kazakhstan	367	367
Pakistan	4,000	3,000
Tajikistan	1,000	1,000
Uzbekistan	200	200
Central Asia Regional	1,230	1,950
Western Hemisphere Total	251,635	224,585
Colombia	132,500	115,500
Mexico	22,000	13,000
Peru	43,685	42,685
State Central America Regional	45,500	46,450
<i>of which, CARS/</i>	45,500	46,450
State Western Hemisphere Regional	7,950	6,950
<i>of which, CBS/</i>	6,450	6,450
<i>of which, other</i>	1,500	500
INL - International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Total	123,525	134,672
INL - Demand Reduction	15,000	15,000
INL - Drug Supply Reduction	17,000	19,933
INL - Global Crime and Drugs Policy	3,100	3,095
INL - Inter-regional Aviation Support	28,400	37,400
INL - Program Development and Support	60,025	59,244

International Training

Bilateral and Regional Training as Component of Broader Foreign Assistance

Most of the counternarcotics assistance programs managed and funded by the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) include, among other components, capacity-building aimed at improving the skills of host country law enforcement personnel, such as training on counter drug matters. These program elements build counterdrug capacity, strengthen the administration of justice generally, and enhance cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials on addressing illicit narcotics production and trafficking.

By placing capacity building such as professional training at the center of INL's assistance programs – rather than solely providing assistance in the form of equipment or infrastructure – INL aims to galvanize and sustain long-term organizational change. INL's overarching goal is to help develop law enforcement institutions in host countries that are able to effectively confront new threats with minimal or no U.S. assistance. Building our partners' capacity is an evolving challenge, as drug traffickers develop more sophisticated means to evade detection, disruption of criminal networks, and seizures of illicit drugs before they reach the United States. To be effective, INL supports training with the intention that it align with the host government's priorities, legal context, and criminal justice system; target identified performance gaps; and be accompanied by non-training efforts that will enable on-the-job application and performance, such as relevant policies and procedures, necessary equipment, and leadership support. INL codified these and other recommended training practices in 2021 in INL's Guiding Principles for Training, a set of seven standards with accompanying checklists for INL personnel and partners overseeing foreign assistance training.

The United States continuously seeks to promote burden-sharing and co-creation with its allies in the provision of training, and to ensure that the respective efforts are directed toward common goals. U.S.-supported training can take a number of forms, including as part of a bilateral assistance program in a partner country, or as training that convenes international participants from multiple countries, such as that INL provides through the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs). INL will seek partners to implement the bureau's training and other programs that are the best fit for the specific need. Therefore, some of these programs involve collaboration with international organizations, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), while others are implemented by U.S. law enforcement organizations, including the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Others draw trainers from host country partners that have themselves been the recipient of U.S.-funded programs, to train other law enforcement forces in their region.

The latter model is one of the most promising for several reasons: trainers are already conversant with the regional culture and language; they likely have experienced common region-specific challenges in addressing illicit drugs; and both trainers and trained staff gain valuable regional contacts. Further, teaching others not only instills a sense of leadership and pride in the trainers, but also fosters better thematic understanding and problem-solving skills, thus building

capacity on both sides. A successful example of this model is the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation (USCAP). The program was created in 2013 to address and combat the detrimental regional effects of narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime by drawing on Colombia's growing expertise in countering these threats. In its first year, USCAP supported fewer than 30 activities; as of November 2022, it has supported 2,293 capacity building activities implemented by the Colombian National Police and Colombian Navy and has trained 32,282 police officers and other officials in the region – 7,212 during the global pandemic in 2020 and 2021. Twelve police forces from Mexico to Argentina participate in the plan.

International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs)

The INL-funded International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) are regional training centers in which U.S. law enforcement experts train criminal justice sector officials from participating countries. Designed for mid- to senior-level managers, topics cover both general law enforcement issues and specialized topics in combatting transnational organized crime (TOC), including counternarcotics, anticorruption, cybercrime, and border control matters. Courses integrate material on promoting human rights and ensuring the rule of law.

The core objectives of the ILEAs are to foster partnerships with other countries in important regions of the world and build the capacity of the United States' foreign criminal justice partners to stop crime before it impacts the United States. The Department of State works with law enforcement components from the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Interior, Energy, Commerce, and Treasury, as well as with state and local partners and foreign government counterparts, to implement the ILEA program.

Since its inception in 1995, the ILEA program has grown to six facilities in Botswana, El Salvador, Ghana, Hungary, Thailand, and the United States (New Mexico). It has provided training to more than 70,000 students from over 100 countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The ILEA program hosts approximately 160 courses per year and delivers a combination of in-person and virtual trainings. Training at the five overseas academies includes leadership and specialized skill development and tactics in law enforcement areas to combat TOC. The ILEA in Roswell, New Mexico provides symposiums for senior and executive level personnel to develop leadership skills and address critical policy areas.

The ILEA trainings have resulted in an extensive network of alumni who exchange information with their regional and U.S. counterparts in order to collaborate in combating TOC. Many ILEA graduates have become leaders and decisionmakers in their respective law enforcement organizations. ILEA graduates have ongoing access to the ILEA Alumni Portal, which connects users with one another and with U.S. law enforcement instructors through blogs, networking events, resources, and discussion boards. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ILEA program pivoted primarily to virtual training and engagements in 2020 and 2021. All ILEAs safely transitioned to full in-person trainings in 2022. Over 5,400 individuals were trained in the first 11 months of 2022.

Africa. ILEA Gaborone (Botswana) opened in 2001 and the Regional Training Center (RTC) in Accra (Ghana) opened in 2012. ILEA Gaborone and RTC Accra deliver specialized courses for police and other criminal justice officials in Africa to boost their capacity to work with U.S. and regional counterparts. These courses concentrate on methods and techniques in a variety of subjects, such as anticorruption, counternarcotics, financial crimes, border security, crime scene investigations, explosives, trafficking in persons, narcotics, and wildlife, gender-based violence, and community policing.

Asia. ILEA Bangkok (Thailand), which was established in 1998, focuses on enhancing regional cooperation against transnational crime threats in Southeast Asia with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ILEA Bangkok's specialized courses focus on anticorruption, cybercrime, and trafficking in persons, counternarcotics, narcotics, and wildlife.

Europe. ILEA Budapest (Hungary) was the first ILEA, established in 1995. It offers courses on regional threats including anticorruption, organized crime, cybercrime, counternarcotics, financial crimes, women in law enforcement, and specialized training for judges and prosecutors.

Global. ILEA Roswell (New Mexico) opened in September 2001. It hosts senior officials and policy makers including top prosecutors, judges, police commanders and lawmakers to discuss ways to achieve effective criminal justice systems. These delegates are at the senior levels of leadership and decision making in their countries and are positioned to implement substantive changes to the criminal justice systems upon their return. ILEA Roswell draws senior and executive level officials from all participating ILEA countries.

Latin America and the Caribbean. ILEA San Salvador (El Salvador) opened in 2005. It offers courses on leadership, anti-gang efforts, human rights, counternarcotics, border security, anticorruption, and financial crimes.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

DEA is the primary law enforcement agency in the United States dedicated to addressing the national drug crisis. The mission of the DEA is to ensure the safety and health of American communities by combating and defeating the criminal drug networks responsible for harm, violence, and drug poisonings.

To accomplish this mission, the DEA employs approximately 10,000 personnel throughout the world – including Special Agents, Diversion Investigators, Intelligence Analysts, and Chemists across 239 domestic offices and 93 foreign offices in 69 countries. DEA aims to engage in innovative, data-driven policing for the safety, security, and wellbeing of the American people.

Ten percent of DEA’s Special Agent and Intelligence Analyst personnel are assigned overseas. DEA’s foreign offices deliver actionable and strategic intelligence and evidence to law enforcement and prosecutorial entities in the United States and around the world. The intelligence and evidence enable DEA to identify, target, and dismantle the entire global network of some transnational criminal organizations.

DEA’s foreign offices are tasked with the following principal objectives:

- Conduct bilateral and multilateral **investigations** with host country law enforcement partners
- Coordinate counternarcotic **intelligence gathering** with host governments
- Develop and expand host nation **capacity and capabilities** in drug law enforcement through strategic partnerships
- Coordinate and provide **training programs** for foreign law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies
- Help to **advance and develop** host country drug law enforcement institutions

DEA tailors each objective to the host nation’s unique circumstances as regards their drug trafficking threats, infrastructure, and law enforcement capabilities.

The State Department INL Bureau funds DEA’s Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and Vetted Unit (VU) programs. The purpose of the SIU and VU programs are to train, equip, build the capacity of, and support specialized counternarcotic units within partner nations’ police forces. Unit members undergo rigorous background checks, polygraphs, and vetting to ensure success and help prevent potential infiltration by corrupt officers. These units work closely with DEA to develop and share intelligence in order to target, dismantle, and prosecute transnational criminal organizations. The success of these programs has inspired other federal agencies to model their programs after DEA’s and has also motivated foreign counterparts to establish SIUs in their countries.

In Fiscal Year 2022, INL provided funding support under 14 active Interagency Agreements to build the capacity of, train, and equip DEA’s host-nation counterparts. DEA works side by side with those counterparts to develop and deliver relevant training, promote intelligence sharing,

conduct bilateral investigations, and support joint counterdrug operations. The vast majority of DEA's foreign efforts and resources are dedicated to conducting international drug and money-laundering investigations. For example, DEA partnered with INL to develop a vetted unit consisting of Tanzanian police forces to serve as a strong counterdrug partner in Africa.

Diversion Control: The mission of DEA's Diversion Control Division is to prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals from legitimate channels, while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply to meet legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs.

DC regulates over 1.9 million DEA registrants, such as physicians. It conducts drug scheduling and compliance with international treaty obligations, drafts and promulgates regulations, liaises with industry, conducts drug trend analysis to forecast potential new diversion drug trends, and oversees the importation and exportation of controlled substances and listed chemicals.

International Training: DEA's International Training Office (TRI) has been conducting international counternarcotics training, mentoring, and capacity building for almost 50 years. DEA's role has grown to include that of international consultant to law enforcement agencies and foreign governments seeking to develop high-quality narcotics law enforcement programs, organizational infrastructures, and judicial reforms.

TRI offers domestic, in-country, and regional training programs conducted by four dedicated mobile training teams. The major objectives of DEA's international training programs are to enhance foreign law enforcement capabilities, develop self-sufficient narcotics investigation training programs, and foster cooperation and communication between foreign and domestic law enforcement personnel in international drug trafficking operations.

In Fiscal Year 2022, TRI successfully conducted 93 courses overseas, training 2,411 foreign law enforcement counterparts from various countries. TRI conducted courses at the Department of State's International Law Enforcement Academies in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Central America, as well as in other host nation training facilities around the world. In addition, the office also supported and conducted six virtual training courses for foreign counterparts.

International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) - Strengthening International Relations: IDEC was established in 1983 as an important global forum for high-ranking agency leaders and prosecutors from approximately 125 countries across the world. Participants work together to develop a cooperative vision and establish strategies for combating transnational criminal organizations. They build, balance, and integrate the tools of law enforcement to combat these criminal networks and develop a framework for international cooperation. Their goal is to protect all citizens from the violence, harm, corruption, and exploitation resulting from drug trafficking and commensurate threats to national security. The IDEC's multilateral enforcement approach has had a cumulative effect, as member nations increasingly coordinate their law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute major DTOs and their leaders and to seize and block their assets. After a two-year hiatus due to COVID-19 restrictions, the IDEC conference will take place in person again in 2023.

Special Testing and Research Laboratory Programs: The Heroin and Cocaine Signature Programs at the DEA Special Testing and Research Laboratory (STRL) determine the geographic origins of heroin and cocaine seizure samples. In addition, the laboratory maintains a Methamphetamine Profiling Program that determines the synthetic routes and precursor chemicals used in producing methamphetamine. STRL developed the classification schemes for these programs using authentic samples collected from drug source countries worldwide, as well as from drug-processing laboratories in those countries. By collaborating with partner nations, DEA's foreign offices submit drug samples annually to the laboratory. Currently, the laboratory collects several thousand drug exhibits seized within the United States and abroad, annually and profiles them for tracking and intelligence purposes. This program assists investigators in helping to determine countries, and in some cases regions, of origin for seized samples.

These Signature and Profiling Programs provide the counterdrug intelligence community with science-based heroin and cocaine source data and intelligence regarding methamphetamine synthesis. These are crucial tools to investigate and support strategic intelligence regarding illicit production, trafficking, and availability of these three high-profile drugs in the United States and foreign countries.

To help address the opioid crisis in the United States, STRL developed and implemented a Fentanyl Profiling Program (FPP), which uses in-depth analysis to provide science-based forensic intelligence for the counterdrug intelligence/enforcement community and U.S. policymakers. Information provided by FPP includes determination of the synthetic pathway for fentanyl and related compounds, as well as precursor types. The program currently focuses on determining the amount of fentanyl and fentanyl-related compounds contained in seized tablets.

DEA Operations Division/Office of Financial Investigations: The mission of the Financial Investigations Section (ODF) is to augment all DEA domestic and foreign money-laundering/threat finance investigations. ODF provides assistance, expertise, and support to identify, document, and prosecute drug money laundering organizations operating globally. It builds capacity among federal, state, local, and international law enforcement counterparts and interacts with the financial services industry in money-laundering/threat finance investigations. Through DEA's foreign offices, ODF assists countries in identifying and prosecuting money laundering organizations that operate as part of or on behalf of transnational criminal organizations.

ODF regularly briefs United States government officials, domestic and international law enforcement counterparts, and financial-related agencies/institutions on the latest money-laundering techniques and trends. Additionally, ODF conducts training for domestic DEA field offices and DEA's host country counterparts in foreign locations to share ideas, share best practices, and promote effective techniques in anti-money-laundering efforts.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plays a vital role in the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to implement the United States' National Drug Control Strategy and reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the United States. As the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdictions, the USCG works closely with the U.S. Navy and partner nations to patrol the maritime approaches to the U.S., target malign actors and criminal networks, and interdict illicit drug smuggling vessels.

The USCG deploys cutters, boats, aircraft, and unmanned systems in a layered approach to combat transnational criminal organizations (TCO) as they transport illicit drugs through the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone and into the United States. Leveraging unique authorities, capabilities, and partnerships, the USCG can effectively target criminal networks across multiple domains. These efforts engage the threat beyond our land borders on the high seas where traffickers are most exposed and illicit drug shipments are most vulnerable to interdiction by law enforcement.

Combating the national security threat posed by TCOs and their manufacturing and trafficking of illicit drugs requires robust interagency partnerships. To target shipments inbound to the United States, the USCG works collaboratively with U.S. combatant commands including Southern Command, Northern Command, and Indo-Pacific Command; Joint Interagency Task Force – South; Joint Interagency Task Force – West; and other federal, state, and local agencies. The Department of Defense, Customs and Border Protection, and other partners provide maritime and aerial platforms with sophisticated surveillance capabilities to facilitate interdiction efforts and enable USCG operations. The USCG's most capable interdiction platforms include cutters with embarked helicopters and drones, pursuit boats, and Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET). These LEDETs routinely deploy on U.S. Navy and partner nation ships (e.g., Royal Dutch Navy and Royal British Navy), supplementing a limited inventory of USCG cutters.

Strong international relationships ensure the USCG can conduct interdiction operations far from U.S. borders. In collaboration with the Departments of State and Justice, the USCG maintains more than 45 bilateral agreements and operational procedures with partner nations across the globe, focused on countering illicit transnational maritime activities. These agreements enhance the USCG's effectiveness by enabling U.S. law enforcement authorities to board suspect trafficking vessels on the high seas and in partner nation territorial waters to deter and disrupt illicit maritime trafficking.

Counternarcotics Operations: Suspected illicit drug trafficking vessels are principally detected through interagency intelligence, international collaboration, and information obtained from multi-domain sensors. Actionable intelligence combined with persistent air and maritime surveillance are essential to maximize interdiction success.

In 2022, irregular migration increased significantly in the Caribbean, reducing interdiction asset availability. As a result, the USCG relied heavily on partner nation maritime drug interdiction capabilities. These operations resulted in increased interdiction successes, and in Fiscal Year 2022 partner nations contributed to more than 74 percent of all cocaine seizures.

International Cooperative Efforts: In 2022, USCG personnel were permanently assigned overseas as USCG Liaison Officers, Defense Attachés, International Maritime Organization Liaisons, Coast Guard Attachés, USCG Section Chief (Mexico), Senior Defense Officials, Maritime Advisors, and Support to Interdiction and Prosecution (CG-SIP) members. These personnel enhanced interoperability, boosted regional security assistance programs, increased intelligence collection and dissemination, and strengthened prosecutorial support for maritime drug trafficking cases.

The Technical Assistance Field Team, a joint initiative between the USCG, U.S. Army, and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), aims to develop the maintenance and logistics capabilities of our Caribbean Basin Security Initiative partners, increase maritime interceptor operational readiness, enhance maintenance/logistics skill absorption, and shift the organizational focus of our partners toward preventative maintenance and self-sufficiency.

The USCG, with support from the Department of State, hosts two annual multilateral summits: the Multilateral Maritime Interdiction and Prosecution Summit in the Caribbean and the Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summit in Central and South America. These summits, last hosted in 2019 due to COVID-19 and funding limitations, brought together professionals from operational and legal communities to enhance regional awareness of illicit trafficking threats, advance multinational cooperation, and discuss judicial/prosecutorial challenges, including information sharing, training, and logistics to improve counter-drug performance outcomes. To counter transatlantic drug flows and other illicit maritime activity, including piracy, weapons trafficking, and illegal fishing, the USCG works with U.S. Africa Command to expand maritime training and combined maritime law enforcement operations with West African countries through the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership program.

In partnership with SOUTHCOM and the Department of State, the USCG executes the maritime training exercise TRADEWINDS. TRADEWINDS focuses on CBSI partner nations and is the only validation exercise for the U.S.-funded Secure Seas Maritime Support Package. It provides an essential linkage between the operational resources supported and maintained by the Technical Assistance Field Team and regional operational plans and strategies developed through the Caribbean Multilateral Interdiction and Prosecution Summit program by offering a venue to build tactical-level relationships and conduct scenario-based exercises to validate regional capabilities.

The CG-SIP program, established in collaboration with the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, focuses on enhancing investigative, law enforcement, and prosecutorial functions; supporting cross-border law enforcement cooperation; and equipping criminal justice systems with a trustworthy legal framework. In Fiscal Year 2023, the program will be establishing a position in Jamaica while looking to expand and provide similar support to other countries receiving assistance under the CBSI.

International Training and Technical Assistance: The USCG's Security Assistance Program offers resident training programs, mobile training teams (MTTs), and technical assistance to partner nation maritime services around the world to enhance their interdiction capacity.

In Fiscal Year 2022, the USCG deployed 54 MTTs to 21 countries, training 933 students. Through the USCG's international resident training program, 258 international students from 59 countries graduated from 32 different resident courses at USCG training installations. The Coast Guard's international training program supplements geographic combatant commanders' theater security cooperation objectives, while deepening the USCG's partnerships with foreign nations combatting shared maritime security challenges.

Operational Highlights: In August 2022, the Royal Netherlands Navy's HNLMS GRONIGEN was operating in the Caribbean with an embarked Coast Guard LEDET when the ship located a low-profile go-fast vessel approximately 25 nautical miles north of Acosta, Venezuela. The embarked helicopter deployed warning shots and disabling fire to stop the non-compliant vessel to conduct a law enforcement boarding. The master of the vessel claimed the vessel was registered in Colombia, at which point the USCG.S. enacted the U.S.-Colombia bilateral agreement to verify the vessel's nationality and board and search the vessel. Colombia confirmed the registry and authorized the Coast Guard to conduct the boarding. The boarding resulted in the seizure of 1,075 kilograms of cocaine and the detention of five suspects. The suspects and contraband were transferred to the Netherlands for prosecution. This case highlights the willingness of Colombian authorities to work in conjunction with the United States and allied partners to combat the illicit flow of narcotics. The U.S.-Colombian bilateral agreement was enacted 75 times in Fiscal Year 2022, leading to the removal of a total of 2.6 metric tons of cocaine and 1,690 pounds of marijuana.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security, is the nation's first line of defense against the introduction of dangerous drugs from foreign sources. CBP processes all goods, vehicles, and people entering and exiting the United States and is charged with passport control and agriculture inspections.

CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and Air and Marine interdiction agents are charged with prevention of terrorist travel to the United States and interception of illicit drugs and other contraband, improperly classified merchandise, unlicensed technology and material, weapons, ammunition, fugitives, undocumented immigrants, and unreported currency at America's 328 international ports of entry (POEs), 135 US Border Patrol Stations and five Substations, and 74 Air and Marine Operations Branches and Units.

Additionally, CBP supports the UN-led international narcotics control efforts including the INL-supported Project Ion Incident Communication System (IONICS) by sharing incidents involving suspicious shipments of, trafficking in, or the illicit manufacture of narcotics. This cooperation fosters data-driven global partnerships to address narcotics control efforts with UN Member States, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector by rapid transformation to virtual platforms for communication and training.

Training Modalities:

Port of Entry Interdiction Training: The approach to border interdiction varies with border environments, i.e., land, seaport, rail, and airport. In addition to training at POEs, CBP also provides training in techniques used by smugglers who attempt to smuggle contraband across lightly patrolled border areas rather than at official POEs.

International Bulk Currency Smuggling Training: Bulk currency smuggling training assists foreign government enforcement personnel in identifying techniques used by bulk currency smugglers. It also helps international partners develop programs to counter this crime, potentially resulting in seizures of millions of dollars from the proceeds of crime.

Overseas Enforcement Training: The curriculum for Overseas Enforcement Training includes Border Enforcement Training; Supply Chain Security; Detection, Interdiction and Investigation; Concealment Methods; Bulk Currency Smuggling; False and Fraudulent Documents; Train-the-Trainer; Anti-Corruption; Targeting and Risk Management; Hazardous Materials; and X-ray Systems. These courses include both basic training and refresher training/mentoring abroad for graduates of training at U.S. port facilities.

Relevant components and associated counternarcotics functions:

Office of Field Operations (OFO) carries out CBP's complex border security mission at POEs. It secures and expedites international trade and travel, and stops illicit travel, trade, and smuggling attempts by means of data analysis, partnerships with trade stakeholders to secure the supply chain, non-intrusive inspection equipment, canine teams, and trained CBP officers.

Continued challenges include growth in international trade and travel, expanding mission requirements, and facility demands.

United States Border Patrol (USBP) agents are responsible for securing the 8,000 miles of land and coastal border between the POEs against smugglers, other criminals, potential terrorists, and persons seeking to avoid inspection at the POEs. USBP operates 35 permanent and 140 tactical immigration checkpoints. While their primary purpose is to inspect vehicles for persons seeking to enter the United States without authorization, agents often encounter violators of other federal laws. The USBP has over 200 task force officers assigned to counter illicit networks with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners. USBP uses experienced agents, canine teams, technology, and stakeholder partnerships to detect threats and apprehend criminals. Agents also patrol frequent entry points for the smuggling of drugs and people into the United States.

Air and Marine Operations (AMO) addresses security threats through aviation and maritime law enforcement expertise. It has over 70 locations, with over 240 aircraft and over 300 maritime vessels covering from Maine to Florida, Washington to California, Northern and Southern borders, and an approximately 42-million-square-mile area which includes more than 40 nations and the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and seaboard approaches to the United States.

AMO Foreign Operations: AMO conducts operations, training, program assessments, and capacity building in collaboration with U.S. partners throughout the world. AMO is increasing its collaboration with CBP International Affairs, CBP Attaches, and other international partners to strengthen its ability to counter transnational crime. In the source and transit zones, AMO has collaborated with the Departments of State and Defense to develop initiatives that build aviation and maritime capacity of partner nations in Africa, Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico.

AMO National Airspace Security Operations (NASO): NASO regularly schedules airborne operations using surveillance aircraft in the 42 million square miles of Caribbean and Eastern Pacific Ocean known as the source and transit zone. It coordinates with the Information Analysis Center, Air and Marine Operations Center, Joint Interagency Task Force South, and international partners who cooperate in combating transnational organized crime. NASO is actively working to expand Unmanned Aircraft System operations in source and transit zones.

Office of International Affairs: CBP's Office of International Affairs (INA) works with other U.S. government agencies and foreign government partners to share information and intelligence and promote CBP international programs. Its programs promote counterterrorism, global border security, nonproliferation, export controls, and building partner capacity. INA strengthens bilateral and multilateral relationships via informal and formal agreements and joint efforts that facilitate legitimate trade and travel. INA leads CBP's international efforts by increasing foreign partners' border security capacities and by programs that identify high-risk travelers and cargo, non-citizens that pose potential national security risks, and joint programs.

CBP Attachés, Representatives and Advisors, and Special Customs Programs: CBP Attachés and Advisors are posted in U.S. Embassies and Consulates where they advise mission leadership on CBP programs and capabilities. In 2022, CBP had 15 Attachés and 13 partner-

funded Advisors in 321 countries. The activities of Attachés include exchanging information with foreign counterparts to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement activity; negotiating international agreements (e.g., Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements - CMAA); promoting initiatives to deter and dismantle transnational criminal organizations; advocating the benefits of integrated border management and developing relationships to facilitate legitimate international trade and travel; and educating stakeholders about CBP's many international programs such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Immigration Advisory Programs (IAP), to include the Joint Security Program (JSP) and the Police Liaison Officer (LO) program, Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), and various trade and capacity building programs.

Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) is a voluntary public-private sector partnership program which recognizes CBP can provide the highest level of cargo security. The partners include importers/exporters, U.S./Canada highway carriers; U.S./Mexico highway carriers; rail and sea carriers; licensed U.S. Customs brokers; U.S. marine port authority/terminal operators; U.S. freight consolidators; ocean transportation intermediaries and non-operating common carriers; Mexican and Canadian manufacturers; and Mexico long-haul highway carriers, which together account for over 52 percent (by value) of cargo imported into the United States. CTPAT partners are considered low risk and are therefore less likely to be examined at a U.S. port of entry.

Container Security Initiative: The Container Security Initiative Division (CSI), within the Office of Field Operations, works alongside host country partners in 35 different countries with a primary focus of enhancing cargo security through targeting shipments of high-risk goods destined to the United States. Partnering with various host country border enforcement and regulatory agencies, as well as industry partners, CSI employs an "all threats" approach to cooperative targeting and information sharing efforts in order to combat terrorism and transnational crime organizations. Furthermore, CSI supports CBP enhanced international cooperation through development of strong relationships and support through technical assistance, capacity building and training efforts.

CBP USBP Foreign Operations Division (FOD): USBP Foreign Operations are part of CBP's comprehensive international security efforts to extend border security beyond U.S. boundaries through a cohesive approach with domestic and foreign partners. USBP FOD enhances information sharing with law enforcement and other relevant agencies in host partner nations and collaborating with other domestic agencies serving abroad by monitoring indicators of irregular migration and reporting to DHS and CBP for situational awareness and preparedness. FOD also provides operational and administrative support to the 15 permanent positions staffed by USBP and nine Southwest Border Sectors' Foreign Operations Branch (FOB).

Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements: In consultation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, CBP leads negotiations of CMAAs with foreign governments. CMAAs provide for mutual assistance in the enforcement of customs-related laws, primarily by exchanging information that facilitates the enforcement of those laws and provide a basis for the development of subsequent cooperation arrangements. As of Fiscal Year 2019, the United States had signed 81 CMAAs.

Office of Field Operations, National Canine Enforcement Program (NCEP): The NCEP provides technical expertise on using dogs in customs environments to detect fentanyl, dangerous narcotics, currency, concealed humans, and firearms. It assesses canine programs and works with the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Department of State to identify global partners that would benefit from canine fentanyl detection capability. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the NCP shared canine health information with the WCO and other global partners.

Preclearance Field Office: Preclearance operations enhance aviation security by stationing CBP personnel overseas to inspect travelers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights from foreign airports. They conduct the same immigration, customs, and agriculture inspections of international air travelers typically performed upon arrival in the United States. This added security layer provides an opportunity to detect and stop threats early in the process. This physical law enforcement presence overseas serves as a visible deterrent to those looking to conduct illicit activities within the United States before they set foot on U.S. soil.

National Targeting Center: The National Targeting Center (NTC) collaborates with international partners to identify, disrupt, and manage cargo and passenger risks through information sharing and joint targeting operations in accordance with memoranda of understanding and CMAAs. The Center hosts and works with participating foreign agencies and other U.S. government agencies to detect and disrupt terrorism, threats to national security and public safety, and transnational criminal activity including drug smuggling and trafficking. It also provides training and technical assistance in risk assessment to foreign customs, immigration, and other border enforcement agencies through partnership programs including the Automated Targeting System – Global, the Foreign Electronic Cargo Data Exchange Program, the Visa Validation Program, and other information sharing initiatives for exchanging advance traveler data and biometrics. CBP also hosts in-person international liaisons.

- **International Targeting Center (ITC):** The ITC is a multi-national targeting cell located within the CBP NTC. It was established as a unified hub to coordinate and connect Border 5 border agencies with a principal role to compile, analyze, share, and disseminate border related threat information to support efforts in anticipating, identifying, preventing and monitoring criminal border related target related activity. The center hosts Intelligence and targeting Subject Matter Experts (SME) from each represented agency from all Border 5 (B5) countries, along with CBP representation we have: Australia – Home Affairs, Canada – Canada Border Services Agency, New Zealand -New Zealand Customs Service and United Kingdom - Border Force. ITC members are co-located within the NTC, alongside fellowship members from other countries.
- **International Fellowship:** The Fellowship program, with the same aims as the ITC, hosts Intelligence and targeting SMEs from each represented agency from all B5 countries, along with CBP representation we have: Australia – Home Affairs, Canada – Canada Border Services Agency, New Zealand -New Zealand Customs Service and United Kingdom - Border Force. ITC members are co-located within the NTC, alongside fellowship members from other countries including Germany, France, Spain, Brazil, and Columbia.

Department of Defense (DOD) Preclearance: The Customs Border Clearance Agent (CBCA) program is designed to permit cargo consigned to the care of DOD, as well as returning military personnel, to be pre-cleared for import/entry into the United States. DOD personnel that have been trained by CBP officers accomplish these pre-clearance inspections. CBCA personnel conduct Customs and Agricultural inspections and certify personnel and cargo have met all CBP and USDA entry requirements, as well as Defense Travel Regulations, prior to departing to the United States. Inspections are conducted at 28 locations in seven foreign countries throughout the Middle East. CBP officers also provide technical assistance and annual site inspections/certifications at these DOD preclearance facilities.

Immigration Advisory Program: The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) Division within the Office of Field Operations (OFO) works in 18 sites around the globe. The first model, and namesake of the Division, is the IAP, which engages with air carriers at foreign airports to prevent terrorists and other high-risk passengers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. OFO's Joint Security Program (JSP), a component and second model of the IAP Division, identifies high-risk air travelers and contraband arriving and departing the foreign host country and partners CBP Officers with local law and administrative enforcement partners to secure the global travel network. Since 2014, a third IAP Division model has deployed Police Liaison Officers (LOs) to foreign partner law enforcement agencies and U.S. embassies to enhance information exchange related to terrorist and criminal travel threats. The IAP Division operates in foreign countries in an advisory role, while also serving as a training and capacity building partner to the host country, industry stakeholders, and other CBP components.

U.S. Border Patrol Special Operations Headquarters Central America Advisory Support and Training: Special Operations Headquarters (SOH) coordinates with USBP FOD and INA in developing strategy and policy regarding overseas operations. It supports USBP vetted interdiction units in Central American countries to dismantle criminal networks involved in smuggling drugs and other contraband. In coordination with interagency partners, SOH provides advisors to Central American governments on border security strategy and information sharing on air passengers, including through biometric data.

Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP): BITMAP is a host country-led initiative in which DHS/Homeland Security Investigations and USBP train and equip foreign counterparts to collect biometric and biographic data on persons posing potential national security risks, gang members, and other persons of interest identified by the host country. Foreign partners share this data with ICE and CBP to enhance U.S. efforts to target criminal networks. It is used to identify illicit pathways and emerging trends among criminal organizations; associate derogatory information with individuals; and identify known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and other persons of interest.

Office of Field Operations (OFO) Special Response Team (SRT): DHS and CBP use the SRT to support CBP international initiatives, including International Affairs International Training and Assistance Division; CBP Advisors and Special Customs' Programs; CBP Pre-Clearance; Immigration Advisory Program/ Joint Security Program; and various other special mission requests. SRT supports capacity building in host nation institutions by providing advanced tactical enforcement training; threat and vulnerability assessments in host countries

prior to deployment; and conducts Site Surveys identifying vulnerabilities in host country border enforcement capabilities and infrastructure to identify capacity building needs. SRT also provides training to CBP employees prior to deployment to foreign assignments.

Office of Intelligence: The Office of Intelligence (OI) plays a critical role in providing timely, actionable, and relevant intelligence to support frontline operators. OI facilitates an enhanced understanding of the threat environment and increases decisionmakers' knowledge of their operational environments by effectively collecting, processing, and analyzing relevant data, as well as producing and disseminating intelligence products that support CBP's strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence needs. OI collaborates with the intelligence offices from customs services across the world to exchange pertinent information and produce joint reports to increase awareness of common trends and techniques used by transnational organized criminals.

CHEMICAL CONTROLS

Introduction

Virtually all illicit drugs except cannabis require chemical inputs, either components to transform plant-based materials such as coca and opium poppy into a final product or as ingredients for the manufacture of synthetic drugs. Because most of those chemicals also have legitimate uses in medicine or industry, preventing their diversion from lawful to criminal uses is a significant and long-standing challenge, exacerbated by the growing threat of synthetic opioids and drug analogues known as new psychoactive substances (NPS). Effective solutions require strong domestic laws to control the production, transport, sale, and storage of these substances, sustained efforts by and information sharing with the international community, and continued cooperation with the private sector.

Production methods for illicit plant-based drugs have changed very little over the years. They involve common chemicals such as potassium permanganate (used to produce cocaine) and acetic anhydride (used to produce heroin). Preventing the diversion of such chemicals depends largely on whether a country has strong internal controls and adheres to international regulatory efforts such as the ones managed by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).

The range of chemicals used as key ingredients to produce synthetic drugs and NPS is constantly evolving as criminals adapt to circumvent detection and evade controls, making it much more difficult to control them. Synthetic drugs can readily be manufactured anywhere without the need for elaborate infrastructure, and the chemicals needed to produce them vary greatly. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified over 1,100 different forms of NPS and estimates the number of potential fentanyl analogues alone to number in the thousands.

The reports below summarize the state of affairs in, and control efforts by, the countries that are major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics. Afghanistan, although the world's largest supplier of opiates, is not included due to the United States' withdrawal of its military forces, the closure of its embassy, and the Taliban takeover in 2021. As a result, it is currently not possible to obtain reliable information on chemical controls in Afghanistan, although the United States believes it remains a significant importer of precursor chemicals from other countries in the region.

The International Framework

The UN Drug Convention. The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Convention) is the legal framework for international cooperation to prevent precursor chemical diversion. Article 12 requires UN member states that are party to the Convention to monitor their international trade in the 30 chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the Convention. These chemicals have legitimate industrial uses, and the tables are updated when chemicals are brought under international control. Under the treaty, the INCB is responsible for monitoring governments' control over precursors used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, and to assist them in preventing the illicit diversion of those chemicals. State parties are required to share information with one another and with the INCB on their international transactions involving these chemicals to identify and prevent diversion for

illicit purposes. Article 12, Sections 8 and 9 of the Convention require licensing or similar control of all persons and enterprises involved in the manufacture and distribution of listed chemicals.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) is the treaty body designated in the international drug control framework with responsibility for deciding whether substances shall be included in the tables and is the entity within the UN system with primary responsibility for international drug control policy. Resolutions adopted by the CND provide additional guidance to state parties, including on best practices to implement their obligations.

In 2017, the CND voted to include two of the key precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl: 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), in Table I. This scheduling decision has reduced the ability of illicit drug manufacturers to obtain these chemicals. This in turn, however, has led some criminals to adjust production methods, including the use of alternative chemicals more widely available for commercial purposes and not controlled under the UN system. Illicit drug manufacturers have also turned increasingly to the use of so-called “pre-precursors” and “designer” precursors (chemicals intentionally produced to use in manufacturing scheduled precursors), using more advanced processing techniques. The INCB has identified these trends as major concerns.

In 2022, the CND decided to add six substances to international control under the 1988 Drug Convention, including three fentanyl precursor chemicals (4-AP, boc-4-AP, and norfentanyl) requested for international control by the United States, extending the scope of control outlined in the Convention to those substances.

International Narcotics Control Board. The INCB is an independent, treaty-based body responsible for assisting states in their efforts to achieve the aims of the three UN drug control treaties. Under the Convention, the INCB has a special responsibility to monitor governments' control over precursors used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, and to assist them in preventing the illicit diversion of those chemicals. State parties are required to share information with one another and with the INCB on their international transactions involving these chemicals to identify and prevent diversion for illicit purposes. Article 12, Sections 8 and 9 of the Convention require licensing or similar control of all persons and enterprises involved in the manufacture and distribution of listed chemicals.

The INCB plays a critical role in preventing the illicit diversion of precursor chemicals. Under the Convention, the INCB is specifically responsible for assessing precursors and making recommendations on monitoring measures to the CND. The Board's assessment as to scientific matters is determinative, but the CND considers other relevant factors in deciding appropriate measures to adopt. Decisions of the CND are binding on parties to the Convention, which, with 191 parties, is nearly universal in its application. The United States provides funding to the INCB to monitor the measures called for in the UN conventions, and to improve detection and tracking of chemicals subject to diversion. Most recently, the United States has provided funding to support the Global Rapid Response to Dangerous Substances (GRIDS) Programme,

which uses real-time platforms to exchange operational information as well as providing practical tools to enhance international cooperation on NPS.

The INCB has implemented several instruments to address the challenges of precursor chemicals:

- The Pre-Export Notification Online system (PEN Online) is an online database system that enables the exchange of information between member states on the import and export of chemicals required for the manufacture of illicit drugs. It is the only global system for monitoring international legitimate trade in precursor chemicals controlled under the Convention and provides importing state authorities with an early alert system to verify the legitimacy of pre-export chemical shipments. Using data conveyed by PEN Online, authorities may stop suspect shipments, or, in some cases, arrange controlled deliveries. Since the PEN Online system was first launched in March 2006, 169 governments have registered to use it. As of December 1, 2022, more than 32,000 pre-export notifications were submitted using the PEN Online system.
- The Pre-Export Notification Online Light system (PEN Online Light) is a new web-based tool that INCB launched on October 17, 2022. Similar to PEN Online, PEN Online Light enables exporting government authorities to exchange, on a voluntary basis, information about planned exports of drug precursors that are not under international control but may be nationally controlled in one or more countries due to their use in the illicit manufacture of drugs. This is expected to help address the growing problem of non-controlled and designer precursors that are being used in place of controlled chemicals in the illicit manufacture of drugs. All users of the PEN Online system automatically have access to PEN Online Light. During the first six weeks of operation of PEN Online Light, planned exports involving more than 500 tons of non-scheduled substances, predominantly GBL, acetic acid and ethyl acetate, have already been pre-notified.
- The Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS) is another INCB tool that facilitates real-time communication exchange among law enforcement officials worldwide. The secure online system supports intelligence sharing on seizure incidents and suspicious shipments involving precursor chemicals (including clandestine laboratories) as well as drug manufacturing equipment. Additionally, it facilitates direct coordination and collaboration among national authorities to advance investigations on chemical trafficking. PICS also provides authorities with information on newly emerging precursors. Preliminary data indicate that more than 220 “incidents” that occurred in 2022 were communicated through PICS. Those incidents involved 30 different countries and territories. As of December 1, 2022, there were a total of more than 3,800 incidents communicated through PICS since its launch. The system has more than 600 registered users from 127 countries and territories, representing more than 300 agencies.
- The International Special Surveillance List (ISSL) is an INCB mechanism that tracks chemicals not regulated by the Convention but for which substantial evidence exists of their use in illicit drug manufacture. The CND has urged governments to make wider use of ISSL

and take voluntary measures to apply greater oversight of the supply chain of chemicals listed by it.

- In 2021, the INCB hosted expert and Member State consultations to develop a list of options for global action that governments can use to address the challenge of non-scheduled chemicals and designer precursors used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. The paper includes recommendations for action including legislative measures, investigative tools, and industry engagement. This initiative builds on a conference room paper submitted by the INCB to the CND in 2020, titled “Options to address the proliferation of non-scheduled chemicals, including designer precursors – contribution to a wider policy dialogue.”

In addition to PEN Online, PICS, and ISSL, the INCB coordinates multinational law enforcement task forces to monitor and intercept diverted chemicals used to illicitly manufacture drugs, specifically synthetic drugs (Project Prism), heroin and cocaine (Project Cohesion), and NPS (Project Ion). These mechanisms facilitate coordination between international law enforcement authorities for coordinating targeted, time-bound intelligence-gathering operations.

Regional Bodies. The regulatory framework codified by the UN operates in concert with regional bodies, such as the European Union and the Organization of American States (OAS), which partner with the United States on multilateral chemical control initiatives, including the implementation of CND resolutions. The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and its Group of Experts on Chemical Substances and Pharmaceutical Products works to advance voluntary cooperation to prevent the diversion and criminal misuse of non-controlled chemicals. Its model guidelines, published in 2019, serve as a regional roadmap for addressing such diversion.

Major Chemical Source Countries and Territories

Belgium

Belgian laws regulate the production and use of many chemicals required for illegal drug production, effectively limiting the production of chemical precursors to synthetic drugs by Belgium’s robust chemical industry. Belgium controls all substances listed in the Drug Convention and has imposed controls on additional substances listed in European Union regulations. Belgium enforces strong reporting requirements for the import and export of precursor chemicals (for example, bulk pseudoephedrine/ephedrine, safrole oil, acetic anhydride, and benzyl methyl ketone), although according to Belgian authorities, importers sometimes get around these restrictions with creative labelling. The Belgian Federal Police and Belgian Customs & Excise have the lead roles in enforcing these controls. Shipments of pharmaceutical medications are controlled on a regulatory level by the Belgian Ministry of Safety and Public Health.

Belgium has traditionally served as a transit point for precursor chemicals from China and India that are destined for clandestine synthetic drug laboratories in the Netherlands and elsewhere, while some of those chemicals are also distributed to labs in Belgium. Belgian authorities

readily admit that, due to the huge influx of cocaine through the Port of Antwerp, the targeting and interdiction of precursor chemicals has not been a priority in recent years.

Belize

According to the Belize National Forensics Science Lab, the government has not identified a significant amount or increase in precursor chemicals in the country in 2022. In 2020, the “Misuse of Drugs Act” was amended to include precursor chemicals, including fentanyl, and in 2021, the United States participated in a Belize Pharmaceutical Task Force meeting to assist Belize to revise the “Precursor Control Bill,” which would allow an increase in the scope of precursor investigations. The bill has not moved forward to date. In 2022, U.S. government agencies supported an educational workshop on the identification of precursor chemicals for Belize government officials.

Bolivia

Bolivia’s government passed a Controlled Substances Law in March 2017 that regulates precursor chemicals in coordination with the INCB. Precursor chemicals continue to be diverted through black market channels into Bolivia for processing cocaine. According to the Chemical Substances Investigations Group (GISUQ) of the Bolivian counterdrug police (FELCN), most of these chemicals come from Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.

The most common chemicals seized match those commonly found in field labs (where base paste is prepared) and cocaine labs (where base paste is transformed into cocaine). The number of labs within Bolivia that process Peruvian and Bolivian base paste into cocaine has significantly increased over the last 10 years. The most common chemicals found in cocaine factories and labs are sulfuric acid; hydrochloric acid; sodium carbonate; caustic soda; potassium permanganate and ethyl ether; phenacetin; sodium metabisulfite; activated carbon; ethyl acetate; and levamisole. The last five products were added to the list as controlled substances under Bolivian law in 2019, and GISUQ believes they are alternative chemicals that drug producers use to avoid law enforcement controls. No additional products have been added to the list since 2019. Cocaine producers are also known to use activated carbon to deodorize and discolor water and other liquids, and phenacetin, a highly toxic analgesic, to increase the volume of cocaine.

The GISUQ is charged with locating and interdicting chemicals used in the cocaine process, such as sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid, and gasoline. The GISUQ coordinates activities with the Special Force for the Fight against Narcotics Trafficking and the Vice Minister of Social Defense and Controlled Substances, which administers and licenses the commercialization and transport of controlled substances listed under Bolivian domestic law. The 2017 Controlled Substances Law indicates that violation of controlled substances could result in penal action against all participants and provides the legal framework for GISUQ, in coordination with other agencies, to add or eliminate chemical substances controlled under Bolivian law.

The Bolivian government does not have control regimes for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. The GISUQ, however, coordinates with the Ministry of Health to supervise and interdict illegal commercialization of methamphetamine. In September 2016, the Ministry of Health created the

State Agency of Medicines and Health Technologies to regulate the use and commercialization of synthetic drugs.

As of September 25, 2022, the GISUQ seized 716 metric tons of solid substances and 436,970 liters of liquid precursor chemicals, an increase of 48 percent and decrease of 39 percent respectively, compared to the first 9 months of 2021.

Brazil

Brazil is one of the world's top ten chemical producing countries. Brazil licenses, controls, and inspects precursor chemicals, including potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride, in conformity with its obligations under the Drug Convention. The Brazilian Federal Police (PF) Chemical Division controls and monitors 146 chemical products in conjunction with 27 PF regional divisions and 97 resident offices. The Chemical Division is composed of two units: the Chemical Control Division, subordinate to the PF Executive Directorate, and the Criminal Diversion Investigations unit under the Organized Crime Division. Both divisions routinely coordinate and share information when conducting administrative inspections and criminal investigations.

The Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency oversees precursor chemicals used in the pharmaceutical industry, including 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP), which are on the list of controlled chemical substances, but are not banned. Regulatory guidelines require chemical handlers to be registered and licensed to conduct activities such as manufacturing, importing, exporting, storing, transporting, commercializing, and distributing chemicals. The PF uses a national computerized system of chemical control to monitor all chemical movements in the country, which requires all companies to register all precursor chemical activity, including monthly reports for all chemical related movements and existing chemical inventories.

Brazil reports to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) its annual estimates of legitimate requirements for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for quantities above 10 grams, and P-2-P in any amount using the INCB's Pre-Export Notification Online system. The PF routinely uses PEN Online in cases of international trade and in coordination with UN member states to alert importing countries with details of an export transaction.

Burma

While Burma's political instability, increased conflict, porous borders, and the COVID-19 pandemic have made it difficult to accurately quantify, there was evidence Burma's illicit production and export of synthetic drugs continued increasing in 2022. In May, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported that methamphetamine production has reached a peak of over one billion tablets in 2021 in the Golden Triangle area, with the borders along Burma, Laos, and Thailand cited as major production areas.

Burma does not have a major chemical industry, and does not manufacture ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or other precursors used in synthetic drug manufacturing. The Supervision

Committee for the Control of Precursor Chemicals, which functions under Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, monitors the possession, use, sale, production, and transportation of chemical precursors. Burma is a party to the Drug Convention but has not instituted laws to meet all UN chemical control provisions. Burma officially monitors the sale or import of 38 identified precursor chemicals. Importers of licit chemicals must use the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control pre-import notification system. Retailers must apply to the Committee for approval to transport chemicals across and within Burma. Authorities face challenges in controlling illicit import and diversion of precursor chemicals, including sophisticated trafficking networks, porous borders, corruption, and conflict areas.

Burma has deployed interdiction equipment to several major checkpoints. The regime's Police Force, Drug Enforcement Division, reported major precursor seizures from January to December 2022, including 15,400kilos sodium cyanide, 567,201 kilos ammonium nitrate, 9,036 caffeine tablets, 1,260 kilos methanol, and 3,120 kilos ethyl acetate, among others.

The United States funds the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen response to precursor chemicals diversion and trafficking. The United States also supports efforts to establish a coordinated, regional response to precursor chemical diversion and trafficking that include Burma.

Canada

Canada maintains strong legislative and regulatory controls over its large chemical industry. Nevertheless, the diversion of chemicals by organized criminal groups for the purpose of illicit drug production remains a problem. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police set up a National Chemical Precursor Diversion Program to address the issue. In addition, Canada's Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), Narcotics Control Regulations (NCR), and Precursor Control Regulations (PCR) provide a legislative framework for the control of substances and chemical precursors. Health Canada submits an annual report to the INCB with respect to its obligations under the Drug Convention.

The scheduling of precursors under the CDSA provides law enforcement agencies with the authority to act against illicit activities. The PCR authorizes Health Canada to communicate information collected to law enforcement agencies, border control officers, foreign competent authorities, and the INCB. Regulatory amendments made to the NCR and PCR in May 2019 gave the government greater control over precursor chemicals, derivatives, analogues, and salts of derivatives and analogues, to help combat the illegal production and distribution of fentanyl and amphetamines. In August, Canada amended Schedule V of the CDSA to add the analogues and derivatives of the fentanyl precursor N-Phenyl-4-piperidinamine and its salts.

China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has implemented a licensing regime for the production, sale, and transport of drug precursor chemicals. PRC oversight functions are poorly staffed and under-resourced to oversee its massive chemical industry, which includes at least 160,000 chemical companies, allowing drug trafficking organizations to directly source or divert

chemicals from the PRC to facilitate drug production in Mexico, Canada, Europe, Australia, and Southeast Asia. The National Narcotics Control Commission has primary responsibility for drug precursor chemical control. The PRC maintains a list of controlled precursor chemicals called the “Catalogue of Precursor Chemicals,” which currently includes 32 drug precursor chemicals. This catalogue includes potassium permanganate (a precursor for cocaine), acetic anhydride (heroin), and ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (methamphetamine).

U.S. law enforcement recognizes the diversion of PRC-produced drug precursors to illicit manufacture as a significant problem, reporting that the most common diversion tactic is the intentional mislabeling of shipments containing precursors. Perpetrators caught mislabeling precursor shipments often face only civil penalties and small fines rather than criminal charges. The challenge of preventing precursor diversion is further exacerbated by the PRC’s unwillingness to effectively screen the high volume of goods being exported via land, air, and sea. Traffickers also skirt chemical control laws by selling and distributing chemicals that are not yet regulated by the PRC but are chemical avenues to the production of fentanyl and methamphetamine, including on e-commerce platforms. Many PRC-based traffickers have shifted to sending non-controlled chemicals to Mexico that are one step earlier in the chemical process for making fentanyl, so-called “indirect precursors” or “pre-precursors.”

The PRC in 2018 controlled 32 new substances, and in 2019 controlled fentanyl as a class. In March 2022, the PRC voted to schedule 4-AP, in addition to t-boc-4-AP, Norfentanyl, and Methlamine at the CND in Vienna.

Individuals are not often prosecuted in the PRC for the manufacture of controlled substances, since once a substance is controlled, the market quickly adjusts to manufacture and sell non-controlled ingredients for synthetic drugs to avoid harsh legal penalties associated with drug trafficking (that include capital punishment). The PRC has not taken effective measures to combat mislabeling used to traffic synthetic opioid precursors, implemented “Know Your Customer” regulations on chemical shipments, or regulated pill presses manufactured in the PRC that continue to fuel the United States’ domestic opioid crisis.

Colombia

Diversion of precursor chemicals is a serious problem in Colombia that the government is working to address. The Colombian government has tightened controls on coca processing chemicals, though traffickers are able to import them illicitly into Colombia and have built illicit labs to produce some precursors. Seizures increased during the first nine months of 2022, when the police and military forces seized 25,284 metric tons (MT) of solid precursors and 4,829,236 gallons of liquid precursors. This represents a 9.9 percent increase in solid precursors and 5.5 percent increase for liquid precursors as compared to the same period in 2021.

The Colombian government controls the import and distribution of chemicals needed for processing coca leaves into cocaine, such as fuel and lubricants 2,727,172, acetone 252,841, sulfuric acid 69,364 gallons seized during the first nine months of 2022), hydrochloric acid (21,304 gallons seized during the same period), sodium hydroxide (129 MT), potassium permanganate (85 MT seized during the same period), and cement (24,908 MT seized during the

same period). The government limits production, distribution, and storage of precursors nationwide and prohibits gasoline and other chemicals in certain zones. Additionally, Colombian companies are not authorized to export ephedrine or pseudoephedrine in bulk form. Colombian law bans the domestic distribution of all pharmaceutical products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine.

Since 2015, the government has regulated precursor chemicals used for drug production and expanded its enforcement efforts related to these chemicals. In 2015, the government began implementing the Information System for the Control of Substances and Chemical Products (SICOQ), a real time tracking tool that the police and the Ministry of Justice developed to strengthen the control of chemicals and has trained companies in the correct use of chemicals to avoid diversion. As of September 2022, more than 3,971 new companies were registered in the SICOQ platform, and 3,728 of those registered companies had valid government-issued authorizations for the legal use of controlled substances and chemical products.

While the Colombian government has strengthened chemical control legislation, traffickers are able to import precursors clandestinely into Colombia. Although chemical companies require government permission to import or export specific chemicals and controlled substances, the police must prove seized chemicals were intended for illicit drug production. Further, to bring U.S. charges against an illicit chemical trafficker, the police must prove that the trafficker had knowledge that the chemicals seized were going to produce drugs that would end up in the United States. Additionally, traffickers and clandestine laboratories recycle controlled chemicals and are increasingly able to replace controlled chemicals with non-controlled chemicals.

Currently, through the Resolution 0001 of the 2015 National Narcotics Council, the use of 33 chemical substances is controlled in illicit drug production. As of September 30, 2022, a total of 1,401 certificates “Certificado de Carencia de Informes por Tráfico de Estupefacientes” (CCITE) have been issued with 1,146 certificates for agents in the fuel chain, for a total of 2,547 certificates.

Based on the 2022 Resolution 002, the National Narcotics Council will approve general instructions for the administration of seized chemical substances.

The police created a special unit tasked with the interdiction of precursor chemicals. The Colombian Marines increased efforts against precursor chemicals transported via rivers by better covering riverine chokepoints - areas through which traffickers must cross to move controlled chemicals. The United States supports a dedicated enforcement group and a special investigations unit within the police anti-narcotics directorate focused on targeting the criminal organizations involved in supplying chemicals to cocaine labs. Special agents, intelligence analysts, and their Colombian counterparts work in concert with colleagues in Ecuador to interdict these chemicals in transit, thereby denying trafficking organizations, heavily armed criminal groups, and terrorist organizations the financial resources needed to expand, purchase illegal weapons, and commit attacks against the Colombian government and civilians.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica has a stringent licensing process for the importation and distribution of precursor chemicals. In 2010 it also adopted recommendations from the INCB. Costa Rica has controls for Table I and Table II precursor and essential chemicals as defined by the Drug Convention.

The Government of Costa Rica's National Drug Plan for 2020-2024 notes the international problem of production and trafficking of chemical precursors. Costa Rica has yet to seize large amounts of chemicals compared to elsewhere in the region and has a low volume of imports. However, it has a robust registration process and is responsive to requests regarding suspicious shipments of precursors. The Costa Rican Drug Institute has a special unit dedicated to the control and regulation of precursor chemicals, and this unit has broad powers to monitor and respond to illegal activity.

By law, importers and businesses that handle chemical precursors or certain types of prescription drugs are required to submit monthly reports through an online tracking system. Between January and October 2022, there were 1,913 authorized import transactions, licensed to 261 registered importers of chemical precursors. The system tracks the movement of chemical precursors and solvents and generates alerts. Costa Rica did not receive any alerts during that period related to possible irregular import activity.

Ecuador

Ecuadorian law designates potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride as controlled chemicals. Buying, selling, or importing such chemicals requires the permission of the Ministry of Interior, the primary agency responsible for precursor chemical control in Ecuador. Article 219 of the Criminal Code prohibits the use of precursor chemicals to produce, manufacture, or prepare illicit materials, such as cocaine or heroin, punishable by three to five years in prison.

The police National Chemical Unit enforces the laws that govern the importation of listed chemicals as well as targets organizations diverting these chemicals to criminal organizations through investigations and intelligence operations. Although the National Chemical Unit is a highly competent entity, its small size and lack of resources hinders its ability to tackle the problem on a large scale.

Ecuador has been importing large quantities of potassium permanganate for at least the past decade. According to the Ministry of Interior, during the first nine months of 2022, Ecuador imported 38 MT of potassium permanganate, compared to 76 MT during the same period in 2021. Potassium permanganate is a controlled chemical requiring an import license for import into the country. Most imports of potassium permanganate in 2022 originated from China. During the first nine months of 2022, Ecuador imported 40 MT of acetic anhydride (most originating from Mexico), compared to 60 MT imported in 2021. Traffickers also continue to smuggle liquid chemicals, including ether, from Ecuador to Colombia and Peru for cocaine processing. Ecuador destroyed 58 MT of precursor chemicals in 2022.

El Salvador

In 1998, El Salvador regulated psychotropic drugs and other precursor chemicals. The Government of El Salvador established regulations for all controlled substances entering El Salvador. In 2003, to enhance the previous laws, additional regulations for psychotropic drugs and precursor chemicals were issued. The additions included descriptions of all illegal drugs and all institutions involved in preventing the use, distribution, and prosecution of drug related crimes. The laws indicated that within the first two months of every year, the National Medicine Directorate would publish a list of medications and controlled substances in El Salvador. The list published on February 3, 2022 includes 156 narcotics, 172 psychotropic drugs, 103 precursor chemicals, and 76 substances related to fentanyl with no legitimate use.

Pseudoephedrine has been prohibited in El Salvador since 2009. It cannot be imported or exported without prior approval and authorization from National Medication Direction. Pharmacies that want to import or export precursor chemicals or other controlled substances need authorization from the National Medication Directorate. Each business is required to submit an estimate of what they will import throughout a year and keep records of the controlled substances they have on hand. All controlled substances must be prescribed by authorized medical professionals.

The United States is working with Salvadoran authorities to provide training on precursor chemical identification, regulation, destruction, diversion, and safety. This includes an emphasis on monitoring importation through active ports in El Salvador.

Germany

Germany is the largest exporter in the world of legal pharmaceuticals by dollar value and among the top five largest exporters of chemicals. As such, German chemical and pharmaceutical industries manufacture and/or sell the majority of the 33 scheduled substances under international control as listed in Tables I and II of the Drug Convention, as well as other chemicals that can be used for the illicit production of narcotic drugs.

According to Germany's most recent Form D submission to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which is based on export authorizations issued and quantities notified to the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices by customs authorities, Germany exported 4.6 metric tons (MT) of ephedrine and 122.0 MT of pseudoephedrine in 2021. The total export share of pseudoephedrine to the United States in 2021 was 57.0 percent, up from 42.7 percent in 2018. The European Union (EU) and Germany have taken significant steps to implement the UN's 2017 decision to control the two primary chemicals used to produce illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues – 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP). They have also initiated the process to schedule NPP, tert-Butyl 4-(phenylamino) piperidine-1-carboxylate (1-boc-4-AP), and norfentanyl into their drug precursor legislation. Germany has also taken strong measures to control the export of potassium permanganate (40.8 MT) and acetic anhydride (295.2 MT).

Germany's National Precursor Monitoring Act complies with EU regulations, including Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 on trade in drug precursors between EU and third countries and Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 on trade in drug precursors within the EU. Germany's highly developed chemical sector is tightly controlled through a combination of national and EU regulations, law enforcement action, and voluntary industry compliance. Cooperation among chemical and pharmaceutical producers, vendors, and German authorities is a key element in Germany's chemical control strategy. Germany works closely with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and is an active participant in chemical control initiatives led by the INCB, including Project Prism and Project Cohesion. U.S. authorities work closely with Germany's chemical regulatory agency, the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices, on chemical control issues and exchanges bilateral information to promote transnational chemical control initiatives. German Ministry of Health officials note measures against the diversion and illegal trafficking of drug precursors continue to be an important part of EU and national German drug policies. To this end, German authorities work closely with chemical and pharmaceutical producers, vendors, the competent authorities of other countries and agencies, such as U.S. counterparts and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Guatemala

Guatemala is a party to the Drug Convention. In October 2022, the country passed legislation to update its national list of controlled substances, as determined by the INCB, for the first time since 2010. Under Guatemalan law, the Ministry of Public Health is responsible for authorizing all imports, exports, and end use oversight of precursor chemicals. The Ministry neither has the personnel and resources to effectively monitor this traffic, nor does it operate a digital database to track and register shipments and share this information with other institutions, such as customs (SAT) or police.

A U.S.-led analysis on precursor chemical controls, conducted with UNODC and with the permission of the Ministry of Health, determined several areas for Guatemala to improve oversight on precursor chemicals, including: updating the list of controlled precursor chemicals; improving interinstitutional coordination with customs, police, justice, and other government agencies; developing software for tracking precursor chemical movements; and filling or increasing staffing at key positions within the Ministry of Health.

In the first nine months of the year, Guatemala authorities seized small amounts of methamphetamines (2.51 kilograms) and had no recorded seizures of ephedrine. According to Ministry of Public Health records, 510 grams of fentanyl were legally imported into the country, as well as 3,151 kg of potassium permanganate. The Ministry of Public Health reported no imports of acetic anhydride or imports of the fentanyl precursor chemicals ANPP (4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine) and NPP (N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone).

The Ministry of Government oversees the destruction of seized chemical precursors under the supervision of the Public Ministry. In July, the country completed removal and cleanup of the last remote storage area for precursor chemicals, culminating over two years of effort to transport over 2,000 metric tons of chemicals to a safe and secure storage facility. In the first nine months of the year, Guatemala recorded over 1,000 metric tons of precursor chemicals destroyed; a new

annual record. As a result, Guatemala is on course to eliminate its remaining stockpile of seized chemicals, once estimated at over 3,500 metric tons, by 2023. A U.S.-donated chemical incinerator was critical to this success. Guatemala also participated in regional and bilateral training with the UNODC, with an emphasis on safe handling and disposal of precursor chemicals.

Honduras

Precursor chemical diversion continues to be a problem in Honduras. Honduras has an active commercial sector involved in the manufacture and sale of common legitimate chemicals. The United States provides training and other assistance to strengthen Honduran institutions responsible for controlling precursor chemicals. However, Honduras does not have an incinerator or a way to dispose of seized chemicals. Moreover, Honduran authorities have limited capacity to detect and identify precursor chemicals, and information sharing between government institutions regarding synthetic drug and precursor chemical trafficking is challenging. The responsibility for the control of precursor chemicals is spread over seven Honduran government agencies that rarely communicate. The primary body tasked with coordinating the work of these agencies, Interagency Technical Board on Chemical Precursors Supply Reduction, has not made significant efforts to enhance precursor seizures or controls. In addition, a lack of proper testing equipment, especially in the largest container port of Puerto Cortes, results in delays that can prevent detainment of a container or other cargo under Honduran customs laws.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong is neither a drug manufacturing nor chemical producing economy. With well-developed logistics connectivity to mainland China, and one of the world's largest precursor chemical exporters, Hong Kong's chemical trade is mostly in the form of imports for consolidation and subsequent re-export or transshipments, or for local consumption for medical and industrial uses. In 2020, the most recent year for which data is available, controlled chemical imports totaled approximately 10,804,989 kilograms, with approximately 1,277,656 kilograms re-exported.

The Control of Chemicals (COC) Ordinance, in effect since 1996, is Hong Kong's basic legislation for regulating possession, manufacture, transport, and distribution of designated controlled chemicals. In June 2021, the COC Order 2021 added methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA) to Schedule 2 of the COC (Cap. 145), while the Hong Kong Dangerous Drugs Ordinance (DDO) Order 2021 added 4F MDMB-BINACA, 5F-AMB-PINACA, 5F-MDMB-PICA, crotonylfentanyl, etizolam, flualprazolam, mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine to the First Schedule of the DDO (Cap. 134). In June 2022, Hong Kong Security Bureau Narcotic Division submitted a legislative proposal to ban cannabidiol (CBD) in Hong Kong by adding the substance to the First Schedule of the DDO. The proposed legislation will prohibit the manufacture, import, export, supply, sale, possession, and transshipment of any products containing CBD in the city, regardless of amount. On October 20, the Hong Kong government announced that the CBD legislation will take effect in February 2023.

The COC Ordinance, which establishes a licensing regime over importers, exporters, dealers, traders, manufacturers, and handlers of the designated chemicals, applies equally to imports, exports, and transshipments. Permits for every shipment are mandatory. Government approval for all premises and containers used to store such chemicals is also mandatory. The maximum penalty for illicit chemical trafficking is imprisonment for fifteen years and a fine of \$130,000. The Controlled Chemicals Group (CCG) of the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department's Drug Investigations Bureau administers and enforces the Ordinance.

Permit applications to handle controlled chemicals, including those for the partial removal of chemicals while in transit, must be received by the CCG at least 10 days before the proposed date of activity. The CCG uses this interim period to establish the bona fides of a proposed shipment, including through coordination with foreign counterparts via the Pre-Export Notification System. Export permits are only issued upon receipt of "No Objection" letters from competent authorities in importing jurisdictions. While Hong Kong does not control sales of over-the-counter medicines containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, the CCG does investigate reports of possible diversion or parallel trading involving those substances.

Hong Kong supports international efforts to prevent precursor chemical diversion through a combination of effective legislation, strong law enforcement, and close collaboration with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND). The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance (Cap. 525), the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503) and the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance (Cap. 405), are three important provisions which provide a legal framework for Hong Kong to pursue drug offenders and confiscate their proceeds at the international level and keep Hong Kong's anti-drug work in step with current international standards.

India

The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) is responsible for issuing licenses for the manufacture of synthetic narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances listed in the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), as well as import/export authorizations for the cross-border movement of precursor chemicals and pharmaceutical drugs. The CBN is the central agency authorized to interact with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and foreign governments in supervising international transactions of regulated substances.

India's NDPS provides the legislative framework to implement precursor chemical control obligations required by the Drug Convention and Article 47 of India's Constitution. The Act codifies the regulation of the manufacture of finished pharmaceutical products and chemicals used in the production of those products. India regulates 19 of 30 precursor substances scheduled in Tables I and II of the Drug Convention. Of those 19 substances, five are subject to the most stringent controls, including acetic anhydride, ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, nacetylanthranilic acid, and anthranilic acid.

In 2018, India added anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP) as controlled substances subject to export controls and added tramadol to the NDPS schedules, which requires approvals from multiple ministries and Parliament. Potassium

permanganate can be exported and imported with a certificate issued by the Narcotics Commissioner of India, under the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT). India participates in international precursor control initiatives such as the INCB-led Project Cohesion and Project Prism. Diversion of precursor chemicals such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine from licit producers to illicit brokers remains a regulatory and law enforcement challenge.

Although the NDPS Act allows India to use emergency scheduling, regulators have not exercised this authority. The NDPS Act does not define controlled substance analogues and does not include controls for related equipment. All manufacturing equipment is required to comply with regulations in Schedule M, “Good Manufacturing Practices and Requirements of Premises, Plant, And Equipment for Pharmaceutical Products” of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945.

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea’s industrial capabilities and position as a global logistics hub make it attractive to criminals seeking to obtain and transship precursor chemicals. Precursor chemicals used for the manufacture of illicit drugs, such as acetic anhydride, pseudoephedrine, and ephedrine, are likely imported from the United States, Japan, India, and China and then either resold within South Korea or smuggled into other countries. In 2021, South Korea imported approximately 3.5 metric tons (MT) of ephedrine and 11.7 MT of pseudoephedrine. While acetic anhydride remains the chemical of greatest concern, there are increasing concerns about the use of legal and less monitored chemicals, such as sodium cyanide, to evade authorities and produce illicit drugs such as methamphetamine. South Korea imports acetic anhydride for legitimate use, such as film production, cigarette filters, and other industrial and medical uses. South Korea placed 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP) under regulatory control after the UN’s 2017 decision to control these precursors.

South Korea’s efforts to control diversion of regulated chemical precursors are largely effective. Both the Korea Customs Service and Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) cooperate with the United States and other international bodies to monitor imports of potassium permanganate and chemicals used to produce amphetamine-type stimulants, and South Korean authorities participate in International Narcotics Control Board-coordinated monitoring and regulating taskforces, including projects Cohesion and Prism, etc. South Korean law enforcement authorities also cooperate with Southeast Asian nations to verify documents and confirm the identities of importing businesses, including by on-site inspection.

The MFDS is responsible for enforcing a 2011 law requiring manufacturers, importers, and exporters of precursor chemicals to register with the government and renew registration every two years. It also provides training and updates to South Korean businesses to keep them from unknowingly exporting precursor chemicals to fraudulent importers. Smugglers exploit South Korean customs and chemical regulations to hide precursor chemical shipments in containerized cargo shipments. Current regulations, which have different reporting thresholds for different chemicals, could allow smugglers to purchase multiple small quantities from different retail outlets to avoid detection, then combine them for shipment. South Korean authorities work closely with U.S. counterparts to track suspect shipments.

Mexico

The Mexican Federal Commission for the Protection Against Sanitary Risk is responsible for regulating many chemicals required for illicit drug production. It works with the National Guard, Customs, and the Attorney General's Office (FGR) to enforce the law. Mexico controls all but six chemicals listed in the 1988 Drug Convention: norfentanyl, boc-4-AP, PMK glycinate, PMK glycidic acid, APAA, and MAPA. Government agencies continue to authorize permits and monitor the importation of controlled precursor chemicals, but this has not significantly deterred local production of synthetic drugs. Mexico regulates both potassium permanganate (cocaine precursor) and acetic anhydride (heroin precursor).

Mexico controls six fentanyl precursor chemicals: 4-anilinopiperidine (4-AP), 4-AP dihydrochloride, propionic anhydride, propionyl chloride, N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), and 4-anilino-N-phenethyl-4-piperidine (ANPP). In 2021, Mexico published a chemical watchlist to flag dual-use chemicals to government and private sector entities. In April 2022, Mexico expanded its chemical watchlist from 14 to 69 (15 fentanyl precursors, 28 methamphetamine precursors, and 26 essential chemicals - the Mexican government controls 69 chemicals on its watchlist, however, some government reports cite 72 chemicals). These controls force transnational criminal organizations to conceal shipments or seek chemical alternatives and provide regulatory and law enforcement agencies a legal basis to seize these substances and file criminal or civil charges.

The United States and Mexico cooperate closely on synthetic drugs to reduce the supply of illicit opioids in the United States. The United States sponsors training and conferences to promote awareness of synthetic drugs and seizure trends, and it supports forensic chemistry labs to improve their investigation of crimes involving synthetic opioids. The United States assists COFEPRIS in processing and issuing electronic permits and tracking the international import and export of precursor chemicals through the National Drug System (NDS). Despite controls, TCOs stay ahead of scheduling laws by using pre-precursors and easily available, off-the-shelf products to synthesize precursors and avoid existing regulations.

Mexico continued to target suspected fentanyl labs, facilities producing fentanyl-laced counterfeit pills ("pill mills"), and fentanyl in transit in 2022. The United States is working with FGR and other agencies, including military units who perform counternarcotics work, to create judicial records of seizures and establish protocols for reporting to a central database.

The Netherlands

The government has identified the chemicals industry as one of the Dutch economy's nine "top sectors," due to the industry's relative size, economic impact, and expertise. The government has placed significant regulation on this industry, including on precursor chemicals. Additional regulations are working through the Dutch parliament to further strengthen legal requirements and prosecutable offenses with respect to the handling of certain precursor chemicals. According to the National Police of the Netherlands, the number of synthetic drug labs has steadily increased from 59 in 2015 to 108 in 2020. China remains a significant source of precursor chemicals entering the Netherlands. The Dutch government cooperates closely with

U.S. authorities to track and disrupt the import of precursor chemicals. The ministries responsible for domestic narcotics issues include the Ministry of Justice and Security and the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport.

The Netherlands has strong legislation and regulatory controls over the industry through the Law for Prevention of the Misuse of Chemicals (WVMC). Law enforcement authorities track domestic shipments and work closely with international partners. The chemical industry is legally obliged to report suspicious transactions. The Financial Investigation Service (FIOD) oversees implementation of the WVMC and has responsibility for law enforcement efforts targeting precursors. Customs officials monitor the production, distribution, and trade of chemicals. The Netherlands has had a memorandum of understanding with China since 2004 concerning chemical precursor investigations. There are chemicals produced in the Netherlands that have both legitimate and illicit uses.

Fentanyl is a List I substance under the Netherlands Opium Act. The prohibition of substances lies with those that are specifically listed on the Opium Act and, as a result, analogues are not fully regulated. However, analogues will soon face regulation following the introduction of a New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) law, expected to come into force 2022. Both potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride are regulated under the WVMC, but the Opium Act can also be applied in the regulation of these substances when used to produce illegal narcotics.

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are not typically used for methamphetamine production in the Netherlands. Most methamphetamine is produced using the phenyl-2-propanone, aluminum, methylamine, and mercuric chloride (P2P) method, also known in the Netherlands as the benzyl methyl ketone (BMK) method. Producers in the Netherlands often use pre-precursors to manufacture P2P/BMK. The use of P2P/BMK precursors has evolved as restrictions have tightened, including transitions from alpha-phenoacetyl nitrile (APAAN) to alphaphenylacetoacetamide (APAA) and from methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA), to ethyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (EAPA).

Nigeria

The Directorate of Forensics and Chemical Monitoring within Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) works with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and in collaboration with the Nigerian National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC), which issues permits for precursor imports. NDLEA reports seizures of precursor chemicals to INCB. NDLEA did not seize any precursor chemicals at courier agency facilities in the first 10 months of 2022, though it did seize products made with precursor chemicals including designer tablets containing tramadol, tapentadol, methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and amphetamine through the course of investigations and enforcement operations. NDLEA did not detect any fentanyl in this reporting period, in part due to limited forensic capacity to detect fentanyl and other chemicals. However, the DEA-mentored Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and the NDLEA's Directorate of Intelligence have reported potential criminal activity to import and distribute fentanyl and other opioids. The NDLEA has implemented a communication plan with NAFDAC and does communicate regularly. A Memorandum of Understanding between NDLEA and NAFDAC is in the process of being drafted to formalize the interagency communication protocol.

Pakistan

Pakistan is a destination and transshipment point for diverted shipments of acetic anhydride (AA) and other precursor chemicals used in the production of heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants. Pakistan does not domestically produce industrial-scale quantities of AA or ephedrine, though it has chemical and pharmaceutical industries with a legitimate, albeit modest, production and demand for these substances.

Pakistan enforces a basic precursor control regime as part of its obligations under the Drug Convention, covering the import of seven multi-use chemicals: AA; pseudoephedrine; anthranilic acid; acetone; potassium permanganate; methyl-ethyl ketone; and toluene. The ANF manages precursor control largely by conducting in-person checks on importing businesses, licensing those businesses, and reviewing Pre-Export Notifications (PEN) of those requesting the sale of these substances within Pakistan. Between July 2021 and June 2022, ANF received 188 PENs, approving 175 and denying 13. ANF reported the seizure of 8,300 liters of precursor chemicals between July 2021 and June 2022. However, significant imports of precursor chemicals likely circumvent the PEN system via mislabeled shipping containers and by maritime smuggling along Pakistan's coastline.

In addition to the ANF, 32 federal and provincial agencies share responsibility for chemical control throughout the country. Per UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs Resolution 49/3, ANF established two review committees to manage the precursor control mechanism: the Committee for Granting Non-Objection Certificates to Companies and Firms for Use of Precursor Chemicals and the Committee for Quota Allocation to Pharmaceutical Companies. As of 2022, ANF continues to submit information via the International Narcotics Control Board Precursor Incident Communication System, which distributes real-time information on precursor seizures to law enforcement agencies worldwide.

Peru

Peru is a producer and major importer of chemicals essential to cocaine production. Reported seizures of precursor chemicals are up by 63 percent since last year. Peruvian authorities reported the seizure of 31,487 MT of precursor chemicals over the first nine months of 2022 in comparison with 19,845 MT seized in 2021.

Chemicals are generally imported legally into Peru by wholesalers, which smaller actors later divert for the illicit purpose of cocaine production. Peru's authority to regulate the precursor chemicals used in illicit drug production is based on Legislative Decree 1126 and the regulation set forth in Supreme Decree No. 268-2019-EF, which came into effect in January 2020. This decree establishes protocols, sanctions, and fines related to the misuse of chemicals. Additionally, Peru requires all chemical sector entities to obtain a license. As of 2020, Peru had issued approximately 18,000 licenses for the use of controlled chemicals in the country.

The National Superintendence of Tax Administration (SUNAT) is the regulatory agency handling all issues related to the chemical industry, but SUNAT has no law enforcement

authority and is limited to investigative activities. SUNAT coordinates with the PNP to combat the diversion of precursor chemicals.

The Ministry of Health produces official estimates of Peru's International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) licit demand for ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P). The Ministry does not have a regulatory or enforcement arm to prevent the diversion of chemicals. Peru classifies fentanyl as a highly controlled narcotic, and the Peruvian pharmaceutical agency (DIGIMED) authorizes all imports and exports, regularly audits its distribution and supply in the country, and establishes strict protocols for filling prescriptions. However, according to UNODC, Peru has not conducted any studies to determine levels of demand for or production of precursor chemicals in Peru.

The INCB reports Peru does not have strict controls to prevent the diversion of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and P-2-P. Indications suggest ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are entering the country in larger quantities than required by INCB assessments of legitimate commercial requirements. Peru participates in the INCB's pre-export notification system, though not always comprehensively. According to the INCB 2021 Annual Report, its most recent, Peruvian imports of potassium permanganate accounted for a very limited proportion (less than 1 percent) of the total amount imported. However, from 2011-2020 seizures of sodium hypochlorite (used in the manufacture of potassium permanganate) in Peru accounted for 41 percent of the total amount of sodium hypochlorite reported seized.

Poland

The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) identifies Poland as a drug transit country and producer of synthetic drugs for Western European markets, especially amphetamine and methamphetamine. Organized crime syndicates control drug manufacturing and distribution, using clandestine laboratories to keep ahead of legal changes.

The 2005 Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction prohibits production, import, and marketing of precursor chemicals in Poland; the State Sanitary Inspector heads enforcement. An October 26, 2011, Memorandum of Understanding between the Chief Sanitary Inspector, National Police Commander, Customs Service Chief, and Chief Pharmaceutical Inspector divides chemical control responsibility. Poland's laws on precursor chemical controls also implement United Nations and European Union mandates, including the Act of July 20, 2018, (amending the 2005 Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction and the Act on the State Sanitary Inspection) and the Health Minister's August 21, 2019, amended regulation on the list of psychotropic substances, intoxicants, and new psychoactive substances.

The State Sanitary Inspector and State Pharmaceutical Inspector lead in implementing drug and chemical controls. The Sanitary Inspector controls category 2 and 3 drug precursors (such as potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride) and supervises manufacturing, importation, and commercial entities that handle them. The State Pharmaceutical Inspector has the same responsibilities for category 1 drug precursors (such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine). In suspected cases of illegal precursor handling, Chief Inspectors notify the Central Bureau of Investigation Police (CBŚP). Poland has not reported any production of fentanyl analogs in its

territory. In 2015, the 2001 Pharmaceutical Law was amended to restrict sale of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals containing psychoactive substances (including pseudoephedrine). The law also requires any manufacturer, importer, or distributor of pharmaceutical substances to be licensed by the State Pharmaceutical Inspector in compliance with EU-Directive 2011/62/EU. Poland enters information into the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) Pre-Export Notification (PEN) system for all exports and imports of drug precursors.

Polish law enforcement, led by the CBSP and State Sanitary Service, focuses on prevention of illegal production of precursors and pre-precursors. In February 2020, CBSP seized approximately four tons of acetic anhydride (AA) from a warehouse in Lodz. According to the 2019 International Narcotics Control Board Annual Precursors Report, Poland investigated an authorized Polish precursor operator and found it had supplied 70 metric tons of AA to unauthorized companies across the EU between 2017 and 2018.

South Africa

South Africa is a leading regional importer of chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, particularly synthetic drugs. The South African Police Service (SAPS) has a trained, dedicated clandestine laboratory team, which operates under the South Africa Narcotics Enforcement Bureau (SANEB). Since 2018, South African authorities have arrested 1,305 suspects and secured 235 convictions for drug related offences. A total of approximately \$197 million of various drugs have been seized from clandestine laboratories, airports, oceans, land borders and roads in South Africa.

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine used in South Africa to synthesize methamphetamine largely originate in Nigeria and India. South African authorities periodically report newly identified precursor substances used in illicit drug production to the INCB. South Africa also submits information on seized precursor shipments to the INCB's Precursors Incident Communication System. Controlling and analyzing the trade of precursors is mandated by the South Africa National Drug Policy, which mandates the establishment of computerized inventory control systems for scheduled chemicals and regulating and monitoring the purchase of medicines containing precursors via a registry system. Such inventory and regulatory measures have not been fully implemented, however.

U.S. law enforcement collaboration with South Africa on investigations is productive but sporadic, and U.S. authorities regularly share information on container shipments suspected of containing possible illicit materials with South African counterparts.

Taiwan

During the first eight months of 2022, Taiwan had no exports of pseudoephedrine and its derivative salts, as was the case in the same period in 2021. Taiwan also had no exports of ephedrine or its derivative salts during the first eight months of 2022.

There is only one company in Taiwan producing pseudoephedrine because the production of pseudoephedrine is considered a heavy and highly polluting industry. The company has

suspended production of pseudoephedrine for more than a year. The suspension was an internal decision and took into account that foreign orders for pseudoephedrine were low. The company told the Taiwan Food and Drug Administration (TFDA) that they plan to resume production of pseudoephedrine once they request and receive approval from the TFDA drug division. TFDA has no recent control measures in place restricting the production of pseudoephedrine.

The Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA)'s Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) continues to impose strict reporting requirements in tracking the production, distribution, sale, storage, and export/import of 25 precursor chemicals including acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate. As amphetamine-type stimulants and ketamine are more prevalent among illicit drug users in Taiwan, there are few cases involving the use of precursor chemicals such as acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate for heroin and cocaine production. Based on the latest available data, at the end of the second quarter of 2022, approximately 930 companies had reported Category A chemical-related activities. IDB maintains a secure database, "Precursors Info Taiwan," where companies are required to self-report chemical-related activity online. Taiwan Customs data showed that as of August 2022, 125 Taiwan companies reported trading activities of Category B chemicals.

The TFDA, through the Controlled Drugs Act, supervises the trade and use of finished products for pharmaceutical and scientific purposes containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and other chemicals, including by end users such as hospitals. In 2021 (latest data available), TFDA inspected 8,018 cases involving the manufacture, sale, and use of drugs subject to the Controlled Drugs Act and found 265 violations, primarily due to administrative errors or failure to timely report the balance of receipts and expenditures of these controlled substances. The violation ratio was 3.31 percent.

Thailand

Thailand's domestic drug production is relatively limited, and it is not a major source country for drug precursor chemicals. Thailand remains a significant transit country and, to a lesser extent, source country for precursor chemicals. Thai authorities assert that most chemicals are imported for legitimate medical or industrial purposes; in reality, however, the true quantity of diverted chemicals is unknown. For exports, Thai chemical companies sometimes do not adequately identify their potential customers and may not be fully aware of the chemical's intended use.

The legal and regulatory framework for preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals is extensive and long-standing, beginning with the Commodity Control Act of 1952. In 2016, Thailand introduced new regulations (Order of the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order 32/2599, 2016) to monitor the import, export, production, trafficking, and possession of precursors. Pre-export notification is conducted to mitigate diversion. The Precursor Chemical Control Committee, which has been in place since 1993, formulates national strategy on precursor chemical control. Thailand has scheduled all chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Drug Convention, in addition to 20 other precursor chemicals not included under the Convention.

During the first nine months of 2022, the only precursor chemical seizure was one seizure of 400 kilograms of caffeine, an additive for methamphetamine tablets, in Sukhothai Province in 2022.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE government oversees the import and export of all internationally recognized chemicals through the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health and Prevention, and customs officials operating under the Federal Authority for Identity, Citizenship, Customs and Ports Security. Federal Decree-Law No. 14 of 1995 is the primary legislation for the control of narcotics and psychotropic substances. It was partially amended by Federal-Decree Law No. 8 of 2016. Fentanyl is an illegal substance on the UAE's Schedule 1 list. UAE authorities have conducted seizure operations for illicit fentanyl and its analogues. Acetic anhydride is also a controlled chemical in the UAE and law enforcement agencies have seized shipments transiting the UAE. In September 2022, the UAE announced its cooperation with Interpol on the transnational "Lionfish V" counter-narcotics operation that seized 35.5 tons of narcotics and 291 chemical substances. The UAE regularly identifies precursor chemicals and has a robust law enforcement/regulatory system to limit precursor diversion.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) is not a source country for illicit drugs, and between January 2020 and January 2022, UK authorities seized amphetamine precursors and gamma-butyrolactone totaling approximately 2.1 metric tons. Precursor chemicals are imported to the UK primarily from China, India, Germany, and the Netherlands; however, the UK is occasionally used as a transshipment point for precursor chemical bound for countries in Africa, Central America, and Mexico. The UK has been a leading producer of precursor chemicals but applies a strict regulatory regime to the production and trade of precursor chemicals, including mandatory licensing and reporting obligations. Though drug precursors have legitimate commercial uses, the UK Home Office controls them because they can be used in illicit drug production.

The Home Office Drug Licensing and Compliance Unit is the regulatory body for precursor chemical control in the UK; however, the NCA and the police are responsible for investigating suspicious transactions. Licensing and reporting obligations are required for the commercialization of listed substances, and non-compliance is a criminal offense. HM Revenue and Customs monitors imports and exports of listed chemicals. The United States and UK cooperate closely in international bodies to promote global regulation of precursor chemicals.

Venezuela

Due to the Maduro regime's lack of information sharing on drug control issues writ large, the United States has minimal information to evaluate precursor chemical diversion through the country or any diversion control efforts under the regime.

Some precursor chemicals used to produce cocaine are believed to be trafficked through Venezuela, but the quantity is unknown. According to independent experts, there is evidence of chemical precursor trafficking from Colombia's Norte de Santander state to Venezuela's northwestern state of Zulia, with the complicity or even active assistance of the Venezuelan military. The easy availability of these precursors has facilitated the proliferation of cocaine laboratories in Venezuela.

Major Exporters and Importers of Pseudoephedrine and Ephedrine (Section 722, Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA))

This section of the INCSR responds to the CMEA's Section 722 requirement to report on the five major importing and exporting countries of the identified methamphetamine precursor chemicals. In meeting these requirements, the Department of State and DEA considered the chemicals involved and the available data on their export, import, worldwide production, and the known legitimate demand. The available data does not address illicit trafficking and production.

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are no longer preferred chemicals for methamphetamine production shipped to the United States, since traffickers are increasingly using substitutes or pre-precursors. The phenomenon of substitute chemicals used in methamphetamine production is particularly observed in Mexico, where the nitrostyrene method is used to produce phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), which starts from benzaldehyde and nitroethane, or from the intermediary product 1-phenyl-2-nitropropene.

Phenylpropanolamine, a third chemical listed in the CMEA, is not a methamphetamine precursor, although it can be used as an amphetamine precursor. In 2000, the FDA issued warnings concerning significant health risks associated with phenylpropanolamine. As a result, phenylpropanolamine is no longer approved for human consumption. Phenylpropanolamine is still imported for veterinary medicines, and for the conversion to amphetamine for the legitimate manufacture of pharmaceutical products. As phenylpropanolamine is not a methamphetamine precursor chemical, and trade and production data are not available, phenylpropanolamine has not been included in this section.

The Information Handling Services (IHS) Markit's Global Trade Atlas (GTA), a commercial compendium, is the only data source on import and export available to produce the CMEA report (<https://ihsmarkit.com/index.html>). Given the reporting cycles by participating countries, data often lags behind one year. The most recent year for which full-year data is available is 2021. The data, including from previous years, is continually revised as countries review and revise it. GTA data analysis and a chart identifying the sources of the data are in the tables at the end of this section.

The most recent International Narcotics Control Board's (INCB) Annual Legitimate Requirements (ALR) report available is from December 2022 (www.incb.org/incb/en/precursors/alrs.html). Data on exports and imports of pharmaceutical preparations containing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are commercial and proprietary and are not available, nor is data on legitimate demand for these substances, whether in bulk or processed pharmaceutical form. Thus, this list of the top five importers does not necessarily demonstrate that these countries have the highest levels of diversion. Instead, it demonstrates the rank position of each country compared to the overall exporters and importers of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine worldwide, as reported by the GTA.

For purposes of this determination, the United States has been excluded from these lists. However, included is additional information on U.S. exports and imports of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. During the preparation of the 2023 CMEA report as well as determination and

certification, GTA data for U.S. exports and imports for both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for calendar years 2019-2021 were updated in light of revised estimates provided by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

Overall, the accuracy of this trade data should be viewed with caution, as some countries have less sophisticated infrastructure and methodologies at their disposal than others for measuring the volume, overall trends, and commodities involved in legitimate trade. Furthermore, this data cannot accurately identify the specific trends of smuggling or diversion involving subterfuge.

The trade data source employed in this determination and certification does not reflect illicit smuggling or production around the globe that has been detected by law enforcement and other reporting. Nor does it reflect an accurate disparity between requirements and imports. Available trade data from GTA is also silent on legitimate commercial sales of alternative precursor chemicals used in methamphetamine production, which comprise a growing proportion of chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, particularly for the U.S. market.

Thus far, the economic and compliance analyses required by the CMEA remain challenging. Often the collection and reporting of such data requires a regulatory infrastructure that is beyond the means of some governments. Further, not all countries are familiar with the methodology and data sources used by the GTA to report the final numbers, and some countries dispute the accuracy of the data. This increases the difficulty of comparing import or export totals across years.

Nevertheless, the United States will continue to urge countries in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and technical forums to report on their licit domestic requirements for methamphetamine precursor chemicals to the INCB. The United States will also continue to work with the INCB and with authorities in the reporting countries to secure explanations for anomalies between reported imports and reported licit domestic requirements, and to follow the development of other chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine.

CMEA Trade data. Quantities in percentages are rounded to the nearest.
(Quantities in percentages are rounded to the nearest percent.)

Top Five Exporting Countries, Economies, and the United States Ephedrine 2019-2021 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2021)				
Reporting Country	Unit	Quantities		
		2019	2020	2021
India	KG	57,940	77,296	47,728
Germany	KG	6,897	18,828	10,185
Singapore	KG	1,900	3,776	3,525
United Kingdom	KG	1,418	1,410	1,326
People's Republic of China	KG	2,801	1,205	1,204
Top Five Total	KG	70,956	102,513	63,968
United States (GTA)	KG	272	61	429
United States (DEA)	KG	1.8	1.6	1.9

Analysis of Export Data: The top five exporters of ephedrine in 2021 were again India, Germany, Singapore, the United Kingdom (UK), and the People's Republic of China (PRC). According to the Global Trade Atlas (GTA) database, ephedrine exports decreased 37.6 percent in 2021 compared to 2020, due mainly to a substantial decrease in exports from India, and Germany. India's exports decreased by 38.25 percent from 77,296 kg in 2020 to 47,728 kg in 2021. India continues to rank as the top global exporter of ephedrine. Germany's exports also decreased from 18,828 kg in 2020 to 10,185 kg in 2021, a 45.9 percent decrease. The reason for these decreases are unknown. Singapore appears as the third top exporter of ephedrine and has also decreased slightly in terms of the level of exports as compared with the previous year – 3,776 kg in 2020 and 3,525 kg in 2021, representing a 6.65 percent decrease. The UK's exports slightly decreased from 1,410 kg in 2020 to 1,326 kg in 2021, a 6.33 percent increase. The reason for the decreases in Singapore and the UK is unknown. The PRC also decreased its exports by 1 kilogram (.08 percent), from 1,205 kg in 2020 to 1,204 kg in 2021.

According to the most current information provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. exports were 1.8 kg in 2019, 1.6 kg in 2020, and 1.9 kg in 2021. For the purposes of this report, we have relied on the data provided by DEA.

Top Five Exporting Countries, Economies, and the United States Pseudoephedrine 2019-2021 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2021)				
Reporting Country	Unit	Quantities		
		2019	2020	2021
India	KG	453,258	360,282	260,897
Germany	KG	277,859	278,301	161,656
Switzerland	KG	48,292	44,540	46,540
People's Republic of China	KG	34,078	34,100	37,470
United Kingdom	KG	147,616	47,248	26,200
Top Five Total	KG	961,103	764,471	371,107

United States (GTA)	KG	1,437	223	72
United States (DEA)	KG	15,135	12,622	2,438

Analysis of Export Data: According to the GTA database, the aggregated volume of worldwide exports of pseudoephedrine from the 2021 top five exporters decreased from 764,471 kg in 2020 to 371,107 kg in 2021, representing a 51.46 percent decrease. The top five exporters of pseudoephedrine in 2021 were again India, Germany, Switzerland, the PRC, and the United Kingdom. India, Germany, and the United Kingdom decreased their pseudoephedrine exports in 2021 from 360,282 kg to 260,897 kg, 278,301 kg to 161,656 kg, and 47,248 kg to 26,200 kg, a 27.58 percent, 41.91 percent, and 44.55 percent decrease, respectively. The reason for such decreases is unknown. Switzerland and China's exports slightly increased between 2020 and 2021 from 44,540 kg to 46,540 kg, and 34,100 kg to 37,470, a 4.49 percent and 9.88 percent increase respectively. The reason for such increase in each country is unknown.

According to the most current information provided by the DEA, the United States decreased its pseudoephedrine exports from 12,622 in 2020 to 2,438 in 2021, a 80.68 percent decrease.

Top Five Importing Countries, Economies, and the United States Ephedrine 2019-2021 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2021)				
Reporting Country	Unit	Quantities		
		2019	2020	2021
Indonesia	KG	7,068	6,385	5,981
Egypt	KG	2,148,360	2,136,697	5,137
Czech Republic	KG	4,710	300	3,800
Republic of Korea	KG	26,952	33,001	3,502
Romania	KG	3,526	100	3,201
Top Five Total	KG	2,190,616	2,176,483	15,640
United States (GTA)	KG	13,501	30,136	33,566
United States (DEA)	KG	2,679	2,156	2,061

Analysis of Import Data: According to the GTA database, the aggregated amount of ephedrine imported by the top five countries and economies in 2021 was 15,640 kg, a substantial decrease compared to 2020 of 99.28 percent. The reason for such decrease is unknown. The top five ephedrine importers in 2020 were Indonesia, Egypt, Czech Republic, Republic of Korea, and Romania. Indonesia, the top ephedrine importer in 2021, had a 6.33 percent decrease in ephedrine importation from 6,385 kg to 5,981 kg. The reason for such decrease is unknown. Egypt and the Republic of Korea experienced decreases in their ephedrine importation with a 99.76 percent and an 89.38 percent decrease respectively. The reason for such decrease for each country is unknown. On the other hand, the Czech Republic and Romania each appear for the first time as top ephedrine importers. Both countries have increased their ephedrine importation substantially. The Czech Republic went from 300 kg in 2020 to 3,800 in 2021, a 1,166.66 percent increase. Romania, it went from 100 kg in 2020 to 3,201 in 2021, a 3,101 percent increase. The reason for such increases is unknown.

According to the most current information provided by DEA, U.S. ephedrine imports decreased from 2,156 kg in 2020 to 2,061 in 2021, a 4.41 percent decrease.

Top Five Importing Countries, Economies, and the United States Pseudoephedrine 2019-2021 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2021)				
Reporting Country	Unit	Quantities		
		2019	2020	2021
Switzerland	KG	65,656	59,913	55,440
Egypt	KG	4,043,625	3,926,530	37,949
France	KG	111,517	23,283	23,173
Belgium	KG	31,236	3,638	19,088
Taiwan	KG	60,020	19,020	17,085
Top Five Total	KG	4,312,054	4,032,384	152,735
United States (GTA)	KG	144,378	123,504	11,755
United States (DEA)	KG	145,116	121,640	100,292

Analysis of Import Data: According to the GTA database, the quantity of pseudoephedrine imported by the top five importers decreased in 2021. The aggregated amount of pseudoephedrine imported by the top five economies in 2021 was 152,735 kg, a 96.21 percent decrease compared to 2010. Switzerland, Egypt, France, and Taiwan decreased their pseudoephedrine importation in 2021. Switzerland's imports dropped from 59,913 kg in 2020 to 55,440 kg in 2021, a 7.47 percent decrease; Egypt's imports decreased from 3,926,530 kg in 2020 to 37,949 kg in 2021, a 99.03 percent decrease; France's imports slightly decreased from 23,283 kg in 2020 to 23,173 kg in 2021, a 0.47 percent decrease; and Taiwan imports decreased from 19,020 kg in 2020 to 17,085 kg in 2021, a 10.17 percent decrease. In all four cases, the reason for such decreases is unknown. Belgium was the only importing country increasing its pseudoephedrine imports in 2021. It went from 3,638 kg in 2020 to 19,088 kg in 2021, a 424.684 percent increase. The reason for such increase is unknown. In the case of Egypt, the reason for the substantial disparities observed in the amounts of importation in 2019 and 2020 is also unknown.

According to the most current information provided by DEA, U.S. imports decreased from 121,640 kg in 2020 to 100,292 kg in 2021, a 17.55 percent decrease. It should be noted that the United States no longer bulk manufactures pseudoephedrine.

FENTANYL

Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 - Fentanyl

The following is provided pursuant to Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by section 6610 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, requiring a separate section in the INCSR identifying countries that are “the most significant sources of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year,” and providing other information as described below. The Department of State, in consultation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other agencies, has identified Mexico as the most significant source of illicit fentanyl and its analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year.

Introduction

Synthetic opioids remain the primary drug threat to the United States and a significant global threat as well. Provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that more than 107,000 people died of a drug overdose in the United States in 2021 (the most recent period for which data is available), a 15 percent increase over the previous year. Alarming, 66 percent of overdose deaths involved synthetic opioids, mostly illicit fentanyl or fentanyl analogues, the availability of which has continued to expand in the United States. This increase in deaths in 2021 coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, which medical authorities have said exacerbated the drug crisis by inhibiting access to treatment and contributing to greater social isolation among those with substance use disorders.

Although opioids are still legally prescribed in the United States to treat severe pain, when illicitly manufactured opioids are mixed with heroin or cocaine or added to counterfeit tablets, they are often ingested unknowingly, with deadly results. Further, the threat posed by illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs is magnified because, unlike plant-based drugs, synthetic drugs are easy and inexpensive to produce. There is no need for large or elaborate infrastructure; a lab can be set up in one’s home and synthetic drugs are often easily trafficked through the mail. They are so potent that even small amounts can be fatal.

Almost no fentanyl or fentanyl analogues have been detected entering the United States from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the PRC implemented controls over fentanyl-related substances as a class in 2019. Production of most illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues detected in North America has since shifted to Mexico, although the precursor chemicals required to produce fentanyl still largely originate in the PRC. Many precursor chemical sales in the PRC are apparently legal, involving chemicals not controlled by China or under the UN framework, but are purchased for the purpose of illicitly manufacturing fentanyl.

Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues are the most common synthetic opioids seized by U.S. authorities. The number of reported fentanyl seizures identified by forensic analysis increased by 29 percent in 2021, the most recent period for which data is available. The Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection seized over 6,667 kilograms (kg) of fentanyl in fiscal year 2022, a 31 percent increase over the previous year. In that period, approximately 96 percent of all fentanyl seized by CBP originated in Mexico, with only 270 kg reaching the United States from other destinations.

New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) also pose a significant threat. UNODC defines NPS as “substances of abuse, either in a pure form or a preparation, that are not controlled by the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs or the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, but which may pose a public health threat.” The term “new” does not necessarily mean newly developed, but refers to new uses, or to substances that have recently become available on the market. Such substances mimic the effects of those that are under international control such as cannabis, cocaine, heroin, LSD, MDMA (ecstasy), or methamphetamine. Over 1,124 NPS have been reported to UNODC as of December 2021. Most are stimulants, and there has been a significant increase in synthetic opioids in recent years.

To better confront the evolving business model of synthetic drug trafficking, in 2019 the Department of State developed a Five-Year Global Plan of Action to Combat Emerging Synthetic Drug Threats. It guides Department efforts to counter synthetic opioids and will be adapted as new dangerous substances emerge. To deter and disrupt production and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs into the United States, the Department seeks to attack the business model of illicit international drug supply chains at all points to increase the cost, risk, and difficulties associated with producing and trafficking these drugs. Therefore, foreign assistance is directed to programs that drive global action to confront this threat by building partner capacity, fostering international cooperation, and identifying and responding to shifts in the illicit market.

Most Significant Source of Illicit Fentanyl and its Analogues

Pursuant to the FY 2022 NDAA, the Department of State, in consultation with the DEA and other relevant agencies, has identified Mexico as the most significant country of import of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year. The following describes Mexico’s cooperation with the United States, utilization of scheduling or other procedures for illicit drugs, actions to prosecute individuals involved in the illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substance analogues, and registration requirements or other similar measures for tableting machines and encapsulating machines.

(A) Significant source countries for fentanyl and fentanyl analogues: For the purposes of this report, the Department of State consulted the DEA, the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection, and other relevant agencies to estimate the most prevalent source countries of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues trafficked into the United States. Based on seizure data and law enforcement investigation information, the consensus among U.S. authorities is that Mexico was the only significant source of illicit fentanyl or fentanyl analogues trafficked into the United States in 2022.

(B) Cooperation with the United States: The Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities that the United States and Mexico adopted in 2021 committed both countries to broadening security cooperation, including expanding efforts to disrupt the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs such as fentanyl. Under the Framework, the countries created a bilateral working group on narcotics and precursor chemicals to identify and take targeted actions to prevent and disrupt the production and trafficking of fentanyl from Mexico to the United States. In October 2022, the United States and Mexico committed to

implement a joint synthetic drug action plan to improve regulatory coordination, information sharing, and training to reduce fentanyl production and precursor chemical diversion.

The United States continues to enhance Mexico's capacity to track electronically chemical imports and exports and support the Mexican Navy's (SEMAR) ability to interdict illicit goods and control ports to disrupt the supply chain of precursor chemicals used to make illicit drugs. The United States sponsors training to promote awareness of synthetic drugs and seizure trends and supports forensic chemistry labs to improve criminal investigations involving synthetic opioids. The United States assists Mexico's Federal Commission for the Protection Against Sanitary Risk (COFEPRIS) in issuing electronic permits and tracking the international import and export of precursor chemicals through the National Drug System (NDS). In October, Mexico signed onto the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Container Control Program to improve port controls to minimize the use of maritime containers for the illicit trafficking of synthetic drugs and their chemical precursors. The United States plans to support implementation of the program at the Mexican port of Manzanillo in 2023.

Mexico seized 1,732.1 kilograms of fentanyl in the first nine months of 2022, a 33.6 percent increase from the same period in 2021. Mexico continued to target suspected fentanyl labs, facilities producing fentanyl-laced counterfeit pills ("pill mills"), and fentanyl in transit in 2022. U.S.-donated canines assisted in significant seizures of illicit drugs in Mexico, including fentanyl and its precursors. During the first nine months of 2022, U.S.-donated canines assisted in the seizure of 121.3 kg of fentanyl powder and 77,662 fentanyl pills. The United States is working with Mexico's Attorney General's Office (FGR) and other agencies, including military units that perform counternarcotics work, to create judicial records of seizures and establish protocols for reporting to a central database to improve investigations and prosecutions.

Mexico engages with Canada and the United States in the North American Drug Dialogue (NADD) to foster international counterdrug cooperation, and the North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI) to share information, improve response to transnational threats, and develop protocols for maritime interdictions. Mexico is a voting member of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and coordinates with the United States ahead of votes on international scheduling decisions.

(C) Controlled substances scheduling procedures: Under U.S. law, the DEA's authority to schedule substances on an emergency basis falls under Title II of the Controlled Substances Act. Mexico has comparable capacity to schedule new psychoactive substances under its domestic framework. Mexico's Interagency Synthetic Drug Control Technical Working Group – comprising multiple federal agencies – proposes substances for control to the cabinet-level General Health Council, which formally publishes the updated list of controlled substances in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial). Mexico's "Precursor Chemicals" list is similar to the U.S. List I designation and requires permit approval for imports, while the "Essential Chemical" list is similar to the U.S. List II designation and requires only notification of imports. Mexican laws regulate the production and use of many chemicals required for illicit drug production. COFEPRIS is responsible for regulating precursor and essential list chemicals. COFEPRIS works with SEMAR, the National Guard, Customs (ANAM), and FGR to enforce the law. Mexico controls all but six chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Convention:

norfentanyl, boc-4-AP, PMK glycinate, PMK glycidic acid, APAA, and MAPA. Mexico controls six fentanyl precursor chemicals: 4-anilinopiperidine (4-AP), 4-AP dihydrochloride, propionic anhydride, propionyl chloride, N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), and 4-anilino-N-phenethyl-4-piperidine (ANPP). In 2021, Mexico published a chemical watchlist to flag dual-use chemicals of concern to government and private sector entities to reduce risk of diversion to illicit drug production. In April 2022, Mexico expanded its chemical watchlist from 14 to 69. (The Mexican government controls 69 chemicals on its watchlist; however, some government reports cite 72 chemicals.)

(D) Steps to prosecute individuals involved in illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substances: Mexico has the authority to prosecute individuals involved in the illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substance analogues. Mexico is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol (Single Convention), the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and in accordance with its obligations under those convention, has laws in place comparable to that of the United States that criminalize trafficking in controlled substances. Mexico's legislation enabling criminal prosecution of controlled substances is under Federal Criminal Code, Title Seven, Chapter 1, which criminalizes criminal conduct related to narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and other substances provided for in the General Health Law Title 12, Chapters 5 and 6.

(E) Requirements to register tableting machines and encapsulating machines: Similar to the United States, Mexico requires documentation on the importation of tableting and encapsulating machines under Chapter 3, Article 17 of the Federal Law for the Control of Chemical Precursors, Essential Chemicals and Machines to Prepare Capsules, Tablets and/or Tablets. This law provides for the Secretariat of Economy to implement control and verification measures pertaining to all persons or entities that produce, dispose of, acquire, import, export, and/or store tableting and encapsulating machines (as well as precursor chemicals) to prevent their diversion for illicit drug production. On an annual basis, pill press owners are responsible for reporting the status of the press to the applicable government institution (the Secretariat of Economy, Secretariat of Health, or Secretariat of Communications and Transportation).

Despite a strong legal and regulatory system for narcotics control and cooperation under the Bicentennial Framework, the volume of dangerous drugs entering the United States from Mexico, and violent crime in Mexico fueled by transnational criminal organizations, remain alarmingly and unacceptably high. Mexico does not officially acknowledge production of fentanyl in Mexico, and control efforts continue to be challenged by a lack of interagency cooperation, a comprehensive and adequately resourced fentanyl strategy, and sufficient investment in security and justice sector institutions at the municipal, state, and federal levels. The United States will continue to press Mexico to take more aggressive action to disrupt the production and trafficking of illicit fentanyl, support Mexico's efforts through targeted capacity building programming and law enforcement cooperation under the Bicentennial Framework, and partner with Mexico in engaging key countries and the private sector to address the global synthetic drug threat.

COUNTRY REPORTS

Afghanistan

A. Introduction

Afghanistan has long been the world's largest supplier of opiates, a state of affairs that remained unchanged after the United States' withdrawal of its military forces, the closure of its embassy, and the Taliban takeover in 2021. Although the United States continues to support limited counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan through the United Nations (UN) and other third parties, including extensive third-party monitoring and evaluation, the absence of U.S. personnel on the ground has meant that reliable information on seizures and enforcement activities is difficult to obtain. Much of the information reported below, therefore, was obtained from partners, such as the UN Office of Drug Control Programs (UNODC), regional law enforcement organizations, and through monitoring and evaluation efforts.

In 2022, according to UNODC, Afghanistan supplied 80 percent of the global opiate demand, including opium processed into heroin. Afghanistan also has one of the world's largest populations suffering from substance use disorders. Revenue from poppy cultivation and the Afghan drug trade continues to contribute to Afghanistan's internal conflicts, undermines the rule of law, fuels corruption, and contributes to high rates of substance use.

According to U.S. sources and UNODC, Afghanistan also produces large quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, and marijuana byproducts such as hashish. The Oman bush, which grows wild and is native to Afghanistan, is a local source of ephedrine, the key ingredient in the production of methamphetamine.

In April 2022, the Taliban announced a ban on opium poppy production and on use, processing, trade, and smuggling of all narcotics; the United States is monitoring implementation of this ban, which notably permitted the harvest of the large 2022 spring poppy crop. However, in 2022, UNODC registered only limited eradication efforts in the main growing areas of the country.

Also in 2022, only 11 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces were poppy-free according to UNODC's 2022 Annual Opium Survey. Afghan poppy cultivation is mostly concentrated in the country's south and west, accounting for 87 percent of the country's area under poppy cultivation. Primary trafficking routes for opiates out of Afghanistan include the Balkan route (Iran to Turkey and the Caucasus, to Eastern and Western Europe); the southern route (Pakistan to Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Canada); and the northern route (Central Asia to the Russian Federation and Europe).

In September 2022, the United States determined that Afghanistan failed demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international drug control agreements and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Ministry of Interior has responsibility for drug control efforts in Afghanistan. Since the 2021 Taliban takeover, the United States has continued counternarcotics support in Afghanistan through the United Nations, the Colombo Plan, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This limited assistance does not flow to or through any Taliban entities and includes funding for alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation and opium production, drug demand reduction and treatment, and anti-narcotics public information programs. The impact of awareness raising and drug treatment outreach since the Taliban takeover is unknown, and U.S.-funded programs only have the capacity to treat a small percentage of the extensive number of people suffering from substance use disorders.

Other U.S. support through international organizations includes the development of licit, high-value crop production as alternatives to cultivation and related efforts such as access to regional and international markets for sustainable food crops such as orchard fruits, spices, and nuts. The program has resulted in products, including those produced by women farmers and traders being sold at international food fairs, where they have signed valuable contracts.

The United States does not have details about implementation of Afghanistan's drug control strategy. There is anecdotal information that previously seized items, including real property, vehicles, and money, have been returned to persons convicted of drug-related crimes.

Following the April ban on opium poppy cultivation, UNODC noted that the Taliban granted a two-month grace period that exempted the largest, yearly opium poppy harvest. UNODC also commented that major droughts destroyed food harvests while the Afghan economy collapsed, such that illicit cultivation may be perceived as the only alternative to starvation for many. The 2022 crop took up one fifth of the arable land in Helmand, potentially leading to greater food insecurity. Observers from U.S.-funded programs in Afghanistan report the Taliban is taking a particularly hard stance on the ban in the major growing area of Helmand Province and has conducted public programs to publicize it. INL partners note the ban may be having an effect, as market prices for opium poppy have risen substantially. Reporting from UNODC member states shows that regional seizures of Afghan opiates have not seen any decline since the Taliban takeover.

2. Supply Reduction

Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is widespread. Although the Taliban has not released official figures on poppy cultivation, according to the UNODC report on opium poppy in Afghanistan published on November 1, 2022, 233,000 hectares (ha) of opium poppy were cultivated in the first 10 months of 2022 with a potential to produce 6,200 Metric Tons (MT) of opium.

The United States and its partners are closely monitoring the impact of the poppy ban. International observers estimate only limited eradication took place in the southern part of the country, the main growing area, during 2022. UNODC reports that increasing opium prices may

indicate the ban is having an initial impact, yet even if there is political will to enforce it, the ability to do so in the south may not be tenable due to the trade being deeply ingrained for decades, and the lack of viable, profitable licit alternatives available to farmers.

Afghan opium is typically refined into heroin or morphine in Afghanistan or neighboring countries. According to U.S. sampling data, Afghanistan is not a major supplier of opiates to the United States; data from DEA's 2022 annual heroin report indicates that heroin from South Asia represents less than one percent by weight of heroin samples tested in the United States.

Given that reporting directly from U.S. sources in Afghanistan is no longer available, trafficking trends must be extrapolated to some degree from statistics produced by the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), which is partially funded by the United States. According to statistics produced by CARICC for 2021, the latest year that figures were available, the volume of heroin and opium seized by responsible national agencies along the northern and Balkan routes increased by 82 percent and 42 percent, respectively.

CARICC also stated that the development of trade and economic relations between CARICC states and with external countries has created conditions for expanding drug trafficking in Central Asia. They are seeing a steady increase in seizures of synthetic drugs in the region.

Data from UNODC's Container Control Programme for Central Asia indicated that more than 100 metric tons of heroin were seized in Pakistan between February and August of 2022, likely originating in Afghanistan and primarily destined for Great Britain.

After the Taliban takeover in 2021 the United States stopped supporting Afghanistan's Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), formerly mentored by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), thus the continued existence and work of these units cannot be evaluated at this time. However, DEA reported that in September 2022 the Ministry of Finance announced a small-scale seizure of opium at Kabul's international airport.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Afghanistan has one of the highest substance use rates in the world. To stem the effects of this public health crisis, the United States continues to fund projects implemented by UNODC and the Colombo Plan to increase access to treatment for drug use in rural areas and to support treatment centers for women, children, and adolescents, and a small number of centers for men.

The United States currently funds UNODC's global children's addiction program to develop protocols for treating children, training treatment staff, and delivering services through NGOs. The United States also supports international organizations and NGOs to offer online continuing education and training for treatment service providers. The United Nations will start a new, limited drug use survey in 2023.

Anti-narcotics public information programs, produced by the U.S. Agency for Global Media, including the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, continue in Afghanistan, reaching nearly 20 million Afghans weekly via radio, television, and social media.

4. Corruption

As a matter of stated policy, the Taliban does not encourage or facilitate activity associated with drug trafficking, however the Taliban's history of profiting from the drug trade casts doubts on the extent to which Taliban officials will adhere to the policy. One of the Taliban's stated goals has been to eliminate corruption, although the United States has limited ability to assess the impacts of this stated policy. The international community will be watching closely to see if the Taliban engages in corrupt practices related to the illicit drug trade since the ban. Contacts reported that the cost of exporting licit crops across land borders dropped significantly after the Taliban-takeover, as bribes were no longer demanded of traders.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Since the end of August 2021, the United States has not maintained an official presence in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU) was established in Doha, Qatar, and reports from there. However, as described above, modest U.S.-funded counternarcotics programs, such as alternative development, drug demand reduction, and anti-narcotics public information programs, carried out through international organizations, the U.S. Agency for Global Media, and non-governmental organizations, are ongoing.

D. Conclusion

The drug trade in Afghanistan poses a major challenge to local institutions, good governance, and the development of a strong, legal economy. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan is also a serious threat to countries and communities along key trafficking routes outside the country. The United States will continue to monitor the impact of the Taliban's ban on poppy cultivation, illicit narcotics, and related activity, to include Afghanistan's burgeoning methamphetamine trade, and the continuing challenges associated with hashish production and trafficking.

Albania

Albania is a source country for cannabis and a key transit country for organized crime groups moving narcotics into European markets. Albanian national traffickers and their associates send Albanian cannabis to Turkey in exchange for heroin and smuggle heroin and cocaine across Europe. South American-produced cocaine enters the country mostly through the Port of Durres, primarily in banana shipments from Ecuador. In the first eight months of 2022, Albanian authorities seized approximately 111 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 6 kg of heroin. Albanian law enforcement agencies participated in several multi-state law enforcement operations in 2022. These and other operations, often supported by U.S. advisors assisting with investigations, led to the dismantling of some drug trafficking organizations consisting of Albanian nationals throughout the Balkans, Western Europe, the United States, and Central and South America. Albania's Specialized Anticorruption Body (SPAK) registered several successes against drug traffickers in 2022, including asset seizures. Since January 2022, SPAK sequestered and seized over 100,000 square meters of land, 25 businesses, 23 buildings, and 4 million euros in bank accounts. In July 2022, the Special Court for Corruption and Organized Crime seized assets owned by Anton Gjinaj in the amount of approximately 10 million euros. Gjinaj was convicted of narcotics trafficking in Spain in 2010 and returned to Albania where he attempted to hide assets purchased with narcotics proceeds. Albania's National Bureau of Investigators (NBI) added more investigators in 2022, expanding SPAK's capacity to investigate drug trafficking cases.

Albanian nationals play an outsized role in international narcotics trafficking and organized crime networks as their territory is a key part of the Balkan route of narcotics trafficking into Western Europe and the United Kingdom. Albanian-led organized crime groups operate in the United States, United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe, United Arab Emirates, and South America, including Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru. These groups use the Albanian economy, particularly the construction sector, to launder their proceeds and contribute to corruption in the country. They also operate out of the UAE, where they collaborate with other European traffickers. The Gjinaj seizure was one of SPAK's first actions against corruption in the construction sector. Violent crime in Albania, including assassinations, is often associated with organized crime, and judges, prosecutors, police, and journalists have been subject to intimidation.

As part of the ongoing U.S. and EU-supported justice reforms, an Albanian independent commission has permanently removed from office 36 judges and prosecutors for unexplained assets and referred them for criminal prosecution. U.S. assistance includes advising SPAK-led cases on narcotics and organized crime, improved interagency cooperation on investigations, corrections reforms to curtail the operations of transnational organized crime behind bars, and specialized equipment to enhance Albanian law enforcement capabilities. Corruption, weak rule of law, and a high rate of unemployment are primary drivers behind Albania's drug control problem. Albania should continue justice reform efforts, tighten anti-money laundering regulations and oversight, and counter organized crime groups' influence throughout government and society. Albanian law enforcement should take a more proactive approach against Albanian nationals' role in transnational organized crime.

Armenia

Armenia lies on a key trafficking route through the South Caucasus. Afghanistan and Iran produce opium, heroin, and methamphetamine that is transited through Armenia to European and Russian markets. Russia and Ukraine recently were the sources for synthetic stimulant drugs like mephedrone and alpha-PVP, though these routes have been disrupted by the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian border guards remain at Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran and compose part of the immigration staff at Yerevan and Gyumri airports. A popular revolution in 2018 brought to power a democratic government that launched new anti-corruption institutions but has said little about narcotics trafficking.

Between January and June 2022, authorities investigated 931 criminal cases related to drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals, a 49 percent increase over the same period last year. A total 437 of the investigated cases related to the illegal sale of drugs, for which 85 persons were charged, while 372 persons were charged with crimes related to illegal trafficking of drugs. Authorities seized 44 kilograms (kg) of drugs – including marijuana (14 kg), cannabis (10.5 kg), opium (9.8 kg), Alpha-PVP (4.1 kg), and methamphetamine (3.5 kg). This included 198.65 grams of psychotropic substances (a decrease) and .0054 kg of precursor chemicals (a decrease). The total 44 kilograms of seized drugs represents a 90 percent decrease from the same period in 2021, during which the Armenian State Revenue Committee (SRC) concluded the second largest drug seizure in Armenia's history. No major illegal drug interdictions have been reported during 2022 to date.

The United States facilitated information sharing between Armenia and other European countries such as Austria and Germany to support drug seizures. The United States also supported training for Armenian law enforcement personnel focused on counternarcotics efforts, including a study visit for Armenian customs officers to Texas and a study visit for the newly established Armenian National Police Dark Net Unit to the neighboring country of Georgia. U.S. assistance also contributed to the expansion of a SRC K9 facility.

The Bahamas

A. Introduction

For decades, traffickers have smuggled cocaine from South America through the Caribbean to the United States. The Bahamas, a nation of 700 islands that spans the northern Caribbean from Hispaniola to Florida, has long been used by traffickers to support this trade. Traffickers often send cocaine from South America to the southern Bahamas via small airplanes. Alternatively, they send large loads of cocaine by boat to Haiti and the Dominican Republic before dividing them into smaller parcels and sending them to the United States on small planes and recreational watercraft. Marijuana is grown in The Bahamas on a small scale, but the vast majority is trafficked by plane or boat from Jamaica through The Bahamas to the United States.

The Bahamian government is motivated to tackle drug trafficking and dismantle gangs, in part because they contribute to high levels of homicide and violent crime. Transnational criminal organizations are widely known to employ local gangs in the drug trade; as a result, local officials struggle to identify and arrest key figures. Bahamian respondents in a national drug survey reported marijuana use and little to no use of other illicit drugs.

Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), a 1982 agreement between the United States, The Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos Islands, allows its three signatories to patrol the northern Caribbean and coordinate operations to locate and apprehend traffickers. These joint operations may include air, water, and drone assets, as well as personnel. Due to this long history of cooperation, Bahamian and U.S. law enforcement agents routinely work side by side in a successful partnership that reduces violent crime and health risks in both countries.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Drug crimes are primarily heard in the lower court by police prosecutors (police officers serving as lay prosecutors). The Magistrates Court has jurisdiction over summary (petty) offenses under the Dangerous Drugs Act. These are heard before a judge; defendants do not have the right to a jury trial. Offenses include possession, intent to supply, involvement in a criminal enterprise, and conspiracy, among others. Penalties range from fines to a maximum custodial sentence of seven years. Magistrate judges, the Director of Public Prosecutions, or upper court judges may move “serious” drug cases to the upper courts if they feel higher penalties are warranted. These cases are tried at the Supreme Court by prosecuting attorneys and decided by juries.

The Bahamas Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has faced difficulties recruiting and retaining prosecutors. Staffing gaps are the main source of severe case backlogs at the upper courts, also known as the Supreme and Appeals Courts. The use of police prosecutors has helped trials proceed in the lower court without unreasonable delay. Nearly all courts in The Bahamas have received a U.S. donation of digital recording equipment, which eliminates the inefficient practice of transcribing court records by hand. The Bahamas has also received loans from the International Development Bank (IDB) to digitize court records and introduce case

management software. Both the U.S. donation and the IDB loan support a larger court modernization program aimed at improving judicial efficiency through technological solutions.

The Bahamas convicts low-level drug couriers arrested through OPBAT operations. The United States provides training and mentoring to improve the investigative capabilities of Bahamian police officers. These capabilities are intended to help Bahamian detectives identify and arrest key members of sophisticated criminal networks, though this goal remains elusive.

The Bahamas has a mutual legal assistance agreement (MLAT) in place with the United States and responds favorably to requests. Response times from Bahamian authorities to U.S. requests are long. Forfeiture orders from U.S. courts are not enforceable in The Bahamas (or vice versa), but officials on both sides historically rely on official channels to coordinate the seizure and handover of illicit property and cash. The Bahamas extradites its nationals to the United States to face drug trafficking charges under a 1990 extradition treaty. Case backlogs at the Appeals Court have delayed extraditions by up to 15 years for suspects who contest the process. The highest court of appeal in The Bahamas, the UK's Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, also suffers from case backlogs that delay extradition. U.S. officials continue to press for reforms that would ensure due process while encouraging extraditions within a reasonable timeframe. Bahamian officials acknowledge a prolonged extradition process due to appeals proceedings.

The Bahamas signed a Comprehensive Maritime Agreement with the United States in 2004, which complements OPBAT by further expanding the scope of joint law enforcement operations. The ruling Progressive Legal Party (PLP) did not move forward with plans to introduce legislation to legalize medical marijuana and cannabis low in THC, and to expunge simple possession convictions.

2. Supply Reduction

Bahamian and U.S. officials describe a strong partnership that has developed through years of cooperation to stem the flow of drugs. Daily collaboration on patrols and interdiction operations resulted in the seizure of 367 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 5.8 metric tons of marijuana during the first nine months of 2022. The amount of marijuana seized quadrupled from the same period last year and was attributed to increased production in Jamaica.

Despite limited resources, OPBAT has maintained consistent levels of operational success covering a territory of 100,000 square miles. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) is midway through implementation of its decentralization program, which aims to shift operations from the central island of New Providence to newly established bases on outlying islands in the North and South of the country's long archipelago. The decentralization plan may improve the interdiction of go-fast boats through more isolated islands of The Bahamas.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Sandilands Rehabilitation Center in the capital city of Nassau is one of The Bahamas's three public hospitals, with 16 beds for patients seeking treatment for drug and alcohol dependence. The Bahamas also has a small number of treatment centers operated by nonprofit organizations.

4. Corruption

The Bahamian government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. In June 2022, the Officer in Charge of a police station on Acklins Island was arraigned in Magistrates court on charges of importing cocaine valued at \$1.4 million. The officer was granted a \$100,000 cash bail. As of October 2022, he awaited trial with two Colombian co-defendants. In January 2022, another Officer in Charge on Crooked Island was investigated for cocaine trafficking. Colombian and Dominican traffickers named him and two other police officers as their co-conspirators in a \$25 million operation. The internal affairs unit of the police found insufficient evidence to recommend charges against the officers. The Officer in Charge has returned to active duty.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The Bahamas is a member of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a security partnership created in 2010 between Caribbean countries and the United States. The United States provides essential equipment, including boats and parts, to the police force to facilitate their effectiveness and cooperation with U.S. law enforcement. U.S. Northern Command has supported the RBDF to improve their maritime domain control and institutional capacity. To this end it has provided training, exchanges, and equipment to the defense force, including significant investments in maritime surveillance radars and sensors, communication hardware, and interdiction vessels.

U.S. assistance to police investigators and prosecutors contributes to effective legal processes in support of drug seizures. The Financial Crimes Investigative Branch (FCIB) of the police force receives assistance from U.S.-funded advisors on forfeiture guidelines for seized cash, small aircraft, and go-fast boats. These assets are early test cases as authorities contemplate pursuing civil forfeiture, which would allow the police to recoup costs under a lower burden of proof. The 2018 Proceeds of Crime Act allows for civil forfeiture, but none have yet been accomplished.

D. Conclusion

The United States and The Bahamas enjoy a cooperative relationship that successfully addresses drug trafficking and disrupts criminal networks. Improved evidence collection, information sharing, and collaboration between law enforcement and prosecutors would greatly assist with building conspiracy investigations and successful prosecutions in both countries. Cooperation in maritime surveillance, patrolling, and interdiction to counter crimes at sea also remains a priority. Continued implementation of the RBDF's decentralization plan to expand the footprint of military forces in the Northern and Southern Bahamas will prevent traffickers from exploiting the country's vast maritime domain. Recent drug enforcement operations suggest the need for broader oversight of police officers stationed on remote islands frequented by traffickers.

Belgium

Belgium is a main point of entry for cocaine into Europe primarily due to the size and geography of the Port of Antwerp. By trade volume, it is the second largest in Europe, covering an area twice the size of Manhattan and a short drive from the Netherlands. Cocaine is the primary illicit narcotic trafficked into Belgium. In the first ten months of 2022, authorities seized 78 metric tons (MT) of cocaine at the Port of Antwerp, compared to 90 MT in the entirety of 2021. The organized crime networks controlling cocaine imports are often based in the Netherlands and have ties to the same South American organizations that transport cocaine to the United States. Cocaine is smuggled in international shipping containers originating most commonly in Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica. In addition to the cocaine seized in Antwerp, authorities in South and Central America seized more than 76.4 MT of cocaine destined for Antwerp during the first 10 months of 2022, compared to 90.7 MT seized in 2021. Belgian authorities estimate that only 20% of the cocaine trafficked through the Port of Antwerp is seized and that 90% of what makes it through is transferred to the Netherlands for distribution around Europe and beyond. Rising levels of cocaine trafficking have led to increased levels of violence between rival drug gangs in the city of Antwerp, with several hand grenade attacks reported in 2022.

Belgium is one of the top methamphetamine producers in Europe and the Port of Antwerp serves as a key transshipment point for Mexican-produced methamphetamine destined for Asian markets. Dutch organized crime groups, working with Mexican counterparts, dominate methamphetamine production in Belgium. Heroin seizures have slightly declined (1.27 MT seized in the first ten months of 2022 compared to 1.35 MT seized in the first ten months of 2021). Drug exports via the Belgian postal system are a problem, with both Belgian and Dutch exporters taking advantage of the reduced scrutiny of packages from Belgium compared to those from the Netherlands. Imports of new psychoactive substances (NPS), largely from China, continue to rise, as do imports of precursor chemicals. Cannabis makes up the largest portion of Belgium's retail market, though street prices for hashish declined by 17 percent from 2020 to 2021 while prices for marijuana held steady. Belgium is not experiencing a significant problem with domestic use of illicit synthetic opioids.

Belgian and U.S. law enforcement agencies maintain close cooperation, primarily focusing on cocaine trafficking and drug money laundering. The two countries have fully operational extradition and mutual legal assistance agreements.

Belize

A. Introduction

Belize is not a drug producing country and does not import large quantities of precursor chemicals or synthetic drugs. However, Belize remains a significant drug trafficking and transit point between countries in South America and the United States. Its porous borders and vast areas of sparsely populated countryside facilitate drug smuggling activities by transnational criminal organizations, including drug cartels. Limited law enforcement capabilities, resources, intelligence, and training, as well as systemic corruption have contributed to increasing amounts of drugs transiting through Belize. Belize's primary domestic use of narcotics is marijuana and some crack cocaine. Although gang rivalries are the main drivers of homicides in Belize, local drug trafficking and consumption have contributed to gang violence and high homicide rates in Belize, specifically in Belize City.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Belize introduced a "Cannabis and Industrial Hemp Control and Licensing Bill" in 2022 to establish a regulatory framework for marijuana production, but progress on the bill halted due to unresolved concerns from the banking sector and civil society.

The Belize Police Department (BPD) is the country's primary law enforcement organization. With U.S. government support, the BPD has made progress in professionalizing the force and expanding its technical capabilities. However, it continued to face resource challenges due to Ministry of Home Affairs budget reductions in 2022. Government funding reductions caused by the continued negative financial effects of COVID-19 exacerbated challenges throughout Belize's justice sector institutions.

The United States continues to provide support for law enforcement agencies, such as the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Belize's primary unit responsible for narcotics interdiction and the prosecution of narco-trafficking cases. The United States signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Belize Customs and Excise Department for the Foreign Electronic Cargo Data Exchange Program, which assists in targeting transnational crime through cargo monitoring.

Belize has been a member of INTERPOL since 1987. The United States facilitates continued dialogue between the Department of Justice and the Belizean Attorney General regarding extradition matters. Belize and the United States signed an extradition treaty on March 30, 2000. Extradition to other countries is governed by the Extradition Act. According to the 2020 UNODC Belize country report, Belize has little extradition experience. To date, Belize has not extradited any criminals to the United States.

The United States, through the Airborne Extensible Relay Over-Horizon Network (AERONet) project, is collaborating with Belize national security organizations to improve communication capabilities in working with other regional actors to deter Air Tracks Of Interest.

2. Supply Reduction

Belize experienced a significant decrease of narco-aircraft landings in 2022 due to increased interdiction and anti-drug operations where suspicious flights bound for Belize were targeted through cooperation with Belize's U.S.-supported Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). In the first nine months of 2022, Belize recorded six known narco-plane landings, of which five landed in the southern districts bordering Guatemala. This is a stark contrast to 2021, when fourteen confirmed plane landings were recorded. Belize's JIOC has collaborated extensively with regional partners, such as Mexico and Guatemala, to provide interception support to joint enforcement units.

Although their institutional capabilities remain underdeveloped, the BPD and other Belizean security institutions are resolute U.S. security partners. As of September 2022, the BPD reported narcotics seizures that included 1.4 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, 249 kilograms (kg) of marijuana, 8.9 kg of methamphetamine, and 148 grams of other drugs. The BPD made some seizures in collaboration with other U.S.-supported entities, such as the Belize Customs and Excise Department. U.S.-supported units arrested 27 individuals on drug-related charges. The Belize Prosecution Branch reported a total of one hundred and sixty-nine convictions in 2022 for drug-related criminal offenses.

Belize actively partners in regional counternarcotics operations and was among 19 countries involved in a joint firearms operation between INTERPOL and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Ministry of Health's National Drug Abuse Control Council (NDACC) is the government organization responsible for addressing Belize's domestic drug use issues. During 2022, NDACC partnered with various stakeholders, including the Community Policing Unit, Ministry of Health, fire department, National Institute for Culture and History, town councils, and child advisory boards to host a "Stakeholder's Camp" for youth to improve the country's response to narcotics abuse. NDACC also oversees two main rehabilitation centers. Although NDACC is a government body, many of its activities are funded through community assistance and donor programs.

4. Corruption

Belize, as a matter of government policy, does not encourage or facilitate illegal activities associated with drug trafficking; however, in recent years a number of law enforcement and military officials have been arrested for involvement in illicit drug-related activities. In 2021, five law enforcement officers were arrested and charged for assisting in the landing of a narcotics aircraft.

To address the issues of endemic corruption in the Belizean government, the United States is partnering to strengthen anticorruption efforts, including judicial reforms. Belize acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption in December 2016 and is working to ratify it. In

recent years, Belize has implemented a series of legislative reforms to assist in the fight against corruption, including the Money Laundering and Terrorism Prevention Amendment; Electronic Transfer of Funds Crime Bill; Misuse of Drug Act Amendment; Companies Amendment Bill; and Tax Administration and Procedure Amendment Bill. Despite these initiatives, government officials have failed to adequately implement anticorruption measures or insist on stringent accountability and rule of law within government institutions.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports capacity building for Belize's security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which supports the United States' Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration in Central America by tackling the underlying security and governance factors driving such migration. CARSI funding is aimed at fighting illicit drug production and trafficking and combatting corruption and transnational criminal organizations, which are among the key such drivers, complementing other U.S. efforts such as those focused on assisting vulnerable populations displaced by drug trafficking, violence, and crime.

In 1992, Belize and the United States signed a bilateral agreement to suppress illicit trafficking by sea with Belize, which includes provisions for pursuit and boarding, shipriders, entry to investigate, over-flight, order to land, and for the use of third-party platforms.

As a CARICOM member state, the United States supports Belize in sharing data via the Advance Passenger Information System. The United States also continues to support Belize's membership in the Regional Border Intelligence and Collaboration Center (GCIF) in El Salvador, where Belize currently maintains three liaison officers. Through October 2022, Belizean officials identified 137 individuals with criminal records through this collaboration. Two individuals had active Interpol alerts and seven had active arrest warrants. The individuals identified had criminal backgrounds for offenses ranging from; immigration violations, attempted aggravated robbery, sexual harassment, homicide, possession of drugs, extortion, active gang membership and other illicit activities.

In 2022, the United States, through the International Law Enforcement Academy, supported the participation of the BPD and other security units in training on law enforcement activities. These included trainings on chemical diversion investigations, emerging trends in illicit synthetic drugs, and production techniques.

D. Conclusion

Belize faces security and transnational crime challenges that can only be addressed through strengthening the rule of law, deterring corruption, and reaffirming counternarcotics efforts through its police and military force. Belize needs an increased focus on interagency communication and the development of multifaceted security, intelligence, and counternarcotics programs through continued collaboration with the United States.

Bolivia

A. Introduction

Bolivia is the world's third-largest source country of cocaine, following Colombia and Peru, and a major transit country for Peruvian cocaine. The United States estimates that Bolivia's coca cultivation in 2021 was relatively unchanged from 2020, totaling 39,700 hectares (ha), with the potential to produce 317 metric tons (MT) of cocaine. Bolivia maintains a legal coca market in recognition of coca's important traditional, religious, and medicinal significance in Bolivia. According to a 2013 European Union (EU)-funded study, 30 percent of the Bolivian population chew coca and the majority consume coca tea. The Bolivian government passed legislation in 2017 increasing legal coca cultivation to 22,000 hectares (ha). The 2013 EU-funded study estimated domestic demand for traditional and medicinal coca was less than 14,705 ha. The United States estimated coca cultivation totaled 39,700 ha in 2021, 80.5 percent more than the 22,000 ha limit. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates for the 2021 calendar year showed 30,500 ha were cultivated in Bolivia.

Coca production over legal limits increases the likelihood of coca diversion to cocaine production and exportation. In 2019, UNODC noted that 90 percent of coca cultivated in the Chapare region of Bolivia was destined for cocaine production, not traditional consumption. UNODC's estimate for coca leaf (dried) production potential in 2021 was 44,900 MT to 56,200 MT. Most Bolivian cocaine is exported to other Latin American countries, especially Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, for domestic consumption, or for onward transit from those countries to West Africa and Europe, rather than to the United States.

In September 2022, the United States determined that Bolivia failed demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international drug control agreements and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This determination was based, in part, on the Bolivian government's failure to take sufficient measures to safeguard the country's licit coca market from criminal exploitation. Bolivia was granted a National Interest Waiver allowing certain foreign assistance to continue. The presidential determination stated that the United States is encouraged by Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts over the past year, including increased cooperation with international partners.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Since President Luis Arce took office in November 2020, Bolivia's drug control approach has been influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, political concerns, and resource limitations. Nonetheless, the competent authorities across the Government of Bolivia are working together and with international partners to make advances in the control of illicit drugs.

Bolivia receives most of its foreign counternarcotics financial support from the EU, which funds programs to combat drug trafficking. In March, Bolivia participated in the EU-funded Assistance Program Against Transnational Organized Crime conference in Belgium and

contributed to the creation of the Latin America Committee on Internal Security, an entity designed to improve efforts to combat transnational organized crime.

The Vice Ministry for Social Defense and Controlled Substances (VMSD), under the Ministry of Government, is mandated to combat drug trafficking, regulate coca production, advance coca eradication and drug prevention, and execute rehabilitation programs. The Special Counter-Narcotics Police Force (FELCN) reports to the VMSD and comprises 1,158 personnel. The Joint Eradication Task Force conducts manual coca eradication with 1,750 personnel.

The Directorate of Support for the Prevention of Drug Use, Control of Illicit Traffic in Controlled Substances and Surplus Coca (DIPREVCON) reports to VMSD. DIPREVCON coordinates and funds drug enforcement operations across all Ministry of Government offices. DIPREVCON had a budget of \$21.92 million in 2022, down from \$30.65 million in 2021 and \$48.3 million in 2019.

Bolivia hosts the Regional Center for Counternarcotics Intelligence (CERIAN), a regional center created in January 2021, whose objective is to exchange intelligence information between Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Colombia, and others for combating narco trafficking in the region. Bolivia has individual bilateral agreements to exchange information with each CERIAN member, and the EU and UNODC plan to support the development of CERIAN as a multilateral institution.

Bolivia also coordinates bilaterally with countries in the region on counternarcotics. In March, FELCN coordinated with Brazilian authorities to destroy a mega drug laboratory in Noel Kempff National Park that could produce 10 metric tons of cocaine per month. Building on cooperation with Brazil, Minister of Government Carlos Eduardo del Castillo joined Brazilian officials to create an “integrated cabinet against organized crime” to coordinate joint police operations on the border, create a rapid response joint police network, and exchange information between police forces, as well as increase information-sharing between immigration and judicial institutions.

Bolivia’s national strategy to combat illicit drug trafficking, released in May 2021, is a four-year plan to: 1) control illicit traffic of controlled substances; 2) control the expansion of coca crops; 3) design and implement a comprehensive drug prevention policy addressing health, education, families, and communities; and 4) regionalize the fight against drug trafficking with international coordination. All four pillars share a mandate to include gender, human rights, and environmental strategies. Despite progress on this strategy, in January 2022, for the first time since 2010, the Bolivian government issued 3,000 new permits for retail coca distribution, which incentivizes more coca production and undermines eradication and interdiction efforts. Bolivia must continue to improve efforts to control surplus coca cultivation above 22,000 ha so that it is not diverted to the illicit market.

The United States and Bolivia are parties to a 1995 extradition treaty that permits the extradition of nationals for the most serious offenses, including drug trafficking. Bolivia and the United States do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty but can request assistance through various multilateral conventions to which both are signatories.

2. Supply Reduction

Through December 31, 2022 FELCN destroyed 55 cocaine hydrochloride processing labs and 618 rustic cocaine labs, an 8 percent increase and 23 percent decrease, respectively, from 2021. FELCN reported seizing 10.12 MT of cocaine base and 10.21 MT of cocaine hydrochloride in 2022, a 5 percent decrease and 30.7 percent increase respectively from 2021. FELCN arrested 3,433 individuals on drug-related offenses in 2022. In 2022, FELCN reported confiscating 99 aircraft involved in drug trafficking, compared to 20 seized in 2021.

The United States estimated that coca cultivation totaled 39,700 ha in 2021, a less than one percent increase from 2020, and that potential pure cocaine production increased 1.6 percent from 312 MT in 2020 to 317 MT in 2021.

On December 16, 2021, the Bolivian government announced it had eradicated 9,458 ha of surplus coca, exceeding its target of 9,000 ha. On January 13, 2022 the government announced it planned to eradicate 10,000 ha of excess coca in 2022. Some experts believe that at least 11,000 ha of coca must be eradicated yearly to see a net reduction in coca cultivation. As of September 25, 2022, Bolivian government authorities reported eradicating 7,089 ha of coca.

In 2021, UNODC observed increased seizures of synthetics and an increasing use of combining coca leaf with synthetics for recreational drug use. The government does not currently have a policy or coordinated effort to monitor the trafficking of fentanyl or other synthetic illicit drugs.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to UNODC, illicit drug consumption is low in Bolivia relative to other countries. Bolivia has approximately 80 drug treatment and rehabilitation centers, the majority of which are run by non-government organizations. Two public treatment centers are available, one in Tarija and the other in Santa Cruz. UNODC officials have noted that in 2021, a Cochabamba treatment center for drug addiction saw a rise in patients as young as nine years old addicted to synthetic illicit drugs.

4. Corruption

Senior government officials acknowledge serious corruption problems in the judiciary and police. In January, Bolivian authorities placed Maximiliano Davila, head of FELCN in 2019, in preventive detention on charges that he illicitly profited from his position. In April, Minister del Castillo announced an internal investigation of FELCN and found that about ten percent of FELCN police officers were “tainted” and would thus be removed from the unit. On July 5, the Bolivian government called for assistance from the EU, the UNODC, and the Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies to restructure the police due to serious allegations of corruption and associations with drug trafficking organizations.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States does not have a counterdrug presence in Bolivia. With the EU, the United States continues to fund a UNODC-led coca eradication-monitoring project, which aims to independently validate government eradication efforts for the international community. In 2022, Bolivia participated in two virtual and three in-person courses at the U.S.-supported International Law Enforcement Academy to strengthen capacity in combatting transnational crime. The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission in Bolivia.

D. Conclusion

Bolivia remains the third-largest source of coca and cocaine in the world – though far behind Colombia and Peru, the world’s first- and second-largest producers – and a major transit country for Peruvian cocaine. Bolivian interdiction and counternarcotic activities in 2022 were encouraging, especially increased cooperation with international partners; however, more work is needed to adequately control coca cultivation and stop cocaine production and trafficking. Given growing concern about the appearance of synthetic illicit drugs, the government of Bolivia may need to increase its efforts to interdict synthetic drugs.

Brazil

Brazil shares a 10,500-mile land border with 10 countries, including cocaine producing countries Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, making it a significant drug transit and destination country. Brazil is an important transit country for cocaine bound for Europe but also supplies other destinations.

Cocaine interdictions in Brazil have encountered aerial and maritime shipments destined for the United States and Europe. Covid-19 restrictions and increased law enforcement interventions in southern Brazil, including Port of Santos and the Tri-Border Area with Argentina and Paraguay, have pushed transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) toward the northern regions of the country. The proximity to drug-producing countries, particularly Colombia and Peru, and Amazonian rivers that serve as fluvial highways with limited infrastructure and law enforcement personnel have prompted TCOs to diversify their routes to transport cocaine and other illicit goods via northern Brazil to the United States and Europe.

Drug trafficking is a key revenue source for Brazil-based transnational criminal organizations, such as the “Primeiro Comando da Capital” (PCC), which constitute Brazil’s primary national security threat. PCC is active in at least 16 countries worldwide including the United States, according to Brazil’s Federal Police (PF). Domestic drug use and addiction is a significant problem in Brazil, and it is second only to the United States in cocaine consumption.

Counterdrug operations and seizures of cocaine and other illicit drugs increased during the first nine months of 2022 compared to the same period in 2021. Through September, the PF seized 80.4 metric-tons (MT) of cocaine and 293.2 MT of marijuana, a slight increase over the same period in 2021. As of October, the PF eradicated 1.69 hectares of cannabis plants in Paraguay, in coordination with the Paraguayan Federal Police, and 390.2 square meters in Brazil. Tetracaine, which is often added to cocaine, is subject to special control by the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency. Brazil takes a holistic approach to drug treatment including assistance to reintegrate people with substance use disorders into society, but its programs are not yet commensurate with the number of people suffering from such disorders.

The United States and Brazil are parties to bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties. The 2008 United States-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement provides the framework for capacity building in Brazilian federal and state agencies to combat illicit drug trafficking. The United States works to strengthen Brazilian efforts to counter transnational organized crime. In February 2022, U.S.-trained PF officers, in cooperation with international partners, seized over 10 MT of cocaine and \$3 million in assets in a transatlantic operation. In April, U.S.-trained PF officers and U.S. law enforcement collaborated with Cabo Verde authorities to seize approximately six MT of cocaine, worth over \$350 million, after inspecting a fishing vessel traveling from Brazil to Europe. This was the second-largest non-containerized transatlantic seizure of cocaine in Cabo Verde’s history.

The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission in Brazil.

Burma

A. Introduction

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has reported that Burma remains the main source of illicit manufacture of methamphetamine in the region and the second largest opium poppy cultivator in the world. Production and trafficking of synthetic narcotics in Burma has continued to increase since the February 1, 2021, military coup d'état, facilitated by the illicit import of precursor chemicals mainly from the People's Republic of China.

Enduring internal conflict and political instability caused by the military dictatorship and inter-ethnic conflict render large parts of the country beyond any effective government control and remain driving forces behind Burma's illicit economies, especially the narcotics trade. Organized crime groups have taken advantage of poorly controlled borders and exploited the regime's crippled governance in conflict areas, resulting in a record-breaking flow of production and trafficking of methamphetamine tablets from northern Burma into South and Southeast Asia through sea and land routes.

Narcotics produced in Burma are trafficked throughout the region, with routes extending beyond Southeast Asia to Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Burma is not a major source or transit country for drugs entering the United States. Synthetic drug cocktails such as "Happy Water" and "Wei Tiong" (mixtures of drugs including caffeine, methamphetamine, tramadol, and MDMA) have become increasingly popular among the younger population, and domestic drug consumption is substantial and widespread.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control is the regime's designated inter-ministerial coordinating body. The regime's Minister for Home Affairs is the Committee's Chair and the Commander of Myanmar Police Force's Drug Enforcement Division is the Joint Secretary. In January 2022, the Committee was reorganized to include 19 members from regime ministries and justice sector institutions with drug enforcement authorities.

The regime's Myanmar Police Force Drug Enforcement Division is the primary narcotics interdiction unit, though joint interdiction operations with the military are common. The Division is understaffed, with only 1,400 of nearly 4,000 authorized positions filled. One additional unit was formed within the Division to monitor inspections using scanning devices, joining operations with ten Drug Enforcement Sub-Divisions, and 65 Anti-Narcotics-Task Forces across the country. The legal framework to protect whistleblowers and to enable complex investigations does not exist, and narcotics cases often conclude without pursuing high-ranking suspects. The regime police force maintains relationships with its counterparts in Thailand, India, Australia, the Philippines, and China.

The regime Ministry of Legal Affairs provides oversight to all criminal narcotics prosecutions in Burma. COVID-19 restrictions continued to delay or suspend narcotics prosecutions, and since the coup, law enforcement has prioritized cases against pro-democracy actors. Prosecution of criminal activity by ethnic armed groups and military-affiliated militias remains outside of police authority to investigate and regime Ministry of Legal Affairs authority to prosecute.

Burma's law enforcement and justice institutions lack experience and understanding of extradition and mutual legal assistance mechanisms. Since the coup, the regime has limited its cooperation with international law enforcement except for efforts to pursue its political opponents. Burma has a colonial-era extradition treaty with the United States that has not been used in many years.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the 2022 UNODC Opium Survey, farmers cultivated an estimated 40,100 hectares of opium poppy, 33 per cent greater or about 10,000 more hectares than in 2021. Burma is not a significant source of fentanyl.

The regime Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control destroyed \$642 million in narcotics-related seizures on the 2022 International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, compared to \$667 million in 2021. The burning included 79 types of narcotic drugs and 17 types of precursor chemicals. From January to December 2022, the regime police reported major seizures, including over 23,402 kilograms (kg) of crystal methamphetamine, over 169 million yaba tablets, and 1,345 kg of heroin. The value of drugs seized in 2022 totaled more than the value seized in 2021.

Primary trafficking routes originate from Burma's Shan State to Thailand, China, India, and Bangladesh over land, and to southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan by sea.

Public data on drug-related arrests and prosecutions was unavailable due to curtailed engagement with regime officials. The regime enacted the Police Act in March increasing the Police's jurisdiction to include search and arrest without warrants, with a motive to criminalize anti-coup demonstrators.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Domestic consumption of illicit drugs is estimated to be high and growing, but official statistics are not available. Evidence-based drug rehabilitation services are insufficient to meet demand, and Burma relies on UN, international and local non-governmental organizations, and community-based entities to provide drug demand reduction services. The regime has not implemented the amended Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic Substance Law of 2018, focused on addiction as a public health issue. The United States continues to implement localized public programming, including to promote public awareness on prevention and recovery.

The Drug Dependency Treatment and Research Unit, under the regime Ministry of Health, provides methadone maintenance therapy, drug detox services, and opioid substitution therapy at public hospitals. Since the February 2021 coup, the regime Ministry of Health has established 29 major drug treatment centers, 59 minor drug treatment centers, and 89 methadone clinics. The regime Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement Department of Rehabilitation has 851 staff members and manages 14 drug rehabilitation centers.

4. Corruption

Burma does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of proceeds from illicit transactions. However, corruption is widespread, and illicit proceeds from the drug trade fuel further corruption and conflict. The Financial Action Task Force “blacklisted” Burma in October.

While the deposed civilian government had made strides to address official corruption, the military regime’s Anti-Corruption Commission has focused exclusively on targeting its political opponents with corruption charges to delegitimize the opposition since the coup.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Following the February 2021 coup, the United States suspended cooperation with Burma on counternarcotics. The United States previously partnered with the police on law enforcement intelligence sharing, joint investigations, training, and material assistance. Burma has not attended U.S.-supported International Law Enforcement Academy programs since the coup. The United States does maintain an information sharing relationship with the regime Myanmar Police Force’s Drug Enforcement Division.

The United States has continued partnerships with civil society to promote evidence-based drug rehabilitation and treatment services and to monitor the anticipated increase in the growth of opium poppy as significant economic contraction drives migrant labor back to opium producing areas in northern Burma.

D. Conclusion

Burma remains a major source of illicit drugs throughout Southeast Asia. Its domestic narcotics consumption is widespread, and illicit proceeds from the trade further threaten internal and regional stability. The absence of political will, capacity, and resources are significant obstacles to reducing drug production and trafficking, improving interdiction, and expanding investigations and prosecutions. These conditions are compounded by an increasingly fragile economy and a nonpermissive and often hostile working environment for enforcement and program implementation. While the scale of Burma’s narcotics problems is vast and growing, the United States remains a committed partner for the people of Burma as they confront counternarcotics issues at the local level and with the assistance of the international community.

Cabo Verde

Narcotraffickers, primarily from South America, exploit Cabo Verde's mid-Atlantic location, long coastline, and vast and largely unpatrolled maritime zone to transit cocaine, cannabis, and other drugs through the island nation to the African continent and Europe. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that criminal behavior and corruption accompanying drug trafficking adversely impacted security in 2022, with domestic trafficking contributing to increased consumption of illicit substances, criminality, youth gang activity, and homicide rates.

The level of corruption is relatively low. Cabo Verde's government has an integrated policy on drugs and crime with security, justice, and health, but lacks resources for demand reduction and preventing and combating street crime. Recidivism for drug crimes is high.

Support from the United States and other donors is helping to improve the capacity of Cabo Verdean law enforcement agencies to interdict illicit drug shipments. A joint U.S.-Cabo Verde operation seized a cargo of nearly six tons of cocaine in 2022 from waters near Cabo Verde. Additionally, authorities made several seizures of inbound multi-kilo body-carried cocaine at Cabo Verde airports. Authorities also seized 227 kilograms of cocaine from a French-flagged vessel at anchor in Mindelo in 2022.

The Attorney General's Office reported 321 new drug crime cases during the year ending July 2022, and 1,079 total cases including those pending from the previous year, 295 of which were resolved. Prosecutions of foreign nationals attempting to smuggle multi-ton shipments of cocaine through Cabo Verde by boat, as well as the extradition of a high-profile foreign national facing money laundering charges in the absence of a bilateral treaty, demonstrate the Cabo Verdean government's will to combat drug trafficking and related crimes. The United States partners with Cabo Verde to enhance maritime security and is exploring ways to increase cooperation in the border and cargo security sectors.

The United States provides robust and varied training to Cabo Verdean law enforcement and armed forces, including on border security and anti-contraband efforts. The Maritime Security Operations Center in Praia and the Rescue Coordination Center in Mindelo provide oversight of Cabo Verde's maritime territory, though Cabo Verde lacks an integrated radar system and vessels capable of interdiction at sea.

The United States and Cabo Verde do not currently have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty or an extradition treaty. However, Cabo Verde is still able to extradite non-Cabo Verdean nationals to the United States, and it is a party to multilateral law enforcement conventions that enable providing mutual legal assistance to the United States.

Cambodia

Cambodia has significant problems with narcotics consumption, trafficking, and production. In recent years, Cambodia has emerged as a significant transshipment country for Burma-sourced methamphetamine and heroin and a location for large-scale ketamine production. The manufacture, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs in Cambodia, particularly of ketamine, methamphetamine, and other amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) has continued unabated despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) from Asia, usually comprised of Chinese, Taiwanese, Cambodian, and Thai nationals, target Cambodia as both a transit and destination for illicit drugs. Precursor chemicals mainly sourced from China by TCOs are used at domestic clandestine laboratories operated by TCOs for the manufacturing of methamphetamine, ketamine, and other synthetic drugs, which are consistently being discovered and dismantled by Cambodian law enforcement.

According to statistics provided by the Cambodia Anti-Drug Police (ADP), ketamine is overtaking methamphetamine as the most seized drug, a significant shift from prior years, although methamphetamine continues to be the primary drug of concern. Heroin primarily transits Cambodia destined for other markets, with minimal domestic consumption. Marijuana is widely used across all levels of society.

During the first six months of 2022, the ADP reported that Cambodian law enforcement authorities had successfully initiated 3,258 drug-related investigations resulting in 7,757 arrests. As a result, Cambodian authorities seized approximately 255 kilograms (kg) of crystal methamphetamine, 7 kg of methamphetamine tablets, 2.7 metric tons (MT) of ketamine, 93 kg of ecstasy, 55 kg of heroin, 24 kg of Nimetazepam, 12 kg of cathinone, 32 kg of dried cannabis, 7,278 marijuana plants, and approximately 4.7 MT of precursor chemicals, indicative of the significant increase in domestic illicit drug production. On June 26, 2022, as part of Cambodia's International Anti-Drug Day, authorities destroyed over six tons of illicit narcotic substances.

U.S.-provided law enforcement training, coupled with the improved efficiency of the Cambodia Anti-Drugs Department, has resulted in substantial increases in the number of drug-related investigations, arrests, and seizures. Preliminary data for the first half of 2022 shows a significant increase of over 16 percent for drug-related arrests and over 240 percent of illicit drugs seized as compared to the same period in 2021. Cambodia does not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty or extradition agreement with the United States, although it has acceded to relevant multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation.

There are no INL-supported vetted or specialized Cambodian law enforcement units that had a counternarcotics mission in 2021 or 2022.

Canada

In 2022, transnational criminal organizations trafficked cocaine, opium, methamphetamine, other synthetic drugs, and prescription drugs (some of which transited the United States) to Canada for domestic consumption. Canada is a source of synthetic drugs (including synthetic opioids), cannabis, and MDMA trafficked to the United States. Canada and the United States cooperate on drug control efforts through federal arrangements and interactions between provincial, municipal, and tribal entities. Bilateral collaboration also occurs pursuant to the U.S.-Canada Joint Action Plan to Combat Opioids, launched in January 2020. Canada is a Party to United Nations conventions and protocols to combat illicit drugs, corruption, and organized crime.

Canada's Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) establishes a framework for the possession, production, and distribution of controlled substances that can be used in the manufacture of illegal drugs. On June 1, 2022, the government announced it was granting British Columbia a three-year exemption under the CDSA to remove criminal penalties for individuals who possess 2.5 grams or less of opioids, cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA for personal use, as of January 31, 2023. On October 5, 2022, the Government of Alberta announced that it would begin offering hydromorphone, diacetylmorphine, and fentanyl in licensed clinics and would license the use of psychedelic drugs, including psilocybin, psilocin, MDMA, LSD, mescaline, DMT and ketamine, in therapy settings.

Canada is the world's second largest consumer of prescription opioids per capita. The latest modelling projections from the Public Health Agency of Canada show opioid-related deaths remaining high in 2022 or even increasing, with 1,400 to 2,400 deaths projected quarterly throughout the year. This is compared to a total of 7,560 opioid deaths in 2021. The Canada Border Services Agency seized 2.7 metric tons (MT) of opioids in the first three months of 2022, compared to 1.1 MT in the first three months of 2021.

Canada legalized the production, distribution, sale, and possession of cannabis for non-medical purposes in 2018 but maintains criminal penalties for the possession of unlicensed goods. The transition to licensed sources of cannabis has improved over time since legalization. From the fourth quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2022, it is estimated that the legal share of household consumption expenditures on cannabis increased from 21.6 percent to 69.1 percent. In the first eight months of 2022, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized 23,000 pounds of marijuana on the northern border, compared to 80,000 pounds in 2021.

In 2022, the United States and Canada used asset-sharing, mutual legal assistance, and extradition and customs treaties to exchange forfeited assets, conduct extraditions, and cooperate on law enforcement matters. Additional measures Canada could undertake going forward include enhancing information sharing and cooperation on investigations into drug trafficking rings and possible seizures; increasing collaboration with the United States on money laundering investigations to target the illicit proceeds of drug traffickers; strengthening coordination that targets real estate and cryptocurrencies used in criminal transactions; and increasing cyber investigations of dark net vendors of illicit substances.

China

A. Introduction

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a major source of precursor chemicals for narcotics such as fentanyl and methamphetamine, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and synthetic drugs. The PRC shares borders with drug source countries in both Southeast and Southwest Asia and is a destination and transit country for methamphetamine and heroin produced in these areas. PRC criminal organizations traffic illicit drugs within the PRC and to international markets, and PRC authorities have noted the presence of international drug trafficking organizations originating from Mexico and Southeast Asia operating in the country. Its porous borders, expanding economy, numerous coastal cities with high-volume seaports, and vast network of international airports make the PRC an ideal hub for drug and precursor chemical production and trafficking.

According to U.S. and international law enforcement sources, the PRC remains a major source of precursor chemicals sold in North America, which are often purchased via the internet and shipped to overseas customers. Ineffective oversight of the PRC's massive chemical and pharmaceutical industries provides a permissive environment for the illicit sale of precursors as well as production of methamphetamine and ketamine. Domestic use of these synthetic drugs is prevalent. Chemical alterations of scheduled drugs to circumvent existing laws have hampered efforts to stem the flow of these drugs.

Confronting the opioid crisis in the United States requires effective bilateral U.S.-PRC counternarcotics and law enforcement cooperation. After PRC implemented class-wide controls of all forms of fentanyl in 2019 (at the urging of the United States), traffickers adapted their strategies, shifting to shipments of synthetic opioid precursor chemicals from the PRC to Mexico and Central America. PRC-based chemical and pharmaceutical companies have also made chemical alterations of scheduled drugs and their precursors to circumvent existing laws, thereby hampering efforts to stem the flow of these drugs. Although U.S. authorities have detected or seized almost no shipments of fentanyl or fentanyl analogues coming from the PRC since September 2019, fentanyl-related overdoses and seizures have continued to increase in the United States, likely in part due to these changes in trafficking strategies.

Mitigating the supply of synthetic opioid precursors from the PRC to third countries for fentanyl manufacturing and eventual shipment to illicit U.S. markets presents formidable challenges. The United States has pressed PRC law enforcement and chemical industry regulators to prevent these shipments, particularly through implementing "Know Your Customer" regulations. Additionally, trafficking by mislabeling cargo to bypass current laws and avoid detection are challenges that will test law enforcement authorities' adaptability to new trafficking techniques. It will take a coordinated effort by the United States, PRC law enforcement, and third countries in the supply chain to combat the trafficking of these precursors.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

PRC drug control strategy focuses on prevention, education, illicit crop eradication, interdiction, rehabilitation, commercial regulation, and law enforcement. The National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) is the national drug control policy entity; the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and provincial public security bureaus enforce NNCC policies and drug laws. The Anti-Smuggling Bureau within the General Administration of Customs is responsible for the enforcement of the PRC's drug control laws at seaports, airports, and land border checkpoints. The PRC maintains bilateral drug control agreements with many countries and international organizations, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and participates in a variety of international drug conferences and bilateral meetings. There is no extradition treaty between the PRC and the United States. The PRC and the United States are parties to a bilateral mutual legal assistance agreement that entered into force in 2001. Despite the existence of a mutual legal assistance agreement, many outstanding requests by both the United States and the PRC remained unfulfilled.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the NNCC's 2021 Annual Drug Report (published June 2022), PRC law enforcement investigated 54,000 drug-related cases, made 77,000 drug-related arrests, and seized 27 tons of illegal drugs in 2021. Investigations and arrests decreased from the previous year. PRC authorities also targeted clandestine labs used to produce NPS and other synthetic drugs, illicit drugs, and precursors, destroyed 123 drug manufacturing labs, and they seized 1.2 tons of illegal drug making materials.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to the NNCC, synthetic drugs – primarily methamphetamine – have surpassed heroin and other opioids as China's primary domestic drug threat. The PRC previously listed 431 kinds of drugs and scheduled fentanyl as a class, but NPS remain a problem. In addition, the NNCC noted etomidate, metomidate, and kratom leaf containing natural opioid properties were becoming more widespread. According to the NNCC's 2021 Annual Drug Report, the total number of registered illegal drug users in the PRC is 1.486 million, a year-on-year 17.5 percent decrease, but the actual number of drug abusers is estimated to be at least 14 million, according to media reports. Of the reported registered drug users, 793,000 used methamphetamine, a year-on-year 18.5 percent decrease, 556,000 reportedly used heroin, a year-on-year 19 percent decrease, and 37,000 used ketamine, a year-on-year 9 percent decrease.

4. Corruption

The PRC government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. The Ministry of Public Security takes allegations of drug-related corruption seriously and launches investigations when deemed appropriate. Despite efforts to stem drug-related

corruption, financial corruption among provincial, prefectural, county, and district government officials continues to be a concern. Based on publicly available information, no senior Chinese official at the central government level is known to have facilitated the illicit production or distribution of drugs since 2017. Similarly, no senior Chinese official from the central or provincial governments is known to have laundered proceeds from drug-related activities.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and the PRC have limited engagement on counternarcotics at the working level. The PRC's COVID-19 related restrictions on travel and in-person meetings drastically limited bilateral contacts in 2022. Additionally, the PRC announced a "suspension" in counternarcotics cooperation on August 5, 2022 as a "countermeasure" following the visit to Taiwan of then U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. In the past, the two countries have worked through the Bilateral Drug Intelligence Working Group (BDIWG), the Counter Narcotics Working Group (CNWG), and a working group of chemists and experts to exchange views and information on trends in drug use and trafficking; discuss pertinent laws, regulations, policies, and procedures in the respective countries; seek progress and address challenges in precursor chemical control; and find mechanisms to cooperate on cases of mutual interest.

The United States supports anti-corruption and counternarcotics initiatives through the presence of an INL-funded Department of Justice Resident OPDAT Legal Advisor who meets with prosecutors and judges to discuss comparative criminal justice and the administration of rule of law, particularly with regard to anti-corruption and counternarcotics regulations. Further, INL funds a specialized training program for select drug enforcement units of the PRC MPS Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to increase NCB capabilities to target, investigate, and disrupt significant drug trafficking organizations operating in China. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, no training with this funding has occurred to date.

D. Conclusion

The United States and the PRC have the potential for meaningful cooperation pending political will in Beijing. Despite current PRC resistance to bilateral cooperation, U.S.-PRC counternarcotics cooperation has been productive in the past and is an agreed area of potential cooperation. Drug trafficking, manufacturing, diversion, and other drug-related crimes remain significant problems in China, and precursor chemicals originating in China contribute directly to the opioid crisis in the United States. The PRC should strengthen enforcement of chemical control regulations and take other measures to prevent the diversion of drug precursors to illicit drug manufacturers and shipment of NPS directly to other countries. PRC law enforcement should assist U.S. law enforcement in tackling these new trafficking challenges.

Colombia

A. Introduction

Colombia is the world's top cocaine producer and exporter and a source of heroin and marijuana. According to the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Colombian coca cultivation decreased to 234,000 hectares (ha) in 2021 (the most recent period for which figures are available), compared to 245,000 ha in 2020. The United States estimates Colombia's potential pure cocaine production decreased from 994 metric tons (MT) in 2020 to 972 MT in 2021.

The United States and Colombia continued counternarcotics cooperation and the implementation of a whole-of-government approach focused on integrated supply reduction, rural security and development, and environmental protection. In September 2021, the United States and Colombia reiterated their commitment to working together on a holistic counternarcotics strategy focusing on efforts to dismantle organized criminal groups and reduce the production and trafficking of cocaine. They agreed to build resilience against the return of narcotrafficking in vulnerable areas through integrated rural security and development programs and committed to targeting efforts strategically in areas most afflicted with narcotics production and trafficking. While this strategy has not yet been officially reviewed by the administration of President Gustavo Petro, who took office in August 2022, bilateral cooperation under the strategy continues and Petro has publicly endorsed a shared focus on rural security and development and environmental protection as described in the strategy.

Colombia reported seizing or assisting with the seizure of 783 MT of cocaine and cocaine base in 2022. Colombian authorities eradicated approximately 70,000 hectares of coca in 2022, about 30,000 hectares short of eradication efforts in 2021 and similarly short of the 2022 eradication goal established by the previous Colombian administration. Ninety seven percent of the cocaine samples seized in the United States and subjected to laboratory analysis were of Colombian origin.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In January 2022, Colombia's Constitutional Court – its highest court on constitutional matters – annulled two lower court decisions from 2021 related to the Duque administration's efforts to resume aerial eradication. The practical effect of the decision, in which the Court ruled the government must redo extensive public consultations as part of the environmental licensing process and put into place more stringent requirements for conducting prior consultations in ethnic communities, was to render the resumption of aerial eradication highly unlikely. Upon taking office, President Petro announced his administration sought to enhance interdiction operations and anti-money laundering efforts targeting high-level narcotraffickers. He has stated his intention to shift focus to voluntary eradication of coca once a revised crop substitution program can be reliably implemented, while maintaining credible forced-eradication capacity under certain circumstances. As the government reviews its counternarcotics plans, Colombia continues its manual eradication programs.

2. Supply Reduction

The United States estimates coca cultivation in Colombia decreased to 234,000 ha in 2021, the year for which the most data is available, compared to 245,000 ha in 2020. The Colombian Ministry of Justice reports police, military, and civilian contractors eradicated approximately 70,000 ha of coca nationwide in 2022. This represents a shortfall of approximately 30,000 ha compared to both eradication efforts in 2021 and the eradication goal for 2022 as established by the previous Colombian administration. As a result of a May 2021 appellate court ruling, the majority of the 68,300 hectares of coca in Nariño, the department with the most coca in 2021, remained off-limits for forced eradication. The court ruled that the Colombian police and military may not eradicate within Afro-Colombian communities in the Department of Nariño, in addition to indigenous reserves, unless the government first completes a lengthy prior consultation process. Along with coca eradication, the Colombian government's drug control priorities include interdicting cocaine and precursor chemicals, dismantling criminal groups, and targeting top drug traffickers. Colombian authorities reported seizing or assisting in the seizure of 783 MT of cocaine and cocaine base in Colombia and abroad in 2022.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to the Organization of American States (OAS) 2019 Report on Drug Use in the Americas (released every four years), Colombia has the fifth-highest consumption rate of cocaine and the sixth-highest consumption rate of marijuana in Latin America. According to the Colombian government's 2019 National Household Consumption Study, the highest rates of cocaine use are among young people between the ages 18 and 24. That age group, along with people between the ages of 25 and 34, accounts for 64 percent of all consumers. Colombia focuses treatment on youth who use drugs. The Colombian National Police prevention unit teaches drug prevention to school children. Colombia expanded its juvenile drug treatment court, first piloted in Medellín, to seven other cities. Colombia is also expanding restorative justice programs and training drug prevention and treatment professionals in evidence-based practices through the U.S.-developed Universal Treatment and Prevention Curricula.

4. Corruption

Colombia does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption remains a pervasive problem, although the country made modest gains in the 2021 Global Corruption Perception Index, ranking 87 of 180 countries (up from 92 in 2020). The Colombian Attorney General's Office received 12,121 reports of corruption through September 2022 – 1,083 more than the same period in 2021. That office has presented provisional charges against 3,047 people, arrested 1,313 individuals, and obtained 647 convictions in this period. Colombia does not regularly publish these figures.

Corruption in Colombian institutions is exemplified by the high-profile case of retired Army Colonel Robinson González del Río, who as of October was on trial for his links to the narco-trafficker known by the alias "Matamba." González was charged with money laundering, aggravated conspiracy to commit a crime, illegal use of uniforms and insignia, bribery,

trafficking, manufacture, and possession of narcotics, among other crimes. He allegedly used his position to alert Matamba to military operations in exchange for handouts, including approximately \$11,000 monthly to an Army commander in Nariño who allegedly helped traffic cocaine. Several other military personnel are linked to these crimes.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

In 2021, the U.S. and Colombian governments agreed to implement a holistic bilateral counternarcotics strategy. The United States provides counterdrug, security, and rule of law assistance to the Colombian police and military, the justice ministry, the offices of the attorney general and inspector general, and the judiciary. Bilateral cooperation on extraditions, drug, and money laundering investigations have resulted in hundreds of U.S. indictments and the extradition of high-level drug traffickers. Additionally, the 2016 Asset Sharing Agreement between the United States and Colombia permits the sharing of the proceeds of assets that are seized and forfeited by U.S. or Colombian law enforcement. To date, the United States has shared proceeds with Colombia on four occasions pursuant to the agreement.

The United States works to strengthen Colombian institutions, especially those located in rural, conflict-affected areas. The focus includes reducing drug trafficking and supply; increasing citizen security; formalizing land titles; bolstering economically sustainable legal livelihoods and markets; expanding the permanent presence of and confidence in the police and other government institutions; environmental protection; promoting the rule of law; dismantling organized crime networks; and protecting human rights. Through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, Colombia's police and military build law enforcement capacity by training regional counterparts in countering transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. Colombia also demonstrates regional leadership in coordinating the multinational Campaign Orion, which, with U.S. support, has seized a combined total of approximately 716 MT of cocaine in nine operations since 2018. The United States and Colombia maintain an agreement to suppress illicit traffic by sea.

D. Conclusion

Reducing cocaine production and dismantling organized criminal groups is critical to achieving enduring peace in Colombia. The Colombian police and military have prevented hundreds of metric tons of drugs from reaching the United States annually at great financial and human cost to Colombian forces and eradicators. To prevent additional coca cultivation, Colombia will need to maintain robust forced eradication, expand voluntary eradication, and augment cocaine and precursor interdiction operations. The United States will continue to engage closely with Colombia on its plans to address its high levels of coca cultivation. Key to achieving sustained reductions in cocaine production is expanding state presence in rural areas to reduce criminal activity and create conditions for licit livelihood efforts. Colombian crop substitution and rural development programs also require strong commitment and investment. In October, Colombia's Congress approved the \$93.3 billion budget for 2023, including a ten percent increase for defense and police proposed and submitted by Petro's administration.

Costa Rica

A. Introduction

Costa Rica remains the top transshipment point for cocaine en route to the United States from South America and is a key transit point in international narcotics trafficking. Costa Rica's geographic location, vast maritime territory, and historically small and underfunded security sector combine to make it an attractive transit and warehousing hub for illicit drug trafficking.

Costa Rica has a growing domestic drug consumption problem, as drugs warehoused in Costa Rica increasingly enter the local market and domestic criminal organizations gain influence with increased narcotics revenues. The national homicide rate rose from 11.2 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021 to 12.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2022. The homicide rate in the province of Limon is 35.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. Despite these challenges, Costa Rica works closely with the United States to professionalize police, strengthen citizen security, and increase drug interdictions. However, resource limitations strain Costa Rican law enforcement services and pose significant challenges to future success.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

With U.S. support, Costa Rica engaged in numerous police professionalization efforts in 2022, including leadership training, improvements to training facilities, expanded canine programs, and better cooperation between national and local authorities.

Costa Rica's Coast Guard is a successful regional partner in maritime interdiction, conducting sustained joint operations with the United States. However, ongoing professional development is required to ensure it can maintain and operate its fleet.

A U.S.-supported remote image processing center is the centerpiece of a container scanning operation that monitors high-risk cargo exiting the country. Major drug seizures continued in 2022, though scanning capability is limited to the major Caribbean port of Moin. Strains on staffing and equipment mean that the port serves as an exit point for large volumes of drugs.

The U.S.-supported UH-1ST helicopter program expanded training in 2022, despite a pause from June to September requested by Costa Rica. In 2022 Costa Rica's Air Surveillance Police began operating a U.S.-supported Small Unmanned Aircraft System program, with eight unmanned aircraft and a structured training and operations program, increasing its ability to conduct intelligence and law enforcement operations in remote regions.

2. Supply Reduction

During the period January to September 2022, Costa Rica seized 41.57 metric tons (MT) of drugs, including 22.84 MT of cocaine, and reported disrupting at least six international drug trafficking rings, working closely with the United States and regional partners.

Drugs continue to flow through Costa Rica, though the government makes concerted efforts to stop them. Maritime seizures on both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts are a major component of Costa Rica cooperation with the United States. Cocaine destined for both the United States and Europe transits the port of Moin, where U.S. support helps identify containers with illicit drugs. A U.S.-supported dive team seized over 170 kilograms of cocaine in September 2022, locating several submerged torpedo-shaped devices on the side of a container ship.

Costa Rican authorities reported destroying over 499,960 cannabis plants from October 2021–August 2022, a 20 percent increase over the previous year.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Costa Rican Drug Institute oversees national anti-drug strategy and drug prevention programs. The Institute on Alcohol and Drug Abuse offers treatment and prevention programs, though considerable gaps remain. Drug-related crimes are serious offenses in Costa Rica, although laws against personal consumption are rarely enforced.

4. Corruption

Costa Rica does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. There is no evidence that senior government officials are engaged in such activity. In 2022, the Judicial Branch expanded implementation of the country's first organized crime court, including remodeling a special courthouse and training judicial personnel.

Despite advances, government corruption remains a pervasive problem. As of May 2022, 12 members of the 2018-2022 National Assembly had criminal corruption cases pending, which continued to move forward following the May 2022 seating of a newly elected Assembly. As a recent signatory to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Anti-Bribery Convention, Costa Rica combats corruption on multiple fronts. In 2022, the National Public Ethics Prosecutor office took major steps, including working with 15 professional associations whose members engage in corruption – such as attorneys, engineers, accountants, architects, physicians, and the media – to develop strengthened ethics and transparency protocols.

The Judicial Branch also continued its efforts to strengthen ethics controls in investigative, prosecutorial, and court systems, with the Judicial Investigative Police implementing an internal anti-corruption program. The Judicial Branch, with assistance from the United States, is also launching three new anti-corruption initiatives to identify and manage corruption in the judiciary.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports capacity building for Costa Rica's security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). CARSI supports the United States' Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration in Central America by tackling the underlying security and governance factors driving such migration. CARSI funding is aimed at fighting illicit drug production and trafficking and combating corruption and transnational

criminal organizations, which are among the key such drivers of migration, complementing other U.S. efforts such as those focused on assisting vulnerable populations displaced by drug trafficking, violence, and crime.

The United States supports police professionalization through a range of leadership and specialized training. At the National Police Academy, the United States provides both curriculum support and infrastructure development.

The U.S.-Costa Rican citizen security program *Sembremos Seguridad* (“Let’s Sow Security”) serves as a cornerstone of bilateral cooperation to prevent drug-related crime, address the root causes of criminality, and reduce the influence of transnational criminal organizations. Costa Rica is an energetic partner in this program, which is active in all 85 municipalities around the country. A new preventative policing model launched in 2022 combines data on crime trends and community risk factors, producing a roadmap that allows local police to identify crime hotspots and better respond to the needs of local communities.

The United States is in the final stages of installing a narcotics incinerator, providing Costa Rica the capability to destroy seized narcotics. Across the justice sector, the United States provides support on a broad range of topics, including countering organized crime, trafficking in drugs and persons, money laundering, cybercrime, anti-corruption, gender-based violence and alternative restorative justice programs.

Costa Rica’s Maritime Interdiction Units expanded to Limon Province in 2022. They now carry out major narcotics interdictions on both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.

D. Conclusion

Costa Rica in 2022 demonstrated a strong commitment to countering narcotics trafficking and transnational criminal organizations, despite major challenges posed by the country’s difficult financial situation and widespread under resourcing. Top priorities should include: 1) efforts to maintain and sustainably operate capital assets, to include much-needed staffing increases in police forces; 2) professionalizing police and judicial institutions, with an emphasis on anti-corruption; 3) investment in border and port security, to include increased use of scanning technology; 4) strengthening Costa Rica’s cooperation with regional partners; and 5) efforts to expand citizen security best practices within Costa Rica and throughout the region.

Cuba

Cuba is not a major consumer, producer, or transshipment point for illicit drugs. Cuba's domestic production and consumption is low due to aggressive policing and strict prison sentences coupled with nationwide prevention and information campaigns. The robust and aggressive security presence in the country reduces demands internally and severely limits the ability of transnational criminal organizations to establish a foothold. Cuba continues to concentrate its efforts on patrolling its territorial seas and conducting searches at its ports of entry. Abandoned packages of suspected illicit drugs often land on Cuban beaches. The resources dedicated to confronting illicit drug trafficking cause drug trafficking entities to bypass Cuba in favor of neighboring countries.

Cuba participates in the international community's effort to curb the flow of illicit drugs from producing to consuming countries. Most of the seizures of illicit drugs come from contraband washing onto Cuban shores. Cuba is a signatory to major international conventions pertaining to efforts to stem the flow of illicit drugs, and to 43 bilateral agreements to assist control efforts. In particular, the Cuban Border Guard (CBG) has a long-standing relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and reports known or suspected drug trafficking efforts to the USCG if there is no Cuban nexus. The U.S. Embassy maintains a USCG Liaison Officer to facilitate communication between governments. Information sharing is limited to the working level.

Prescription drug abuse remains low compared to other countries. Despite severe pharmaceutical shortages in Cuba, steroids, psychoactive drugs, sedatives, and painkillers are available on the black market through diversion from the legitimate supply chain (including drugs intended for veterinary use) and illicit importation.

Dominican Republic

A. Introduction

The Dominican Republic is the top first-stop country for cocaine shipments in the Caribbean. “Go-fast” boats and commercial containers are the primary methods of transportation. The Dominican government continued its cooperation with the United States in 2022 to interdict illicit drug shipments, extradite criminals, and combat the influence of drug traffickers and transnational criminal organizations, although corruption continues to impede these efforts. Most drugs are transshipped to the United States and Europe, although some are consumed locally.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The United States has a strong relationship with key Dominican government law enforcement institutions. The primary partners are the National Directorate for the Control of Drugs (DNCD); the Dominican National Police (DNP); the National Council on Drugs (CND); the Office of the Attorney General (PGR); the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI); and the Armed Forces. The Dominican Specialized Corps for Port Security (CESEP), and Specialized Corps for Airport Security (CESAC), working with U.S. authorities, international organizations, and private port operators, continued to improve security at key aerial and sea points of entry. The participation of the Dominican government in the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), the Cooperative Situational Information Integration system, and the Central America Integration System (SICA) enhanced relations with the United States and regional partners.

2. Supply Reduction

Most seizures result from operations targeting vessels from South America. Dominican forces seized 24.45 metric tons (MT) of cocaine during the first nine months of 2022 in Dominican territory with a street value of \$733.6 million. Despite the challenges experienced as the Dominican Republic incrementally increased the number of operations since the onset of the pandemic, seizures were 70 percent higher than in the same period in 2021.

Dominican security forces cooperate with U.S. and international partners in planning and conducting interdiction operations. The United States supports two Dominican ports, Caucedo and Haina, with two agents assigned under the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). INL supports the operations of four Port Control Units (PCU) at the ports of Rio Haina, Caucedo, Puerto Plata, and Manzanillo under the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Container Control Program. The PCUs are responsible for profiling and targeting suspect containers and are made up of members from the DNCD, CESEP, CESFRONT, and Customs.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Drug use occurs throughout the country but is concentrated in tourist centers and major urban areas. The Dominican government conducts outreach to inform the general population and youth

about the dangers of drugs. The CND conducted demand reduction efforts in 2022 under its strategic national prevention plan. The DNP promoted community-based policing as an effective way to deal with crime locally and the publication of its Community Policing manual has served as a catalyst to implement community policing in the country's largest cities.

4. Corruption

The Dominican government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Recognizing the negative impact corruption has on law enforcement, the Abinader administration has demonstrated a willingness to combat endemic corruption by prioritizing efforts to address association with illicit activities among judicial, military, and law enforcement entities. In 2022, the PGR launched several high-profile operations to dismantle major Transnational Criminal Organizations, reflecting a commitment on the part of the Dominican government and a more independent PGR to combat corruption across all political parties. In 2022, President Abinader announced the establishment of a money laundering task force made up of members from multiple institutions across the government.

In July 2022, the Dominican Congress unanimously approved a Civil Asset Forfeiture Bill, which was subsequently signed into law. Civil asset forfeiture, a powerful tool to fight corruption and organized crime, will allow the Dominican Republic to confiscate assets acquired through, or used in, a range of illicit activities including corruption, narcotrafficking, and human trafficking. Efforts to approve the Asset Management law that will strengthen the Civil Asset Forfeiture Law are underway.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U. S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a wide range of efforts to address crime and violence affecting Dominican citizens, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and Caribbean nations that seeks to reduce illicit trafficking and increase public safety and security. U.S. assistance improves Dominican capabilities to conduct investigations, undertake effective prosecution, and coordinate and participate in drug control efforts with the United States and neighboring countries.

The United States provided equipment and training in 2022 to increase the capabilities of the DNCD canine unit, the Dominican Navy, and other specialized units, to enhance coordination and strengthen maritime capabilities through training in maritime law enforcement, boarding inspections, search and rescue, port security, and professional development. The United States also provided training, equipment, and other assistance to law enforcement and military institutions to strengthen maritime interdiction and land-based operational capabilities. This included training and technical assistance to the DNCD and DNP to strengthen police skills, improve management and leadership, enhance operational capabilities, and modernize the institution. During 2022, multiple U.S.-funded sources – including the U.S. Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation (USCAP), the International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, UNODC, and private institutions conducted over 50 activities and trained more than 1400 Dominican law enforcement and military officials.

The United States plans to support the CND with a community anti-drugs coalition grant to reduce drug use in vulnerable areas in the Dominican Republic's two largest cities – Santo Domingo and Santiago. The United States also provided technical assistance in the drafting and promotion of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Law.

U.S. assistance strengthens Dominican civil society coalitions for citizen security and criminal justice reform, supports access to justice for vulnerable populations, and helps at-risk youth pursue education, vocational training, and employment.

The U.S.-Dominican Republic extradition treaty entered into force in December 2016, updating a 1909 treaty. The Dominican Republic is one of the United States' most active extradition partners. Requests for legal assistance take place under multilateral treaties. Cooperation through law enforcement channels is robust. The Dominican Republic has had an agreement on international narcotics control cooperation with the United States since 1985. The Dominican Republic signed and ratified the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement (also known as the Treaty of San Jose) and has a maritime counter-drug agreement with the United States that entered into force in 1995.

D. Conclusion

Combating pervasive corruption, restoring public confidence in law enforcement, addressing illicit maritime drug smuggling, and confronting rising levels of citizen insecurity are major challenges facing the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic's interdiction efforts and record seizures demonstrate institutional capacity and political will to help stem the flow of drugs into the country. The Abinader administration has shown a strong commitment to strengthen efforts to build a coherent, multifaceted drug control strategy featuring both increased cooperation between national security forces and greater regional and international cooperation.

Dutch Caribbean

A. Introduction

The countries of the Dutch Caribbean vary in the degree to which illicit drug trafficking is significant, but several are key transshipment points. The Dutch Caribbean consists of Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba. Aruba, Curacao, and Sint Maarten are semi-autonomous countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba are special municipalities of the country of the Netherlands. Aruba and Curacao are located 30 to 40 miles north of Venezuela and serve as northbound transshipment points for cocaine originating from Colombia and Venezuela. Cocaine is primarily transported via go-fast vessels, fishing boats and inter-coastal freighters for transshipment to the United States, other Caribbean islands, Africa, and Europe. Sint Maarten is in the Eastern Caribbean and is a transshipment hub for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana transiting onward to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands as well as Europe.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Aruba, Curacao, and Sint Maarten have a high degree of autonomy over their internal affairs, with the right to exercise independent decision-making in several counternarcotics areas. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is responsible for the islands' defense and foreign affairs and assists the governments in their efforts to combat drug trafficking through its support for the Recherche Samenwerkings Team or "Special Police Task Force" (RST) and the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard (DCCG).

Since 2016, the United States, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Aruba, Sint Maarten, and Curacao have been party to a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at enhancing existing cooperation and strengthening law enforcement and the criminal justice system in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. These efforts are ongoing.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the single point of contact for drug enforcement efforts in the region, with DEA coordinating illicit drug investigations between other U.S. law enforcement agencies and DEA's regional counterparts. These efforts have strengthened relationships with the foreign counterparts, and enhanced cooperation among the regional law enforcement counterparts, allowing DEA and other U.S. agencies to further investigations with a domestic nexus.

Aruba

Aruba's police force, the Korps Politie Aruba (KPA), is a regional leader in addressing drug trafficking and combating transnational criminal organizations. The KPA is at the forefront of collecting and sharing intelligence with regional law enforcement partners. The primary methods of transporting cocaine to Aruba are go-fast vessels, cargo containers and commercial flights. KPA conducted several successful investigations in 2022, especially in collaboration

with the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard (DCCG). In the first nine months of 2022 KPA, with the assistance of other law enforcement agencies, seized over 3.7 metric tons (MT) of cocaine and approximately 100 kilograms of marijuana. Additionally, KPA seized almost \$100,000 in U.S. currency. U.S. law enforcement continues to work with KPA and other law enforcement agencies on the island including RST, in an effort to disrupt significant drug traffickers with the possibility of a prosecution in the United States. In November 2022, the United States provided training to approximately 30 individuals from Koninklijke Marechaussee (KMAR) and KPA in order to target suspicious aircrafts and their pilots. U.S. law enforcement regularly meets with prosecutors in Aruba to make coordinated law enforcement efforts more productive. Despite resource challenges, the KPA and its partners continue to investigate trafficking organizations effectively. The United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands maintain a bilateral agreement concerning access to and use of facilities in the Netherland Antilles and Aruba for aerial counternarcotics activities.

Curacao

Curacao's police force, the Korps Politie Curacao (KPC), works closely with the United States to diminish the flow of illicit drugs from Venezuela and Colombia to the Dutch Caribbean. In the first nine months of 2022, as part of joint law enforcement efforts involving the DCCG, KPC seized more than 8.6 MT of cocaine. United States law enforcement collaborates well with KPC, RST, and KMAR on multiple law enforcement efforts, particularly with targets involved in maritime drug smuggling and the movement of drugs via aircrafts, both private and commercial. The United States is also working with KPC and their law enforcement partners to investigate money laundering activities being organized by Chinese nationals based in Curacao. DEA also provided a first-of-its-kind training to approximately 40 individuals via the FAA to KMAR and KPC to target suspicious aircrafts and their pilots to promote interagency cooperation and interoperability with the United States.

The United States is also making strong efforts to build relationships with prosecutors and the Minister of Justice. KPC continues to investigate drug trafficking organizations effectively, but institutional weaknesses remain. The United States provides investigative equipment to the KPC which assists both agencies and countries with bi-lateral drug investigations.

Sint Maarten

Sint Maarten/Saint Martin is a significant transshipment point for cocaine trafficked from the Caribbean to the United States, in part due to its proximity to the U.S. Virgin Islands (approximately 100 nautical miles away) and Puerto Rico (approximately 200 nautical miles away). Cocaine is also trafficked from Sint Maarten to Europe, often via transatlantic shipping vessels. Although cocaine is the most prominent drug trafficked through Sint Maarten and its territorial waters, heroin and marijuana are also trafficked through the country and region. This small two-nation island (Sint Maarten/Dutch side – population of approximately 44,000 and Saint Martin/French side – population of approximately 37,000) is a challenging place for law enforcement to combat drug trafficking. Colombian and Venezuelan drug trafficking organizations operating on the island mostly employ Dominican boat captains to transport large cocaine shipments via go-fast vessels to the United States. Multi-ton quantities of cocaine are

smuggled monthly into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands via go-fast vessels from Sint Maarten/Saint Martin.

Following a 2021 operation, the United States and the Korps Politie St. Maarten (KPSM) successfully extradited a high-level narcotics trafficking fugitive after his arrest the previous year. The United States and St. Maarten law enforcement partners are currently focusing on many of the transporters related to this same organization. Dominican drug traffickers, along with their local St. Maarten associates, remain the most significant threat to violence and criminal activity on the island. Additionally, KPSM and RST have recognized an increase in targets believed to be associated with Canadian organized crime families and outlaw motorcycle gangs. These organizations are believed to be smuggling drugs to Canada via private aircrafts and laundering illegal proceeds through casinos established in St. Maarten. KPSM has also identified high-grade marijuana being smuggled from Canada to St. Maarten.

The Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard, KMAR, RST, Dutch Navy, Central Office for the Suppression of Illicit Drug Trafficking, and French Customs in Saint Martin work effectively to target maritime vessels trafficking large quantities of cocaine from Sint Maarten/Saint Martin to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, Saba

The National Office for the Caribbean in the Netherlands Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations oversees law enforcement, security, and other administrative functions on behalf of the Government of the Netherlands for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba.

None of these islands have particularly high levels of detected drug trafficking. However, Bonaire is at times suspected of being a staging location for pilots and smaller private planes planning to take illicit flights to South and Central America. The pilots and planes are suspected of then transporting illicit drugs north throughout the Caribbean and the United States. Additionally, because of the significant success with seizing maritime drug loads by the DCCG in the vicinity of Bonaire, the Korps Politie Caribisch Nederland (KPCN) seized nearly seven MT of cocaine. The seizures and related arrests significantly impacted their law enforcement and judicial systems. The United States made a significant effort to partner with both KPCN and the prosecutor's office to jointly exchange information and potential evidence to strengthen the local prosecution and potentially enhance international drug investigations initiated in the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

Increased intelligence sharing and cooperation between Dutch Caribbean law enforcement organizations and the United States offers opportunities to improve counternarcotics efforts. Through more routine case coordination meetings among various United States agencies and regional law enforcement, particularly in the Eastern Caribbean, law enforcement has improved its ability to receive, evaluate and act on drug smuggling intelligence impacting the region and ultimately prevent the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. A layered law enforcement

approach between the United States and the various Dutch Caribbean law enforcement organizations has resulted in more than 19 MT of cocaine seized throughout the region.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Drug treatment and prevention is accomplished through a combination of privately and publicly funded foundations on each island. Sint Maarten has one drug treatment foundation on the French portion of the island and one drug treatment facility on the Dutch portion.

Curacao has a government funded drug rehabilitation center known as Fundashon pa Maneho di Adikshon, known locally as “FMA.” FMA focuses on various forms of addiction including, drugs, alcohol and gambling. Drug rehabilitation is at times court ordered in Curacao, with persons ordered to attend rehabilitation receive services from FMA.

4. Corruption

None of the Dutch Caribbean countries, as a matter of government policy, encourages or facilitates illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. However, wages, economic hardship, and small island politics can make counterparts more vulnerable to corruption, and active investigations are underway to thwart corruption throughout the region.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. counternarcotics policy in the Dutch Caribbean aims to promote cooperation between law enforcement and military partners and reduce illicit drug trafficking. The United States works with its island counterparts to advance joint investigations, both within the Dutch Caribbean and the United States. The Kingdom of the Netherlands supports counternarcotics efforts by supporting the U.S. Air Force Cooperative Security Locations in Curacao. The United States conducts detection and monitoring flights from the FOL in Curacao over the southern Caribbean Sea. In addition, the Dutch Navy regularly conducts counternarcotics operations in the region. The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission in the Dutch Caribbean countries.

D. Conclusion

Over ten years after the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles, Curacao, Aruba, and Sint Maarten are still establishing counternarcotics organizational structures among their agencies with increasing success. United States law enforcement continues to take a multi-pronged approach to counter illicit drugs in the region, including further training of counterparts, enhancing intelligence for interdiction operations, and collaborating with top priority investigations. The United States encourages the Dutch Caribbean islands to embrace regional cooperation and intelligence sharing efforts in furtherance of securing this international region.

Eastern Caribbean

A. Introduction

The “Eastern Caribbean” refers to seven independent countries in the region: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Eastern Caribbean drug production consists of marijuana cultivation, in most cases for local consumption, with varying amounts produced in each of the seven countries. The region is also a transshipment channel for cocaine and marijuana to North America, Europe, and the wider Caribbean basin. Countries report increases in seizures of high-grade marijuana originating from the United States and Canada. There is small scale local demand for cocaine and negligible use of synthetic drugs.

Challenges in the Eastern Caribbean to addressing the illegal drug trade include the region’s jurisdictional complexity due to extensive maritime borders and a lack of capacity among regional police forces. Countries also lack sufficient maritime patrol and domain awareness resources to effectively cover their national waters. Traffickers use a variety of vessels to transport illicit drugs, but “go-fast” and fishing boats are the most popular, enabling traffickers to evade capture by accessing multiple territorial waters to move drugs through the region.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The police forces of all Eastern Caribbean countries have dedicated drug units, which generally have solid working relationships with the United States on counternarcotics operations. Given the small size of Eastern Caribbean countries, many police forces face institutional challenges due to resource constraints, a lack of professional and leadership development, and corruption.

All governments noted an increase in seizures of marijuana from the United States and Canada at its ports of entry. Many countries indicated that traffickers importing marijuana into the region increasingly use commercial carriers and express mail delivery services.

Several countries have decriminalized the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana. Barbados decriminalized possession of 14 grams or less of marijuana, while Dominica decriminalized the possession of up to 28 grams. Saint Kitts and Nevis allow for the possession of up to 56 grams of marijuana.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines allows cultivation of marijuana under the Medical Cannabis Industry Act of 2018. Antigua and Barbuda issued medicinal cannabis licenses to companies to grow marijuana.

All Eastern Caribbean countries have extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties in force with the United States. All have signed or ratified the Inter-American Convention against

Corruption and the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Lucia ratified the Inter-American Convention on Extradition. Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Grenada signed and/or ratified the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.

2. Supply Reduction

During the first ten months of 2022, the seven countries of the Eastern Caribbean reported drug seizures totaling 1 metric ton (MT) of cocaine and 6.6 MT of marijuana. Ninety eight percent of the cocaine seizures in the region occurred in Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, while two-thirds of the marijuana seized was in Barbados and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

During the same period, Saint Kitts and Nevis reported 19 arrests, 15 prosecutions, and four convictions for drug-related offenses, including the arrest of five individuals in October 2022 for trafficking 800 kilograms of cocaine. Barbados reported 122 drug-related arrests, while Grenada reported 132 arrests and 125 prosecutions. No data for the other countries was available at the time of this report.

The United States provided assistance to all of the countries, as well as to regional security organizations, in the form of training, advisory programs, and equipment, which has allowed U.S. law enforcement agencies to build better operational relationships with counterparts.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

While reliable statistics on local consumption are not always available, evidence indicates that marijuana is the most used drug locally. All Eastern Caribbean countries have some form of drug demand reduction programs. For example, Barbados, Grenada, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines all implement Drug Abuse Resistance Education programs for youth in their countries.

Barbados also has programs through the National Council on Substance Abuse, including an Early Warning System to detect and test New Psychoactive Substances (NPS), although the incidence of NPS use in Barbados is negligible to date. The Barbados government allocated \$650,000 for drug demand reduction in 2022. The Royal Grenada Police Force has school programs to highlight substance abuse while Grenada's National Council on Drug Control has organized programs to support demand reduction.

Saint Kitts and Nevis has formal programs, including the Teen and Police Service (TAPS) program, which addresses at-risk or troubled teens. Saint Lucia's Substance Abuse Advisory Council develops policies and programs tailored to individuals and communities. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has various prevention programs, including a Coast Guard summer program and police youth clubs. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has a Monday night radio program that reaches a large audience with anti-drug messaging, and police are facilitating the establishment of neighborhood watch programs.

Some countries have drug rehabilitation clinics. The Crossroads Rehabilitation Center and its affiliate halfway house, Bevon House, are in Antigua and Barbuda. Barbados has five drug rehabilitation clinics. Saint Lucia has the National Mental Wellness Centre, while The Marion House in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has offered drug counseling for decades.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, Eastern Caribbean governments do not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking; however, evidence suggests that some officials may be involved in collusive activities with narcotics gangs. In October 2022, a member of the Saint Lucia Senate was arrested for obstruction of justice for allegedly interfering with a police investigation into a known gang leader.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. assistance through INL to the Eastern Caribbean is delivered mainly via the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and thirteen Caribbean countries that seeks to build Caribbean capacity to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and prevent youth crime and violence. The United States has CBSI agreements with the Regional Security System (RSS) and CARICOM's Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), as well as bilateral agreements on law enforcement cooperation with each Eastern Caribbean country. The main counternarcotics goals of the RSS agreement include supporting operations of the RSS Air Wing and the RSS Digital Forensics Lab and collaborating on training for all member states.

D. Conclusion

The United States enjoys a strong counternarcotics operational relationship with Eastern Caribbean countries and urges all member countries to meet their financial commitments to the RSS. The United States also recommends the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for communication and coordination between countries, as well as regional exercises utilizing realistic illicit drug interdiction scenarios to practice SOP implementation and increase regional cooperation. Countries should continue to train and professionalize counternarcotics officers, including developing a career path for such officers.

Ecuador

A. Introduction

Ecuador is a major transit country for Colombian cocaine destined for the United States and other international destinations, largely due to its porous land, sea, and air borders. Criminal groups traffic cocaine precursor chemicals, along with weapons and explosives for drug gangs, via Ecuador's border with Peru. While Ecuador is not a major drug producing country, authorities have discovered some coca fields and clandestine cocaine processing facilities in the jungle along the Colombian border. The United Nations (UN) June 2022 World Drug Report noted Ecuador was third in the world for cocaine seizures in 2020. Ecuador's government has taken significant actions against drug trafficking, but corruption and insufficient resources for the police, military, and justice sector limit its ability to more effectively counter narco trafficking.

Ecuador has seen a sharp increase in recent years in its homicide rate and narco trafficking-driven violent crime. In May, President Lasso declared narco trafficking a national security threat, enabling the government to access additional resources for counterdrug efforts. While the Ecuadorian government is committed to reducing drug supply and demand, domestic drug consumption is rising, and treatment facilities are insufficient to fully address increasing substance abuse. The United States maintains a strong security partnership with the Ecuadorian government.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Ecuador's Ministry of Health has oversight of drug prevention and treatment programs. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for countering the production, trafficking, sale, and use of illicit drugs, for regulating the use of controlled substances, and for destroying seized substances.

In 2022 U.S. and Ecuadorian maritime authorities conducted patrol flights to monitor and interdict maritime drug trafficking and engaged in operations to board vessels claiming Ecuadorian nationality and stateless vessels in international waters. The United States supports several units within the police.

2. Supply Reduction

As of October 31, 2022, the Ecuadorian government seized a total of 168.5 metric tons (MT) of illegal drugs, including 153.6 MT of cocaine, a 19 percent increase from that same period in 2021. Authorities seized 325 kilograms (kg) of heroin, an increase of 264 kg from the same period in 2021. Seizures of marijuana totaled 11.71 MT as of October 1, down from 21.8 MT during that timeframe in 2021. The United States supported Ecuador's efforts to streamline the legal process to destroy stockpiled drugs, and in the first ten months of 2022 authorities destroyed over 150 MT of seized narcotics, including drugs that had been stored in government warehouses dating back to 2016. Ecuador's use of encapsulation, which turns drugs into cement, is faster, cheaper, and more environmentally friendly than incineration. The new legal

framework, combined with the encapsulation destruction method, resulted in the increase in destroyed drugs from 104 MT in 2021 to 189 MT in the first ten months of 2022.

The police seized 16,150 liters of liquid controlled precursor chemicals and 65,671 MT of solid controlled precursor chemicals as of October 1, 2022, compared with 22,130 liters and 32 MT in the first nine months of 2021. As of October 5, 2022, the police arrested 9,483 individuals for drug-related crimes, compared to 10,278 during the same period in 2021. Maritime seizures of illicit drugs totaled 3.6 MT during the first nine months of 2022, compared to 5.14 MT during the same period in 2021. Through September 2022, Ecuadorian authorities detected one drug trafficking aircraft and located one clandestine airstrip, in Santa Elena province, compared to five such aircrafts authorities encountered in the first nine months of 2021.

Guayaquil is a major transshipment hub for cocaine concealed in cargo shipped to the United States, Europe, and other destinations around the world. As of October 1, 2022, authorities had inspected 23.4 percent of containerized exports from Guayaquil ports and nearby Posorja. Up until that date, the national police conducted 75,568 container inspections in Guayaquil's four port terminals, compared to only 53,759 containers inspected in all of 2021. U.S. officials continued to work with Ecuadorian authorities to secure maritime cargo under the Container Security Initiative established in 2018. In 2021, President Lasso issued a decree requiring Ecuador's ports to scan all outgoing containers. As of October 17, all outbound export containers are currently scanned at the port of Posorja.

Ecuador is not a major drug producing country. In the first nine months of 2022, Ecuador eradicated 1,075 coca plants, mostly in Sucumbíos province on Ecuador's northern border with Colombia.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Ecuador has 62 publicly funded out-patient drug treatment facilities and 11 in-patient facilities, which authorities say are insufficient to deal with the country's rising drug use problem. The lack of sufficient drug treatment facilities has led to the growth of unofficial facilities.

The United States supports the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America on drug demand reduction efforts in Ecuador, including through training women leaders to engage vulnerable youth on efforts against drugs. In 2022, the U.S.-supported International Society of Substance Use Professionals Ecuador Chapter worked with international organizations such as the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and Colombo Plan to provide training on prevention and treatment to drug demand reduction professionals.

4. Corruption

The Ecuadorian government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. President Guillermo Lasso has made fighting corruption a priority, and government policy and laws forbid the illicit production or distribution of narcotics and other controlled substances, as well as the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Nevertheless,

drug-related corruption remains a problem within Ecuador's public security forces and judicial system. On August 16, the National Police detained eight Ecuadorian Navy officials in the Galapagos Islands for selling cocaine that the U.S. Coast Guard previously seized in the high seas near Ecuador. The Attorney General's office opened a criminal prosecution against all eight Ecuadorian Navy officials for drug trafficking.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States enjoys a strong security partnership with the Ecuadorian government, and in 2022 the Lasso administration requested U.S. government support for a comprehensive plan to combat drug trafficking and transnational crime. Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso also announced plans to modernize and expand the national police force while increasing the military's role in combatting narcotrafficking. With significant United States government support, Ecuador established its first ever Specialized Court for Corruption and Organized Crime, including narcotrafficking. As of mid-October, the Ecuadorian government was training the first judges to serve on this court, with plans to hold the first trials by the end of the year.

Throughout 2022, the United States provided extensive support for Ecuador's antinarcotics efforts, including through equipment donations, technical assistance, and training to judges, prosecutors, the police, Coast Guard, the military, financial analysts, and justice sector officials. The United States also works with Ecuadorian security officials to increase maritime, port, and land interdiction capacity, and to strengthen anti-corruption and anti-money laundering capabilities related to drug trafficking.

The United States and Ecuador have a bilateral extradition treaty that entered into force in 1872 and a supplemental extradition treaty from 1939. Ecuador's constitution prohibits the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens. The United States works with Ecuador's National Court of Justice to facilitate extradition requests. The United States and Ecuador do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty but cooperate under the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, as well as relevant UN conventions.

D. Conclusion

The Ecuadorian government and public are increasingly concerned about the impact of narcotrafficking on citizen security and the country's escalating homicide rate. The Lasso administration's efforts to strengthen police and military capabilities are positive steps, and the establishment of the Specialized Court could significantly increase Ecuador's ability to dismantle drug trafficking networks. The Ecuadorian government should dedicate more resources for crime prevention, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and border security, however, in order to adequately address its security challenges. Ecuadorian police, military, and justice sector officials must strengthen inter-institutional cooperation and information sharing to more effectively counter narcotrafficking. The United States and other international partners will continue to play a critical role in strengthening Ecuador's fight against transnational crime.

El Salvador

A. Introduction

El Salvador is a transit country for illicit drugs destined for the United States and cooperation on counternarcotics remains positive. Analysis of 2021 and 2022 trends suggests drug trafficking organizations largely avoid passing through El Salvador by employing Pacific maritime routes, often passing more than 200 to 500 miles offshore. Some of these routes lie beyond the technical operational capacity of most regional navies, including El Salvador's. Nonetheless, El Salvador has achieved noteworthy success intercepting shipments even outside the perceived limits of its technical operational capacity thanks in part to U.S. support. Transnational criminal organizations use private vessels to transport large amounts of cocaine north to Guatemala and larger amounts overland from Honduras and Nicaragua to Guatemala using prefabricated concealment devices attached to large trucks. Small shipments of bulk currency have been detected moving at sea along the coastline southbound towards Nicaragua.

Interdictions as of November 2022 were significantly higher than in the same time frames in 2021, 2020, and 2019.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Anti-Narcotics Division (DAN) of the National Civil Police (PNC) is the primary agency responsible for combating drug-related crimes throughout El Salvador. The PNC has had a vetted, full time Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) since late 2019. The SIU is responsible for conducting high level and international drug investigations and is the primary contact for such cases within El Salvador's Attorney General's Office (FGR). The SIU continued to build institutional links with SIUs in Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia, greatly expanding El Salvador's ability to respond to drug trafficking alerts and to investigate larger transnational criminal organizations and operations.

El Salvador has a full-time liaison officer assigned to the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force - South (JIATF-S) to support regional drug control coordination. This permits direct collaboration and communications with both the U.S.-funded Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and Salvadoran military leadership in support of counternarcotics missions.

El Salvador's National Electronic Monitoring Center allows Salvadoran law enforcement authorities with judicial warrants to intercept electronic communications for violations of Salvadoran law including drug and human trafficking, extortion, gang/terrorist organizations, and homicide. The center also supports U.S. partners in a wide variety of investigations targeting transnational criminal organizations. The center has increased communication between the PNC and FGR and streamlined the flow of actionable intercepted intelligence from the center to PNC surveillance teams.

2. Supply Reduction

In 2022, authorities continued to increase seizures in maritime drug trafficking within Salvadoran territorial waters. The newly expanded PNC's Maritime Tactical Operations Response Section (STORM) and the Salvadoran Navy have been conducting enhanced patrolling of the Pacific coastline. The Salvadoran Navy maintains primary responsibility for maritime interdiction at or beyond 20 nautical miles from El Salvador's coastline. The average at-sea interdiction occurs between 200-500 nautical miles offshore, and suspects are detained and escorted ashore for processing by the Salvadoran justice system, normally conducted by the SIU and FGR Anti-Narcotics Unit. The Salvadoran Navy is increasing its coverage of coastal areas by enhancing maritime interdiction capabilities of the Naval Task Force Trident (FTNT) and fleet units stationed in bases and captaincies in Acajutla, La Libertad, La Concordia, and La Union areas and the recently renovated site on Meanguera Island in the Gulf of Fonseca.

From January through September of 2022 the DAN seized 8.7 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, 44 kilograms (kg) of marijuana, and 0.5 kg of crack cocaine. In the same period, Salvadoran authorities seized approximately \$1.7 million in bulk currency and arrested 2,681 individuals on drug-related crimes.

In late August 2022, the Navy and SIU seized 3.6 MT of cocaine on the high seas. A month prior, the STORM and SIU seized 447 kg on the coast. In addition, the PNC made a land seizure of over \$1.2 million in bulk cash on March 10, 2022.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

El Salvador has not kept reliable statistics for illegal consumption since 2012.

4. Corruption

The Government of El Salvador does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption presents an ongoing challenge at multiple levels. The United States continues to support programs aimed at curbing corruption, including vetting and polygraph tests for El Salvador's security forces.

The United States worked with interlocutors in the Ministry of Public Security, the FGR, and the Legislative Assembly to develop a "control and confidence" law to classify sensitive jobs and require the job holder to meet specific clearance requirements. This protocol aims to stymie corruption within the government. The United States continues to encourage the Legislative Assembly to take up the proposal.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports law enforcement cooperation, combating corruption, and strengthening rule of law in El Salvador and the region. The United States supports capacity building for Guatemala's security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which supports the United States' Strategy to Address the Root

Causes of Migration in Central America by tackling the underlying security and governance factors driving such migration. CARSI funding is aimed at fighting illicit drug production and trafficking and combatting corruption and transnational criminal organizations, which are among the key such drivers, complementing other U.S. efforts such as those focused on assisting vulnerable populations displaced by drug trafficking, violence, and crime.

U.S.-supported programs aim to expand Salvadoran capabilities to interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit drug trafficking and other transnational crimes, implement prevention programs, and strengthen El Salvador's justice sector. The United States' continued support of Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), an automated fingerprint database, has resulted in data sharing that allows U.S. law enforcement access to over 350,000 criminal fingerprints, including records for drug traffickers and members of transnational criminal organizations. U.S. law enforcement requests information from El Salvador's AFIS database more than it does from any other foreign law enforcement system.

The Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Agreement, signed by the United States and El Salvador, permits basing of U.S. counternarcotics detection and monitoring air assets in El Salvador. The arrangement supports El Salvador as a hub for regional drug interdiction efforts. It also allows U.S. access to ports and other governmental facilities in connection with aerial detection, monitoring, and tracking of illicit drug trafficking operations. The CSL agreement will be up for renewal in 2025.

D. Conclusion

El Salvador is a cooperative partner in anti-narcotics efforts, despite challenges in other areas. The country maintained its capacity to fight transnational crime in 2022, evidenced by both drug traffickers continuing to shift their maritime routes further from El Salvador's coast and by successful drug interdiction within El Salvador's economic exclusive zone and beyond 500 nautical miles.

Strengthening El Salvador's criminal justice institutions is needed to prevent the return of trafficking routes if interdiction efforts in neighboring countries continue to advance. Political will to confront corruption and support adequate budgets for the PNC and FGR, including adequate pay and physical protection, remains a challenge.

Georgia

Georgia is primarily a transit country for opiates produced in Asia that are trafficked into Ukraine or Moldova via the Black Sea for other European destinations. Based on quantities seized, Georgia is not a major corridor for synthetic drug smuggling operations. A domestic synthetic market exists, however, with ecstasy/MDMA and amphetamine being the most commonly found drugs after cannabis. Ecstasy laced with fentanyl became the drug of choice for Georgian partygoers in 2022, with unconfirmed reports of ten fentanyl-overdose deaths during a six-week period in September and October 2022. Fentanyl is easy to obtain via the dark web and is delivered through the mail in the form of powder or tablets. Domestic heroin and cocaine markets in Georgia are small.

The Dark Net and Drug Transit units of the Central Criminal Police Department have improved their capacity to interdict narco-trafficking operations as a result of continued engagement by the United States, including with U.S.-donated equipment, that assists with their investigations of drug-crime networks, illicit drug-trafficking, and the tracing of the distribution of new psychoactive substances on the dark web.

No major drug-related legislative changes were implemented in 2022.

The Anti-Drug Inter-Agency Coordination Council and the National Drug Observatory, with the support of the European Monitoring Center on Drugs and Drug Addiction, are working to establish an Early Warning System in Georgia to monitor emerging drug use trends and to develop a Drug-Related Deaths (DRD) indicator. With the support of Council of Europe's Pompidou Group, the Government of Georgia has advanced preventive activities both at the central and municipal level.

There are no vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission in Georgia that receive \$50,000 or more in INL funding.

Ghana

A. Introduction

Ghana is a transit and destination point for illicit drugs trafficked from Asia and South America to other African countries, Europe, and to a lesser extent North America. Ghana is not a significant source for drugs entering the United States. Controlled pharmaceuticals and heroin from Asia, as well as cocaine from South America, are trafficked into the country for limited consumption and onward shipment to Ghana's landlocked neighbors, Europe, and Asia. Cannabis is cultivated and produced in large quantities in most rural areas of Ghana, especially along Lake Volta. While cannabis is widely cultivated in Ghana and small seizures of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine do occur, there has not been a baseline survey to determine the extent of drug use and abuse within the country.

Corruption, insufficient resources, and porous borders seriously impede an effective law enforcement response to illicit drug trafficking and associated crimes. The Narcotics Control Commission (NACOC) has made several large cannabis seizures in 2022. Many were contained in large box trucks intended for export with thirty tons of cannabis destined for Nigeria alone. The production of methamphetamine is an increasing problem in West Africa. Substantial quantities of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and other precursor chemicals are shipped into the country, believed destined for methamphetamine labs in Nigeria. There has not been a significant controlled substance seizure at any of the ports of entry since September 2020.

Ghana continues to work productively with international partners on law enforcement operations and strategic information sharing targeting transnational drug trafficking organizations. Ghana is a willing and strong bilateral partner with the United States and benefits from many U.S.-sponsored trainings to improve the capabilities and capacity of law enforcement to address the growing transnational drug trafficking issues. More generally, Ghana has extradited fugitives to the United States pursuant to the extradition treaty binding both countries. Although no mutual legal assistance treaty exists between Ghana and the United States, both countries are nevertheless able to provide each other such assistance, and Ghana is a party to multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Ghana Police Service contains a Drug Law Enforcement Unit (DLEU) as a branch of the Criminal Investigations Department. The DLEU engages in combating narcotics drug offenses and investigations related to money laundering, to include cases reported by the Ghana Food and Drugs Authority. It operates by gathering intelligence and monitoring the activities of organized syndicate groups that operate both internationally and internally in the production, cultivation, distribution, and consumption of illicit drugs.

On April 26, NACOC organized a two-day training and advocacy workshop for law enforcement agencies, civil society, and other pertinent stakeholders on the Narcotics Control Commission

Act 2020, Act 1019 to introduce the new law, strengthen and promote understanding of Act 1019, and foster cooperation and information sharing among all parties involved in the fight against organized crime. On June 27, the Minister of Interior chaired an official launch ceremony of the Narcotics Control Commission.

NACOC developed Ghana's first National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP) in 2022. It is a comprehensive plan that reaffirms the commitment of the Government of Ghana to ensure all aspects of Drug Demand Reduction, Supply Reduction and International Cooperation are in full compliance with standards, rules, and laws relevant to the United Nations Conventions and Declaration of Human Rights. Ghana is a pioneering member and active participant in the Africa Multilateral Drug Enforcement Coordination (AMDEC) meetings, which consist mainly of drug law enforcement agencies in Africa. The AMDEC platform provides for information sharing on drug-related cases between the United States and African countries across the continent.

Ghana is a significant importer of ephedrine, a precursor drug used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The illegal importation of controlled pharmaceuticals such as Tramadol, Tapentadol, and Carisoprodol is on the rise. Authorities believe the majority of ephedrine and other precursor chemicals entering Ghana are destined for methamphetamine labs in Nigeria. Recent seizures in Togo and Benin originating from Ghana transiting to Nigeria confirm these suspicions. However, to date there is no concrete evidence of clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in Ghana. Open source reporting indicates that militant groups in West Africa and the Sahel, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, are trafficking and consuming Tramadol transiting Ghana.

2. Supply Reduction

NACOC monitors activities of 233 Ghanaian companies involved in precursor chemical distribution chains. The main challenge is difficulty identifying the small and often unlicensed businesses involved with chemical usage. NACOC is holding stakeholder workshops in all regions to promote cooperation among businesses and their representatives relevant to the reporting and documentation of precursor chemicals.

During the period January-September 2022, NACOC seized 46.6 metric tons of marijuana in 26 operations and made 12 arrests. As of October 2022, eight cases were pending trial with one conviction of trafficking marijuana receiving a ten-year sentence. In March 2022, NACOC eradicated a 40-acre marijuana farm in the Volta region and arrested three individuals.

The training program "Operation Azure," implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has proven successful in Ghana. The training focuses on opioid trafficking in mail and courier centers. In addition to several marijuana seizures made by the NACOC unit assigned to the Accra post office, there were two notable seizures of six kilograms (kg) of methamphetamine in May and 2.5 kg in June in outgoing packages destined to New Zealand and Australia respectively.

Authorities in Ghana have not made a cocaine seizure since 152 kg were seized off the coast in 2020, although over 17 metric tons of cocaine were seized in West African countries, including

Cabo Verde, Canary Islands, Liberia, neighboring Cote d' Ivoire, and Nigeria in the period January-September 2022.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

NACOC partnered with media, educational, corporate, community, and faith-based organizations to conduct drug awareness and prevention programs aimed at reducing the demand for drugs, especially among youth, through slide presentations, photo exhibitions, radio and television discussions, and social media platforms. As of October 2022, NACOC reached an estimated 122,700 participants using various outreach platforms, including engaging with 389 institutions, and sponsoring 10 public exhibitions, 11 television programs, and 398 radio programs.

NACOC employs 20 certified substance abuse counselors in the Demand Reduction unit. They engaged with 2,848 participants and patients in the period January-October 2022. The unit also held a three-week long substance abuse training course for 12 participants from rehabilitation centers using the Universal Prevention Curriculum (UPC) as part of the U.S.-sponsored Colombo Plan. Twenty-five Ghanaians from the Ministry of Education, NACOC, and community groups underwent training to qualify as internationally certified drug prevention professionals to join the fight against drug trafficking and abuse in the country.

4. Corruption

Ghana does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, family members and close associates of prominent politicians have been publicly accused of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Ghana has laws that cover drug-related corruption, but enforcement is weak due to existing corruption, lack of capacity, resource constraints, and political will. Ghana also has a generally free press, which routinely reports on corruption issues. To date, no arrests or formal charges have been brought against any sitting member of Parliament or senior government official.

Media reports allege corruption at the highest levels of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that high-ranking members of the ruling New Patriotic Party are facilitating the entrance of narcotics at Ghana's Tema port.

UNODC's July 2022 publication "Corruption in Ghana, People's Experiences and Views," reported that corruption in Ghana was on the rise and noted the public perception that the Ghana Police Services, Ghana Immigration Service, and the GRA Customs Division are the top three Government of Ghana organizations involved in taking bribes.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

In August 2022 the United States, in coordination with UNODC, officially launched a 30-month project that provides various technical trainings to build the capacity of NACOC to gather intelligence, investigate, and collaborate with prosecutors to seek a legal finish to drug trafficking and transnational organized crime cases. Additionally, the project will provide

narcotics test equipment and test kits along with training and mentorship in forensics. The program will assist NACOC to implement the new mandates of Act 1019 and improve operational presence at key border crossings and points of entry.

The United States funded training for DLEU and NACOC officers including the Drug Unit Commander Course, Advance Narcotics Investigation Course, Financial Investigations Collaboration Training, Leadership in Crisis, Cybercrime, and Emerging Trends in Illicit Synthetic Drugs Course. The United States also provides counterdrug assistance, equipment, and training to the Ghana police and border agencies, the justice ministry, the offices of the attorney general and inspector general, and the judiciary.

D. Conclusion

The Ghanaian government is working to strengthen and streamline information sharing between its law enforcement agencies and regularly cooperates with the United States and other international partners on drug control issues. Ghanaian law enforcement and intelligence agencies have noted that drug trafficking networks within the country have links to organized crime and terrorist organizations, but incomplete data collection and fragmented information sharing make accurate figures and calculations difficult to obtain and verify. While NACOC's mandate and enforcement authority is new, that agency and others in Ghana are building capacity and becoming better equipped to combat narcotics trafficking.

Ghana continues to face challenges in addressing substance use disorders and should look to address the lack of alternative livelihood or alternative crops and crop programs for cannabis farmers, lack of law enforcement accessibility in rural areas and the border regions, rampant corruption, and lack of resources for counternarcotics law enforcement.

Guatemala

A. Introduction

Guatemala's limited law enforcement resources and proximity to the United States make it a major transit country for illegal drugs. Poverty and a lack of viable economic alternatives incentivize illicit cultivation of opium poppies, marijuana, and coca plants in rural areas. Effective drug treatment and prevention campaigns are nonexistent outside of main urban centers. Transnational criminal organizations exploit a lack of interagency cooperation and weak oversight at ports of entry to traffic drugs through Mexico to the United States.

Drug seizures continue to fall as the number of detected illicit air and maritime deliveries remains below record levels of past years. While Guatemala has achieved notable success in the disposal of precursor chemicals, its ability to detect and deter illicit trafficking of these chemicals remains weak. Law enforcement cooperation remains strong, particularly with small, vetted units that drive the number of arrests for extradition to the United States.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

A specialized antinarcotics unit (SGAIA) of the Guatemalan National Police (PNC) is responsible for combating all drug-related criminal activities in country and at ports of entry, including eradication of illicit cultivations. The United States supports SGAIA's K9 detection unit, which screens for drugs, contraband, and explosives at airports, checkpoints, and prisons. The SGAIA K9 unit was involved in over 90 percent of all drug seizures in country. The Guatemalan Naval Special Forces (FEN) has responsibility for all maritime drug interdictions. In July, the FEN commenced activities at a U.S.-supported forward operating base near the Mexican border, expanding its ability to quickly respond to maritime deliveries of drugs.

Guatemala achieved major milestones in the management and destruction of precursor chemicals. In July 2022, the country completed removal of the last remote storage area for precursor chemicals. By September 2022, Guatemala recorded a record annual amount of precursor chemicals destroyed, putting the country on course to eliminate its remaining stockpile of seized chemicals in 2023. A U.S.-donated chemical incinerator was critical to this success.

In August 2022, Guatemala assumed responsibility for logistics, technical support, and the training of pilots, crews, and maintenance teams for five helicopters the United States donated in 2013. Guatemala also cancelled a bilateral agreement on police cooperation with Colombia under the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan (USCAP) in August. The decade-long program provided capacity building for the PNC and military, with an emphasis on counterdrug investigations.

2. Supply Reduction

In the first nine months of 2022, SGAIA reported seizures of 1.5 metric tons (MT) of cocaine and eradication of 28.68 hectares of opium poppy and 19.96 hectares of coca. The unit reported

six clandestine cocaine base laboratories destroyed, but only trace amounts of methamphetamine and synthetic drug seizures. According to the Ministry of Government, over 1,300 people were detained on drug charges, with an estimated \$450 million in drugs, money, and confiscated goods seized from drug traffickers.

In September 2022 SGAIA units, the Guatemalan military, and Public Ministry (MP) conducted the first coordinated, large-scale operation to eradicate coca in Guatemala's rural northeastern areas of Izabal, Alta Verapaz, and Peten. Guatemala also conducted three joint eradication operations of opium poppies in the eastern region of San Marcos in 2022. Cocaine seized in maritime operations continued to fall from record high levels in 2018, with the FEN reporting 193 kilograms of cocaine seized in the first nine months of 2022, compared to 22.4 metric tons (MT) in 2018. Despite decreasing drug seizures, the FEN continues to conduct hundreds of maritime security operations, including joint operations with the United States.

Guatemala reported eight illicit landings of aircraft suspected of delivering drugs in the first nine months of 2022, a reduction from 23 illicit landings in 2021 and 40 in 2020. Coordinated law enforcement arrests of groups coordinating illicit air movements, a lack of licensed pilots and aircraft, and the increased ability of Guatemalan security forces to respond to air incursions are the main reasons for the reduction. Guatemalan security forces destroyed 14 clandestine landing strips in the first nine months of 2022.

In March 2022 the United States sanctioned Guatemalan criminal organization "Los Huistas" for trafficking cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin to the United States. Los Huistas operate in the region of Huehuetenango, near the Mexican border, and are accused of controlling poppy cultivation fields, importing precursor chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, and money laundering. The Department of State is offering a \$10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of the leader of Los Huistas, Dario Molina-Lopez, who faces an extradition warrant out of the Southern District of California for drug trafficking.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) concluded a survey of national drug use and substance abuse in Guatemala. The study found that Guatemala has the second-highest per capita death rate from illicit drug use in North, Central, and South America, behind the United States. According to the study, the consumption of illicit drugs increased by 40 percent from 2005-2021, with marijuana the leading drug used, followed by cocaine. The study underscored that Guatemala lacks a national treatment system for chronic drug abusers and that informal treatment services are only available in areas centered around the capital.

The United States supports the Guatemalan Ministry of Health and Commission on Drug Abuse and Prevention in creating and implementing a science-based drug demand reduction strategy that includes treatment and prevention training for rural health providers, technical assistance, and a drug awareness campaign with municipalities, the private sector, and community leaders. In 2022, Guatemala chaired the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission's Group of Experts on Chemical Substances and Pharmaceutical Products.

4. Corruption

The Government of Guatemala does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption weakens and destabilizes Guatemala's ability to combat criminal organizations. In 2021, the United States paused support to the Public Ministry as a result of Attorney General Maria Consuelo Porras dismissing the head of the Special Prosecutor's Office Against Impunity, and designated Porras under the Section 353 List of Corrupt and Democratic Actors. In May 2022, Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei reappointed Porras to a second four-year term, and the United States designated Porras again under Section 7031(c). In July 2022, the United States sanctioned 16 individuals, including members of congress, the current chief anti-corruption prosecutor, and Supreme Court magistrates, for undermining democratic institutions, engaging in significant corruption, and/or obstructing corruption investigations.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and Guatemala have a bilateral agreement to suppress drug trafficking by sea and air with provisions for ship boarding, ship riders, pursuit, entry to investigate, overflight of territorial seas, order to land, and interdiction support. Guatemala has an extradition treaty with the United States, and U.S. law enforcement agencies support several vetted units in the PNC.

The United States supports law enforcement cooperation, combating corruption, and strengthening rule of law in Guatemala and the region. Bilateral efforts are focused on reducing crime, building trust in the PNC, and decreasing drug trafficking, social conflict, and lack of investment due to security concerns. The United States supports capacity building for Guatemala's security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which supports the United States' Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration in Central America by tackling the underlying security and governance factors driving such migration. CARSI funding is aimed at fighting illicit drug production and trafficking and combatting corruption and transnational criminal organizations, which are among the key such drivers, complementing other U.S. efforts such as those focused on assisting vulnerable populations displaced by drug trafficking, violence, and crime.

D. Conclusion

Corruption, weak interinstitutional collaboration, and a lack of security and economic alternatives for rural residents limit efforts to fully counter transnational criminal organizations from trafficking drugs through the country. Nonetheless, Guatemala demonstrates strong collaboration with U.S. law enforcement on narcotics investigations and arrests. The Guatemalan government should continue to expand its presence and community engagement in rural areas, allowing law enforcement the ability to respond to drug trafficking while improving security.

Guyana

A. Introduction

Guyana is a transit country for cocaine destined for the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Europe, and West Africa and increasingly a locus for marijuana cultivation and consumption. Cocaine produced in Colombia is smuggled to Venezuela and onward to Guyana by sea or air. Smugglers also transit land borders and shared river networks with Brazil, Venezuela, and Suriname. Cocaine is concealed in legitimate commodities and smuggled by commercial and private flights, maritime vessels, human couriers, “go-fast” boats, and postal systems.

Guyana’s rapid GDP growth resulting from its increased oil production will continue to attract more sophisticated criminal actors. Drug traffickers exploit the country’s poorly monitored ports, unlicensed airstrips, intricate river networks, porous land borders, and a permissive environment resulting from corruption and the under-resourced security sector. Guyana also has a growing domestic drug consumption problem. Despite these challenges, the Guyanese government has demonstrated some political will to combat drug trafficking.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Guyana’s drug control institutions are the Guyana Police Force (GPF), Guyana Revenue Authority, Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), and Guyana Defense Force Coast Guard. They are responsible for the implementation of the National Drug Strategy Master Plan 2022-2026. While Guyana has a coordination mechanism among these agencies, corruption and limited financial and human resources hamper its effectiveness.

The 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom is applicable to the United States and Guyana, and Guyana cooperates with the United States on extradition cases. In 2008, Guyana acceded to and has since filed information requests under the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, to which the United States is also a party. Guyana has bilateral counternarcotics agreements with its neighbors and the United Kingdom. Guyana is a member of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. In 2020, a bilateral ship rider agreement with the United States entered into force, enabling joint maritime and aerospace patrols to counter drug flows.

2. Supply Reduction

Local cultivation and consumption of marijuana increased in 2022. Guyanese law enforcement conducted eradication operations at marijuana farms throughout the country. While the government has shown the will to reduce marijuana consumption and cultivation, it has not comprehensively addressed or dismantled unlicensed airstrips in the interior used for cocaine trafficking between Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Suriname. In July 2022 the government jailed Brazilian Mateus Alberto and Columbian Canon Rodrigues for landing a drug-laden aircraft on an unlicensed airstrip. The government reports an increase in the use of ecstasy but

has not finalized a 2021 amendment to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act to criminalize the possession and use of the drug as of October.

The Guyanese government has a drug enforcement presence at its international airports, post offices, and at some seaports and land-border entry points. It does not have a robust container inspection program in place at its seaports.

Drug enforcement agencies reported several interdiction efforts, drug-related seizures, and prosecutions in 2022. During the first nine months of 2022, authorities seized 103 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 2.8 metric tons (MT) of cannabis. Seizures decreased by 82 percent for cocaine but increased by 45 percent for cannabis compared to the same period in 2021 (563 kg of cocaine and 1.5 MT of cannabis respectively). Authorities also seized small amounts of synthetic drugs, including ecstasy and methamphetamine. Drug enforcement agencies reported 77 prosecutions for illicit drug trafficking as of October, with 34 resulting in convictions.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Guyana has a growing domestic drug consumption problem. Marijuana is the most widely used illicit drug in Guyana, followed by cocaine. The Ministries of Health, Education, and Human Services and Social Security are responsible for addressing demand reduction. Guyana has a comprehensive demand reduction strategy that addresses drug rehabilitation. A National Drug Demand Unit is the single agency with oversight of the strategy. It operates four treatment and rehabilitation centers, twice as many as in 2021. Non-governmental organizations also offer rehabilitation services, with the government providing financial assistance. The Georgetown Public Hospital also provides free rehabilitation services for drug users. The government conducts anti-drug awareness sessions in secondary schools and has drug treatment courts.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the Government of Guyana does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. However, insufficient resources, weak law enforcement institutions, an ineffective judicial system, and inadequate compensation for civil service employees and public safety officials facilitate corruption throughout all sectors. Guyana is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption but has not fully implemented its provisions, such as the seizure of property obtained through corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a wide range of efforts to combat illicit narcotics trafficking and address crime and violence affecting Guyanese citizens, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and Caribbean countries that seeks to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice. Efforts to increase law enforcement capabilities, protect borders, air, and seaports, strengthen workforce development, and combat money laundering directly address priorities shared by Guyana and the United States. In August, the

Guyanese government agreed to commence a U.S.-funded project to strengthen GPF training to improve its responses to vulnerable populations, including LGBTQI+ persons, migrants, victims of gender-based violence, and youth in at-risk neighborhoods. The Guyanese government has an interest in deepening cooperation with the United States on drug control, extradition, mutual legal assistance, and other transnational crime issues.

Guyanese military and law enforcement maintain cooperative relationships with the United States. CBSI-funded programs support Guyana's maritime operations by providing interdiction assets, command and control systems, and logistical support and training. In 2022 the United States provided maritime training to Guyana's Coast Guard and capacity-building training to its FIU on civil asset forfeiture. U.S. assistance programs also promote law enforcement professionalization and more effective drug investigations. By strengthening Guyana's counterdrug capabilities, the United States seeks to enhance Guyana's interagency coordination and help gather better information on drug trafficking routes.

The United States and Guyana maintain a bilateral agreement to jointly suppress illicit trafficking by sea and air. The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission that receive \$50,000 or more in funding.

D. Conclusion

The United States enjoys positive cooperation with Guyana in advancing mutual interests against the threat of international drug trafficking and Guyana has shown interest in furthering collaboration under CBSI. The United States looks forward to tangible progress on investigations, prosecutions, extraditions, security sector capacity enhancement, engagement of at-risk communities, and enforcement of laws against money laundering and financial crimes. To achieve results, Guyana should invest more in its security sector, enhance the entrance requirements, professionalism, and training levels of its security sector personnel, combat corruption, and focus on greater interagency coordination and information sharing. Counternarcotics activities should focus on improving port security and enhancing container inspections, monitoring and dismantling unlicensed airstrips, and building skills in complex transnational investigations. Political will is needed to dismantle trafficking networks linked to corrupt individuals in the public and private sector.

Haiti

A. Introduction

Haiti has long been beset by political and economic headwinds that create not only governance challenges but also directly affect its ability to effectively address drug trafficking. Gangs regularly interrupted government control in Port-au-Prince and disrupted commerce, including periodic disruption of the national fuel supply.

These overlapping political, economic, and security crises overwhelmed the Haitian National Police (HNP), which was already suffering from low morale and corruption. The HNP struggles to control Haiti's borders, as most of the coastline and the land border crossings with the Dominican Republic are largely unpatrolled, resulting in an overwhelmingly difficult environment in which to combat illicit drugs. The drug trafficking trend has not changed for cocaine from South America and marijuana from Jamaica to reach the United States. Cultivation of cannabis is mainly for local consumption.

The counternarcotics unit of the HNP, known by the French acronym BLTS, and other specialized units have shifted their focus from counternarcotics operations to participating in HNP's fight to dismantle the gangs, with all their resources committed to that effort. Gang violence has also displaced thousands of Haitian citizens from their homes.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The current political stalemate and frequent demonstrations have made it difficult for the Haitian government to collect taxes and generate revenue from customs and the ports. This has impacted the government's ability to adequately fund the police force, resulting in an insufficient number of police officers in every category of policing, including counternarcotics. HNP anticipates a total force strength of approximately 14,000 by the end of 2022.

BLTS remains the primary domestic organization dedicated to drug interdiction. Their numbers declined from 237 to 198 officers since 2021. Currently, officers are routinely reassigned to non-counternarcotics related duties. Despite the reduction in staffing, they continue to work in close coordination with the border patrol unit (POLIFRONT) and the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG). BLTS officers are co-located with POLIFRONT officers at three of the four official land border crossings; the fourth will come online in 2023. The HCG is the sole maritime enforcement agency with operating bases in Cap Haitien, Port-au-Prince, and Les Cayes. Maritime law enforcement is a daunting task considering Haiti's 1,100 miles of coastline and seven international ports. The HCG has three partially operational vessels, two requiring repair, and five that are no longer operational. BLTS also operates two boats for maritime interdiction. As of October 2022, the HCG had 180 officers and 35 civilian staff, and POLIFRONT had 295 officers. Operational capacity remains low due to insufficient funding, improper management, fuel shortages, and inaccessibility of maintenance supplies.

2. Supply Reduction

In the first nine months of 2022, BLTS executed several counternarcotics operations that resulted in the seizure of 1.8 metric tons (MT) of marijuana and 33 kilograms kg of cocaine. BLTS also arrested 101 suspects for drug-related crimes during this period. The United States does not have information regarding any significant availability or trafficking of illegal synthetic drugs in Haiti.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Haiti's population is very poor, and approximately 60 percent of the population lives under the national poverty line. Thus, substance use is very uncommon. The Government of Haiti's Counternarcotics Policy Commission is functioning but is under-resourced. There is limited to no available data on either the scope or impact of its programming.

4. Corruption

While the Haitian government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, Haiti is plagued by corruption, gang violence, and drug trafficking. Haiti's constant political volatility has undermined good governance, the rule of law, and the government's efforts to fight corruption and ensure accountability. Haiti's judiciary remains in a state of chronic dysfunction, and the government has not made any improvements in prosecuting individuals and organizations involved in drug trafficking. The major contributing factor to Haiti's dismal record in fighting corruption is its weak legal system, which is largely controlled by political actors. The Unit for Combating Corruption has advanced 32 corruption-related cases to the judiciary since its inception in 2005, but the cases have not been brought before the courts. Haiti's asset seizure laws allow the Central Unit of Financial Investigations and the HNP's Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau to seize the assets of drug traffickers convicted of crimes outside of Haiti. However, there have not been any recent seizures.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Haiti is a party to several international drug control agreements and cooperates regularly with the United States on drug-related cases. The 1997 bilateral letter of agreement on Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Maritime Drug Traffic allows U.S. law enforcement agencies to enter Haitian territorial waters and airspace in pursuit of suspect vessels or aircraft; to board and search suspect vessels; to patrol Haitian airspace, and to carry members of the HCG as passengers on U.S. vessels. Although there is no mutual legal assistance treaty between Haiti and the United States, the Haitian government cooperates within the limits of Haitian law. Though there is a bilateral extradition treaty that entered into force on June 28, 1905, other lawful bases have supported Haiti's decisions to surrender individuals under indictment in the United States to U.S. law enforcement agencies.

In close coordination with U.S. law enforcement agencies, the United States is helping Haiti to develop the operational capabilities of BLTS, POLIFRONT, and the HCG. These efforts will aim to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations by investigating the operations of

drug traffickers, seizing drugs, cash, and other assets. Two Letters of Agreement between the United States and Haiti signed in 2004 and 2013 govern these activities.

D. Conclusion

The HNP remains committed to combating illicit drug trafficking, but competing resources are funneled towards combatting increasing gang violence and kidnappings for ransom. The HNP's development is further weakened by the scourge of corrupt officers within their ranks with possible gang affiliation. U.S. government support for the institutional development of the HNP remains critical to increase Haiti's ability to fight drug trafficking. Prosecutors and courts lack capacity and corruption is a major factor. Despite the adoption of penal and criminal procedure codes there has not been any improvement in drug related cases. Drug seizures remain low, and the ability of the HNP to patrol Haiti's maritime and terrestrial borders consistently remains insufficient. Continuing political instability also impedes Haiti's efforts to counter illicit drugs.

Honduras

A. Introduction

Honduras is a major transit country for cocaine destined for the United States, and coca is increasingly being grown in remote areas in the Colon, Yoro, Olancho, El Paraiso, and Cortes departments with little to no law enforcement access. Honduran security forces find and destroy coca fields and co-located laboratories at increasing rates, although the scale of coca cultivation remains relatively small. However, seizures of cocaine in transit are diminishing—during the first nine months of 2022, the Government of Honduras reported seizing a total of 4.9 metric tons (MT) of cocaine (compared to 17.8 MT in 2021). Precursor chemical diversion continues to be a problem in Honduras.

The Honduran government suffers from long-term problems associated with the influence of drug traffickers and their proxies, institutional weaknesses, and high levels of impunity. The Honduran government has maintained its efforts against drug trafficking in coordination with U.S. law enforcement agencies; however, structural challenges remain in investigative capacity, human resources, communications, and corruption. In addition, law enforcement entities lack sufficient equipment and transportation needed for air and maritime interdiction.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

President Xiomara Castro took office in January 2022, promising to crack down on coca cultivation and transit and to address the law enforcement vacuum in the Colon and Gracias a Dios Departments on the northwestern coast. Gracias a Dios is the primary entry point for cocaine entering Honduras by air, sea, and land. The near total absence of the state, and the complicity of some of the region's officials, only enhances the attractiveness of Gracias a Dios to the country's criminal networks. Sources estimate that Honduras is the country of first arrival for between 85 and 300 MT of cocaine annually via maritime and aerial conveyance. The lack of a comprehensive national counternarcotics strategy has inhibited successful operational planning and execution, with various counternarcotics and interdiction units often not communicating and sometimes working at odds against one another.

Honduras is party to the Organization of American States' Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and the Caribbean Regional Agreement on Maritime Counternarcotics and ratified the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The United States and Honduras are parties to a bilateral extradition treaty. Honduras cooperates on extraditions. The United States maintains a bilateral agreement with Honduras to suppress illicit traffic by sea, including by ship boarding, ship riders, pursuit, entry to investigate, and overflight.

2. Supply Reduction

Honduran authorities eradicated approximately 140 hectares of coca plants and destroyed 15 rudimentary laboratories during the first nine months of 2022, compared to 30 hectares and

seven laboratories during the same period of 2021. Collaboration between the Honduras National Police's Anti-Drug, Frontier Police, and Special Forces Directorates – all supported by the United States – has been fundamental to these seizures. In the first nine months of 2022 the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) seized 2.9 MT of cocaine as a result of information derived from judicial wire intercepts. The special tactical group within the Honduran Frontier Police, which secures Honduran borders, supported the seizure of 3.3 MT of cocaine in the first nine months of 2022.

The limitations of Honduran security forces' ability to interdict the maritime flow of counternarcotics provides an opportunity to narcotraffickers. The Ministry of Defense reported the destruction of nine clandestine airstrips used for transshipment of narcotics during the first nine months of 2022, as compared to 18 during the same period of 2021. The United States is collaborating with the Honduran Navy to create a DEA-trusted anti-drug interdiction unit (UMA) within the Navy Special Forces to conduct maritime interdictions in support of SIU-led investigations.

Honduras has an active commercial sector involved in the manufacture and sale of common precursor chemicals. The United States provides training and other assistance to strengthen Honduran institutions responsible for controlling precursor chemicals. However, the responsibility for the control of precursor chemicals is spread over seven Honduran government agencies that rarely communicate. The primary body tasked with coordinating the work of these agencies has not made significant efforts to enhance precursor seizures or controls.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Public information on drug use is sparse. The Honduran Drug Observatory has never undertaken a general population survey regarding illegal drug use and the only national survey is of secondary students conducted in 2005. Based on the results of this survey, the Organization of American States' Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission reported the most used drugs are marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and cocaine, and that student drug consumption levels were some of the lowest in Central America at that time. Gangs remain a significant problem and contribute to Honduran youth involvement in the drug trade, leading to violence and instability. The U.S.-supported Gang Resistance Education and Training program reaches more than 100,000 students annually with information about the dangers of drugs.

4. Corruption

Honduras does not, as a matter of official government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution. However, corruption remains widespread in the private and public sectors and impedes interdiction and prosecution efforts. Continued impunity in the judicial branch is of particular concern since it reduces risks to narcotraffickers.

President Castro identified transparency as a top priority early in her administration, including in a February letter to the UN requesting support for an international commission to counter corruption in Honduras. Negotiations between Honduras and the United Nations on the details of the International Commission Against Impunity and Corruption in Honduras are ongoing.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports capacity building for Honduras' security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). CARSI funding is aimed at fighting illicit drug production and trafficking and combating corruption and transnational criminal organizations, which are among the key drivers of irregular migration, complementing other U.S. efforts such as those focused on assisting vulnerable populations displaced by drug trafficking, violence, and crime.

A top priority for Honduras is acquiring a drug incinerator or other safe method to dispose of seized chemicals. The United States partnered with the UN Office of Drug Control on a two-year regional project to develop a tailored, practical, and safe National Interagency Disposal Plan. Part of this effort will be to increase coordination with Guatemala and the possible joint use of their drug incinerator. The United States provides advisory, training, and logistical support and equipment to the Honduran National Police, Public Ministry, and military to improve Honduras' capacity to disrupt drug trafficking.

The U.S. Government maintains a bilateral agreement to suppress illicit trafficking by sea with Honduras, which includes provisions for pursuit and boarding, shipriders, entry to investigate, over-flight, order to land, and for the use of third-party platforms.

D. Conclusion

While Honduras demonstrated consistent capacity to conduct land interdictions in 2022, lack of a comprehensive national counternarcotics strategy, funding limitations, limited communications capabilities, and corruption hampered additional progress. Future action, in coordination with U.S. and international assistance, should focus on developing a national counternarcotics strategy, enhancing investigative capabilities and information sharing, strengthening air and maritime interdiction capabilities, developing ways to destroy seized drugs and chemicals, and taking significant steps to counter corruption through building the capacity of prosecutors and judges and through establishment of an independent anticorruption commission enabled by legislative reform.

India

A. Introduction

India seeks to strengthen its law enforcement and regulations relating to illicit drug production and trafficking and to reduce drug demand but faces resource, bureaucratic, and capacity obstacles. These challenges are compounded by India's large and geographically dispersed pharmaceutical sector.

India is a source, transit, and destination point for illicit narcotics and precursor chemicals for illicit substances. Drug use in India is growing, facilitated by illicit narcotics and the availability of over-the-counter medicines. Commonly used substances in India include heroin, marijuana, and cocaine, with growing use of pharmaceutical drugs in recent years including tramadol, opioids, and MDMA (ecstasy) analogues.

India is the largest producer of generic drugs in the world. Criminal drug trafficking organizations exploit Indian technical expertise and the ready supply of chemicals to manufacture synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals. Global demand for illicit synthetic drugs such as pharmaceutical opioids, methamphetamine, heroin, MDMA, ketamine, and other drugs has given rise to entrepreneurs in India who retool commercial chemical factories to produce large volumes of these drugs and their precursors illicitly. Illicit drugs and precursor chemicals sourced from India, including from illicit online pharmacies, can be found in Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and North America.

U.S.-based customers use online pharmacies and call centers registered in India to obtain synthetic pharmaceutical opioid drugs illegally, which are shipped to the United States from India using international mail and express consignment shipping systems. Websites registered in India advertise a range of drugs, including dangerous synthetic pharmaceutical opioids such as tramadol, tapentadol, fentanyl, and fentanyl analogues. Law enforcement agencies assess that online drug sales and the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals will not only increase within India, but in the United States and Africa as well. Seizures of tramadol and tapentadol are common and a high priority for the Indian government, with most ultimately linked to an Indian source.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In 2022, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare drafted the Drugs, Medical Devices, and Cosmetics Bill 2022, which is intended to replace earlier versions of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act of 1940. If enacted, the bill will bring clarity to how India plans to regulate medical devices, clinical trial oversight, and adulterated drugs.

The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) is India's primary law enforcement agency for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Central Bureau of Narcotics oversees the legal cultivation of opium poppy and issues licenses to manufacture, import, and export controlled

drugs that are lawfully produced. Other relevant Indian law enforcement agencies include the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs and the Enforcement Directorate. The National Investigation Agency may participate in certain investigations if narcotics trafficking is suspected to be related to terrorist financing.

Inadequate training, equipment, staffing, high personnel turnover rates, and inconsistent interagency coordination constrain efforts to investigate criminal drug manufacturing and trafficking and identify higher-level targets. Long delays in India's court system complicate prosecutions. Further, a lack of legislation to support comprehensive drug regulation also impedes efforts by Indian law enforcement agencies to conduct complex drug conspiracy investigations. Regulatory processes are also slow and require the coordination of multiple agencies. As a result, regulation often lags the development and proliferation of chemical precursors that may be diverted to illicit drug manufacture and novel synthetic drugs.

India has entered bilateral agreements with 36 countries providing cooperation to reduce demand and prevent the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals. India is a signatory to mutual legal assistance treaties with 41 countries, including the United States, and maintains extradition treaties with at least 50 countries, including the United States. The NCB also shares information and coordinates with regional organizations, including the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Drug Offences Monitoring Desk; Colombo Plan; and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-Operation.

2. Supply Reduction

India's "Drugs Free India" campaign continued in 2022. As part of a campaign by the NCB, more than 75 thousand kilograms (kg) of drugs were destroyed and more than 1,300 kg of heroin were seized in operations in Gujarat, Delhi, and Kolkata. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Annual report in 2021, the most recent period for which data is available, noted a large number of seizures, including 5.3 metric tons (MT) of heroin, 2.4 MT of opium, 46.3 MT of ganja, and over 2.3 million tablets of psychotropic substances. MHA also reported that 8,992 acres of illicit cannabis and 2,774 acres of illicit poppy were destroyed in 2021. Among significant seizures through October 2022 were of 717 kg of drugs in Gujarat and 260 kg of heroin in April from a shipping container at the port in Kandla. Indian customs and law enforcement officials also made multiple airport interdictions of couriers smuggling heroin, cocaine, and MDMA.

Due in large part to the enormous size of its pharmaceutical and chemical industry, India faces significant challenges in regulating chemical and pharmaceutical production, trade, and sales. Many pharmaceutical and chemical products, legally produced in India where there are few to no controls, find their way into the illicit market in countries where those substances are regulated. For instance, India is a major source of synthetic pharmaceutical opioids, such as tramadol and tapentadol, that are trafficked throughout the African continent. In July 2022, Nigerian law enforcement seized over 27 million India-sourced tramadol tablets discovered in a shipping container. Lack of integrated networks and case management software present additional enforcement challenges. Illicit Indian online pharmacies over the dark web continue to export illicit drugs, including tramadol and tapentadol, cough syrup, and amphetamine to countries including the United States.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The last national survey on substance use, conducted by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MSJE) in 2018, estimated that 23 million people aged 10 to 75 use opioids, most prevalently heroin and pharmaceutical opioids, and eight million Indians suffered from opioid use disorder of which over 70 percent received no treatment. India's national "Drugs Free India" campaign continued in 2022 with a focus on interdictions by law enforcement.

India's MSJE and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare develop national guidelines and implement drug treatment clinics within government hospitals across the country. The MSJE is responsible for implementing the National Action Plan for Drug Demand Reduction (2018-2024) and funds over 400 non-governmental organizations to operate integrated drug use disorder awareness, treatment, and rehabilitation centers.

4. Corruption

The Government of India does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, some security and local government officials have been implicated in drug-related corruption. Media reports have alleged official corruption where bribes are paid to police and local officials to ignore illicit poppy and cannabis growing fields and some reports have claimed that corrupt border officials have enabled cross-border movement of heroin, pharmaceutical drugs, and precursor materials.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and India continue to expand cooperation on counterdrug issues, including convening, in July 2022, a third annual Counternarcotics Working Group meeting focused on law enforcement cooperation and public health, sharing of data and best practices, enhancing multilateral collaboration, drug demand reduction, and supporting India's regional counternarcotics leadership. U.S.-India law enforcement cooperation resulted in multiple joint arrests and high-value seizures in 2022. U.S. and Indian law enforcement authorities continue to target TCOs based in the United States and elsewhere with extensive ties to India. The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission that receive \$50,000 or more in INL funding in India.

D. Conclusion

Illicit manufacturing and trafficking networks in India could well increase as global demand for synthetic drugs continues to grow, particularly regarding synthetic opioids. More proactive regulations, allowing for the early acknowledgement and scheduling of new psychoactive substances and improved regulation of online drug sales, enhanced digital and traditional investigative capacity, and improved coordination among Indian government agencies are necessary to address India's growing role as a source for precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs and assist in reducing drug demand in the country.

Indonesia

A. Introduction

Indonesia remains a major transit point and destination for illicit narcotics. Organized crime groups capitalize on one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and the difficulty in policing Indonesia's 17,000 islands to traffic methamphetamines and other illicit drugs. Based on analysis from seizures, the majority of methamphetamine is produced in Burma, transited through Malaysia, and destined for Australia and New Zealand. Indonesia, however, is also increasingly a destination for methamphetamine, ecstasy, and other illicit drugs. Cannabis continues to be produced in northern Sumatra and other areas, primarily for domestic consumption. Indonesia's Anti-Narcotics Agency (BNN) and the Indonesian National Police (INP) lead government efforts to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute narcotics-related crimes.

In its annual Drugs Report published in June 2022, BNN recognized its need to address the ongoing threat posed by the production and distribution of illicit drugs originating in the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos, and Burma). For the second year in a row, however, authorities discovered methamphetamine production facilities within Indonesia. While drug use in rural areas has decreased modestly in recent years, the overall prevalence of drug use in Indonesia continues to increase. The greatest increases were found among women, those taking care of households, and the unemployed.

During the first six months of 2022, Indonesian authorities seized approximately 45 metric tons (MT) of cannabis, 5 MT of methamphetamines, more than 455,000 ecstasy tablets, and more than 3.2 million tablets of psychotropic drugs. As of March 2022, authorities seized 87 types of new psychoactive substances, including 12 that are not yet registered by Indonesian authorities.

Indonesia's drug-related laws remain among the strictest in the world, with drug trafficking punishable by the death penalty. The number of individuals sentenced to death has increased steadily each year since 2017; however, Indonesia has not carried out a trafficking-related execution in that time period. Based on data from August 2022, Indonesian prison populations average 109 percent above capacity, with the majority of inmates imprisoned on drug-related charges.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Indonesian President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo has called for a whole-of-nation approach to combat drug use and trafficking, to include increasing efforts on education, prevention, and rehabilitation. BNN's budget increased by almost 19 percent in 2022, with total funding at over \$117 million. 97 percent of the BNN budget is allocated to supporting anti-narcotics operations, with the remainder set aside for prevention and eradication efforts.

As part of its collaboration with BNN, the regional Customs and Excise Office in Kerawanan launched a Directorate of Narcotics Interdiction in January in order to better target illicit drugs and effectively respond to trends in narcotics crimes.

2. Supply Reduction

Information and training provided by the United States contributed to several significant narcotics seizures in 2022. In March, INP in West Java seized approximately one MT of methamphetamine as it was being transferred from ship to the shore. In June, the INP Narcotics Directorate in Jawa Timur seized approximately 90 kilograms (kg) of methamphetamine that had been concealed in Chinese tea packages. Between May and July, BNN seized more than 100 kg of methamphetamine and 11 MT of marijuana in Jakarta from 15 narcotics cases. The majority of these cases involved Indonesians within the country. Three, however, involved the attempted shipment of methamphetamine by mail from South Africa and Thailand, while another package was being sent from Indonesia to Australia.

In July 2022 BNN discovered a clandestine methamphetamine lab in the Riau islands. BNN detained two Malaysian citizens and one Indonesian and seized undisclosed narcotics precursor liquids. In July INP and Indonesian Customs seized approximately 50 kilograms of cocaine in the Riau Islands connected to a larger criminal organization operating out of South America. In August, BNN destroyed over 10 hectares of a cannabis plantation in Aceh and North Sumatra.

In August 2022 the Indonesian military, BNN, INP, Customs and Excise, and others conducted a joint operation, code named “Purnama” and seized more than 74 kg of crystal methamphetamine and 19,700 ecstasy pills after tracking the shipment and its eventual transfer from ship to car.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Narcotics law number 35 (2009) outlines guidance for drug user rehabilitation versus criminalization, a list of illicit substances, and the establishment of drug courts. Presidential Proclamation Number 2 of 2020 outlines the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Eradication of Drug Use and Illicit Trafficking (P4GN).

The Indonesian government extended its “Shining Village” program by seven sub-districts, with plans to launch “clean campuses” at five university campuses in 2022. The program aims to handle drug abuse at the village government level, including prevention, rehabilitation, and providing basic life skills to empower former drug users.

4. Corruption

The Indonesian government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Within the current administration, no senior government officials have been identified as being engaged in such activity. However, there have been recent scandals involving police corruption where police officers have been arrested for selling methamphetamine, including high ranking officers.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Although there are no bilateral mutual legal assistance or extradition treaties between Indonesia and the United States, Indonesia does cooperate to some extent. For example, Indonesia's domestic extradition law provides for the possibility of extradition of non-Indonesian citizens with the approval of the President. Indonesia can also rely on various multilateral treaties as a basis for mutual legal assistance.

U.S.-funded programs have trained Indonesian officials on a range of anti-narcotics issues, including financial crimes investigations for narcotics investigators and counter transnational organized crime. U.S. programs also address drug demand reduction, including through education and rehabilitation training. Likewise, U.S. programs work with members of Indonesia's criminal justice system regarding strategies to address the large number of drug-related individuals in prison and to further develop its restorative justice practices.

D. Conclusion

Indonesia continues to make strides toward a more effective strategy to police its borders. The government's increased attention to education and treatment of substance use disorder is vital. U.S. support of these efforts, in addition to support for counternarcotics operations and the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of drug traffickers, represent a holistic approach to combating transnational crime and curbing the domestic demand for drugs in the country. Key to a multifaceted drug control program will be Indonesia's renewed focus on amendments to Narcotics Law 35 (2009), including better delineation between users and dealers and allowing for treatment and rehabilitation instead of mandatory sentencing.

Iran

Opiates, cannabis products, and methamphetamine transit to and through Iran, the vast majority of which originate in Afghanistan. Significant volumes of methamphetamine are also produced and consumed within Iran and trafficked to international markets. Drugs transiting Iran primarily enter the country from Afghanistan and Pakistan and are then transported onward across Iran's northern borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as by sea from Iran into Eastern Africa for further transshipment. Corrupt elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reportedly facilitate illicit drug smuggling or profit from the drug trade. An estimated 9,000 metric tons of drugs pass through Iran annually, according to Iranian press reports. Drug seizures increased along the Iran-Turkey and Iran-Azerbaijan borders in 2022, along with indications that drug traffickers were forcing refugees fleeing Afghanistan and illegally crossing the Iranian-Turkish border to smuggle drugs across the border.

Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) is the country's leading drug policy coordination body and reports directly to the country's president. The Law Enforcement Force (LEF) comprises the country's uniformed police units, including the Anti-Narcotics Police and border interdiction forces. The Iranian government treats illicit drug consumption as a serious challenge. DCHQ authorities estimate that 2.8 million people regularly use some form of illicit drug within the country. Opium is the most widely used illicit drug in Iran, according to Iranian authorities, followed by cannabis products. There has recently been an increase in crystal methamphetamine use, particularly among women who use drugs.

Most of the government's counternarcotics efforts are focused on interdiction and law enforcement, with fewer resources devoted to prevention and rehabilitation. Non-governmental organizations and the private sector manage the majority of Iran's demand reduction efforts including treatment centers. However, the Government of Iran did launch a new initiative in 2022 to tackle the issue of drug use among children and adolescents by introducing a new drug treatment protocol for children and adolescents.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime maintains a field office in Tehran that provides training and capacity building to Iranian authorities on border management and the fight against illicit trafficking, drug prevention, and treatment, care for people living with HIV, as well as sustainable job creation. Iran maintains liaison relationships with some neighboring countries and has made some attempts to expand law enforcement cooperation with them. For example, on March 9, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani signed a document on bilateral security cooperation with his Uzbek counterpart preparing the establishment of a joint security commission to bolster the two states' cooperation in the fight against drug smuggling, organized crime, and terrorism. However, operational cooperation on international investigations remains limited. Drug control cooperation between Iran and European states has been limited partially due to concerns over the Iranian government's widespread application of the death penalty for drug offenses.

Jamaica

A. Introduction

Jamaica is the largest Caribbean source country of marijuana and a transit point for cocaine trafficked from South America to North America and other international markets. Criminal gangs in Jamaica, Haiti, and Central America engage in a “guns for ganja” enterprise where Jamaican criminals use marijuana for currency to obtain guns or other contraband from criminal entities in Haiti and Central America. The “guns for ganja” trade is especially pronounced between Jamaica and Haiti; in February 2022, Jamaican police reported seizing 1,000 pounds of marijuana over a five-hour period linked to the guns for drugs trade, and in April 2022, police seized \$30,000 worth of marijuana and two stolen vessels involved in the guns for ganja trade.

Jamaica’s geographic position in the western Caribbean, its expansive and difficult-to-patrol coastline with 145 unmanned marinas, high volume of tourist travel, and status as a major containerized cargo transshipment hub ultimately leads to the country being used by Transnational Criminal Organizations as a drug trafficking transit location. The United States and Jamaica use bilateral legal assistance and extradition treaties, agreements on maritime law enforcement cooperation, and information sharing to combat criminal activity. Jamaica’s drug control efforts face significant challenges from weak drug penalties, internal conspiracies and corruption, organized crime, gang activity, resource constraints, and a criminal justice system burdened by case backlogs.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The United States and Jamaica have strong bilateral law enforcement cooperation on combatting illicit drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) Coast Guard is responsible for maritime law enforcement, while the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is primarily responsible for drug enforcement on land. Jamaica’s national drug control strategy expired in 2021, and the government is in the process of drafting a new five-year strategy.

Jamaica’s efforts to bring drug traffickers to justice are hobbled by an under-resourced and overburdened police and judicial system. Repeated delays and trial postponements contribute to significant case backlogs, leading to impunity for many offenders. In response, the Jamaican government, with U.S. government support, has made progress on reducing the case backlog with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) to provide more timely justice.

The United States and Jamaica are bilateral parties to a mutual legal assistance treaty, a ship rider agreement, and an extradition treaty. In 2022 the United States and Jamaica made use of a reciprocity agreement to share information as well as a bilateral agreement on law enforcement cooperation on maritime interdiction of illicit traffickers to board suspicious vessels and facilitate embarkation of law enforcement officials on other countries’ vessels.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the JCF, authorities seized 740 kilograms (kg) of cocaine in the first eight months in 2022, an increase from 290 kg seized during the same period in 2021. Intelligence indicates shipments of cocaine reach Jamaica via commercial shipping containers from South and Central America, as well as via small “go-fast” watercraft. Cocaine is transshipped through the seaports onto commercial vessels or aircrafts bound for the United States. After reaching Jamaica, the cocaine is then divided for outbound shipment concealed in mail, aircraft, luggage, air freight, and human couriers. Traffickers smuggle Jamaican-grown marijuana out of the country via commercial shipping and small watercraft. Small fishing and go-fast vessels carry marijuana to Central America, Haiti, the Cayman Islands, and The Bahamas.

According to police data, during the first eight months of 2022, Jamaican authorities eradicated 0.809 hectares (ha) of cannabis plants (compared to 199 ha in 2021) and seized approximately 19 MT of cured marijuana, compared to 18 MT in the first eight months of 2021.

Jamaica prohibits the manufacture, sale, transport, and possession of MDMA (ecstasy) and methamphetamine and regulates the precursor chemicals used to produce them. There were no reports of precursor chemicals produced or trafficked in Jamaica in 2022. U.S. law enforcement agencies work closely with Jamaican police and customs officials to develop leads, share information, and facilitate interdiction of drug shipments originating in or transiting through Jamaica. In the first eight months of 2022, 409 persons were arrested for drug crimes, a decrease from the 634 arrests in 2021.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Ministry of Health National Council on Drug Abuse provides assessment, counseling, and treatment services for substance abusers and conducts prevention programs for targeted populations, including children and parents. In 2022, the Council conducted a Rapid Situation Assessment on Substance Use Secondary Schools that found MDMA, edibles, and vaping have become increasingly popular among youth. The resulting assessment was used to strengthen school-based drug policy, increase capacity in the health and education systems to undertake screenings, conduct interventions, and make referrals to drug treatment. The Ministry of Health also developed a public education campaign to address New Psychoactive Substances (NPS). The Council is implementing a National Drug Prevalence Survey among persons aged 12 to 65 (most recently conducted in 2016) to determine the prevalence and patterns of psychoactive substance use in Jamaica and a Global School Based Student Health Survey among persons aged 13 to 17 in secondary schools in St. Catherine. Increased demand for drug prevention and treatment services persists.

The Jamaican government operates one detoxification center and offers services at Kingston’s Bellevue Hospital. Drug treatment remains underfunded and under resourced. Significant partnerships include the United States, Organization of American States, European Union, World Health Organization, and the United Nations.

4. Corruption

The Jamaican government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Jamaican law penalizes corruption, but in practice, corruption remains entrenched and widespread, even among senior government officials. The judicial system has a poor record of prosecuting corruption cases against law enforcement and government officials. Internal conspiracy schemes at Jamaica's airports and seaports facilitates the movement of drug shipments across borders, and organized crime leaders have historically had ties to government officials.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The U.S. and Jamaican governments coordinate closely on shared priorities related to illicit drug control, including investigative capacity, customs cooperation, maritime security, and support to the judicial system. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) provided support to Jamaica, including training, equipment, and logistical assistance for interdicting illicit drugs and trafficked firearms as well as support to combat money laundering, financial fraud, and other organized crime. The U.S. government has supported the JCF's Narcotics Division and the JDF's Military Intelligence Unit and Coast Guard with equipment and training. The U.S. government continues to raise concerns about illicit drug trafficking with the Jamaican government as well as transportation agencies and commercial shippers.

D. Conclusion

Cooperation between Jamaica and the United States related to drug trafficking and transnational crime continued to be strong in 2022, especially as it pertained to efforts to dismantle internal conspiracies at airports. Significant progress against drug trafficking will depend on efforts to arrest and prosecute high-level drug traffickers and their accomplices, increase penalties for drug trafficking, combat internal conspiracies and corruption, increase extraditions, implement a national drug strategy, and provide swift justice to hold drug traffickers accountable.

Kazakhstan

A. Introduction

Kazakhstan is on the Northern Route, a land drug trafficking route from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. Declining year-to-year heroin seizures in Kazakhstan suggest the country's prominence along the route may be waning. Anecdotal evidence indicates a change in illegal drug use trends in Kazakhstan, with synthetic drugs outpacing the use of traditional drugs like heroin and cannabis.

Domestic manufacturing of synthetics, as measured by seized clandestine laboratories, is increasing. Underscoring the problem of synthetic drugs, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in his September State of the Nation address called for a national action plan to deal with the challenges that synthetic drugs pose to Kazakhstan.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments/Policies and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Kazakhstan has adequate laws and resources to counter illicit drugs. Encrypted messaging platforms posed problems to countering drug trafficking online, the most common sales medium for synthetic drugs. In the first nine months of 2022 law enforcement agencies requested the closure of 1,787 websites associated with distributing synthetic drugs, compared to 845 during the same period of 2021.

In the first nine months of 2022, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the nation's police agency) placed one synthetic drug (acetyl-fentanyl) on the controlled substances list and anticipated adding another 30 drugs before 2023. Kazakhstan has a mutual legal assistance agreement with the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

In the first nine months of 2022, Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies seized 33 kilograms (kg) of heroin (compared to 57 kg for the same period in 2021); 670 kg of hashish (compared to 842 kg for the same period in 2021); 68 kg of opium (compared to 35 kg for the same period in 2021), and almost four metric tons (MT) of cannabis (compared to ten MT in 2021).

Law enforcement authorities also seized 365 kg of all types of synthetic drugs during the first nine months of 2022 (compared to 305 kg for the first nine months of 2021). During the same period, authorities seized 46 clandestine laboratories manufacturing synthetic drugs (compared to 40 for the same period in 2021). Mephedrone and alpha-PVP were the most common synthetic drugs manufactured in clandestine laboratories. The retail cost of a gram of mephedrone was \$38, and dosage units were usually 0.3 grams. The low cost of synthetic drugs, combined with negative perceptions of heroin use, factored into illegal drug users' increased preference for synthetic drugs.

According to law enforcement, synthetic drugs are smuggled into Kazakhstan, but it is easier to import precursor chemicals for local manufacture as clandestine laboratories grow in sophistication. European drug traffickers assist in establishing clandestine laboratories.

In the first known instance of domestically manufactured synthetic drugs being smuggled outside the country, police seized a large clandestine laboratory supplying synthetic drugs to Uzbekistan and Russia. The case was also the first to detect the use of a cryptocurrency to make payments for drug deliveries and to launder funds. Anecdotally, heroin smuggled from Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is available for personal consumption in some western areas of the country. Raw opium is also reportedly smuggled into Kazakhstan from Iran. Cannabis is the drug of choice in Kazakhstan's far northwest, where synthetic drugs are not yet widely available. Cocaine is available in Kazakhstan, but expensive at \$300 a gram.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Adolescents generally use pharmaceutical drugs like tramadol, and adults under 30 use synthetic drugs. Older users generally use cannabis, hashish, or heroin. In September 2022, 18,130 people were registered with the government for drug use treatment (compared to 18,952 for the same period in 2021), including 1,468 women and 93 juveniles. Registering as an addict with the government is typically the last recourse for treatment due to the stigma attached to addiction and the restrictions that registration imposes on government employment, other social benefits, and marriage. The Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America continued its program for community based anti-drug programming in six regions of Kazakhstan with support from the United States.

4. Corruption

The Government of Kazakhstan does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Combating public corruption is a priority for the Kazakhstani government.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. drug control programs aim to improve Kazakhstan's capacity to combat drug trafficking and drug demand. The United States supports counternarcotics capacity building, with a focus on countering drug-related money laundering and strengthening drug treatment curriculum at medical schools. All U.S. government programs enjoy host-government support.

Responding to President Tokayev's call for action on synthetic drugs, an interagency panel of the Kazakhstani government began drafting a plan in fall 2022 to combat drug trafficking and addiction.

There are no vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission in Kazakhstan that receive \$50,000 or more in INL funding.

D. Conclusion

The ease of acquiring synthetic drugs online, combined with their low cost, has created a growing population of drug users, posing new challenges for Kazakhstani law enforcement and treatment centers. Kazakhstani law enforcement understands the value of international cooperation in developing drug cases, as demonstrated by controlled deliveries to the Netherlands and Italy in 2021. Kazakhstan should apply this same cooperative approach to counter synthetic drugs by working with foreign partners to interdict the importation of finished product, precursor chemicals, and equipment needed to clandestinely manufacture synthetic drugs.

Kenya

Kenya is a transit country for illicit drugs and precursor chemicals; domestic drug consumption is growing. Criminal syndicates grow cannabis and miraa (khat) for local use and export. Kenya's location on the East African coast makes it attractive for narcotics traffickers moving drugs from Asia and Latin America to Europe and the Arabian Peninsula.

Heroin enters Kenya via Tanzania and in shipments across the Indian Ocean from Southwest Asia. Most heroin entering Kenya is destined for international markets, principally Europe. Domestic heroin use is a growing concern, especially along the coast and in Mombasa. Cocaine enters Kenya primarily via transshipment through Ethiopia.

Increased enforcement and preventive measures in Kenya have pushed some maritime drug transport southward toward Tanzania and Mozambique. Kenya's primary narcotics enforcement agency is the Anti-Narcotics Unit within the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. Kenya is a member of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC), which coordinates maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean.

During the first nine months of 2022, the Anti-Narcotics Unit made 113 arrests and seized approximately 78 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 8.7 metric tons of cannabis, 8 kg of cocaine, 5 kg of methamphetamine, and small quantities of rohypnol and morphine. Authorities seized approximately \$70,000 in cash and vehicles linked to suspected drug trafficking.

Kenya honors a 1935 pre-independence extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. While no mutual legal assistance treaty exists between Kenya and the United States, both countries are nevertheless able to provide each other such assistance, and Kenya is a party to multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation.

The National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA) is a demand reduction agency that educates Kenyans on the dangers of substance use. NACADA operates a 24-hour helpline for addiction counseling, referrals to treatment, and family support.

Drug trafficking is both a source and driver of official corruption in Kenya. Both Kenyan and international media highlight the role of gang activity in supporting the drug trade in the port city of Mombasa and along the Kenya/Tanzania border, reportedly with the complicity of low-level law enforcement officials. Kenya's National Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission maintains oversight of drug-related corruption. Kenyan law enforcement supports U.S. investigations and conducts its own investigations into corrupt officials directly or indirectly involved in drug-related crimes, such as money laundering and obstruction of justice.

Kyrgyz Republic

A. Introduction

The Kyrgyz Republic is a prime transit route and transshipment location due to its proximity to Afghanistan, limited resources, a weak criminal justice system, and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. The Kyrgyz Republic lies along a significant transit route for illegal drugs transiting north from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. Illicit drugs are primarily smuggled into the country from Tajikistan across un-demarcated borders. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces contributed to an increase in the volume of drug trafficking.

The Kyrgyz Republic has shown a commitment to addressing drug use. Domestically, the Kyrgyz Republic continues to work on identifying new psychoactive substances (NPS), coordinating law enforcement activities to improve interdiction, and improving border controls.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior (MOI) is responsible for countering illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and their precursors. The Ministry of Health controls the legal use of drugs. The National Development Program of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2026 was approved in 2022. The Program seeks to strengthen law enforcement and toughen penalties for drug crimes including sale of drugs or psychotropic substances, involvement in distribution, and advertising drugs on the Internet. A national mechanism for notifying international systems about new synthetic drugs is included in the government's plan. The draft Law of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and their Precursors is still pending approval by Parliament.

The fight against synthetic drugs and NPS has been identified as a priority area of CNS activity. In July, CNS officers received training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest to improve their ability to track new illegal substances and their production.

The Kyrgyz Republic is a member of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), which promotes regional information sharing and cooperative operations to combat transnational drug trafficking. The Kyrgyz Republic does not have an extradition agreement or mutual legal assistance agreement with the United States. However, it is a signatory to multilateral legal instruments that can be used to facilitate cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

In April 2022 CNS and Kazakhstan Special Services liquidated a network of synthetic drugs sold via the Internet. Four citizens of Kazakhstan and three citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic were detained, and two drug production laboratories were closed. 31 kilograms (kg) of synthetic drugs were seized, including "Alpha PVP," mephedrone, hashish, and marijuana, with a total

value of approximately \$1.8 million. In the first eight months of 2022, law enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic registered 1109 drug crimes, a 34 percent increase from the same period in 2021. Drug-related crimes constituted 3.2 percent of total crimes during the period. In 2022, MOI announced the seizure of 1233 kg of hashish, 33 kg of heroin, nine kg of opium, and 218 kg of marijuana - a total of 5 tons 556 kilograms of psychotropic substances, and precursors.

There are no vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission in Kyrgyz Republic that receive \$50,000 or more in funding from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The United States supports the Kyrgyz Republic through advocacy programs aimed at improving access to quality drug prevention and treatment services. These programs include organizing high-level advocacy meetings, supporting technical expert groups, reviewing legal documents, and building capacity of health care workers and civil society organizations to assist key populations.

Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America works with a local NGO “Door-Eli” and CNS on healthy and drug-free-lifestyle promotion programs in communities throughout the country. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Health implemented a set of programs to support the legal framework on drug control, strengthened interagency cooperation, and trained law enforcement officers in fighting drug trafficking.

The Republican HIV/AIDS Committee reported that HIV and hepatitis C prevalence among people who inject drugs ranges from 13 to 26 percent and 50 to 71 percent respectively, significantly higher than among the general population. The United States, via its Centers for Disease Control and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, provides technical and financial support to the Republican Psychology and Narcology Committee to provide evidence-based harm-reduction services, such as opioid substitution therapy (OST) and integrated HIV and viral hepatitis services. As of June 2022, there were 811 individuals receiving OST with CDC support in the Kyrgyz Republic. Harm reduction programming is also provided through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria grants. Host government funding for harm reduction activities is limited and there are challenges in implementing and expanding evidence-based programs due to the influence of countries such as Russia that approach drug use from a more punitive perspective. There is evidence that drug users, particularly young users, are increasingly using NPS, synthetic drugs, and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), which requires a shift in government and clinical strategies.

4. Corruption

The Kyrgyz Republic government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, there are instances of corruption among law enforcement agencies and politicians in aiding the transport of drugs. The government has prioritized

combating corruption, but enforcement is selective, results are mixed, and corruption remains widespread. Criminal liability for corruption was increased in 2021 through legal reforms, but the government has not implemented the law effectively. The payment of bribes to avoid investigation or prosecution is pervasive at all levels. Law enforcement officers employ arbitrary arrest, detainee abuse, and the threat of criminal prosecution to extort cash payments from citizens.

The Kyrgyz Republic is changing its Law No. 153 “On combatting corruption” and developing a new anti-corruption strategy as part of ongoing legislative reform. Responsibility for investigating corruption falls under the Prosecutor General’s Office and the investigative department of the State Committee for National Security. The Anti-Corruption Council under the President is seeking to change its status to be funded from the state budget as an authorized body for combatting corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The law enforcement-related policy objectives of the United States in the Kyrgyz Republic include strengthening the capacity of law enforcement, expanding its ability to investigate and prosecute criminal cases, and enhancing anti-corruption and counternarcotics cooperation.

There has been little engagement from the MOI, the State Customs Service, or the State Border Service in countering drug trafficking. A proposed memorandum of cooperation between the MOI and the United States designed to replace the previous memorandum remains stalled.

D. Conclusion

The Kyrgyz Republic’s location makes it a prime candidate for stockpiling drugs, particularly from Afghanistan, as they can then be shipped to Kazakhstan, Russia, and to the borders of the European Union without further customs checks. Sources in the MOI believe it is impossible to stop the flow of drug trafficking until Kyrgyz and Tajik authorities resolve their border disputes and demarcate the border. The CNS currently lacks the capacity to effectively address drug smuggling but has shown willingness to work with international partners to address this issue. Tackling corruption and transnational crime syndicates would help reduce the quantity of drugs trafficked from Afghanistan.

Laos

A. Introduction

Landlocked and sharing roughly 3,000 miles of often porous borders with Burma, China, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, Laos remained a key transit route for drug trafficking and the movement of precursor chemicals in 2022. Record seizures by law enforcement of methamphetamine tablets from uncontrolled areas of Burma indicated an increase of drug supply as well as the government's commitment to counter drug trafficking.

The Lao Commission for Drug Control and Supervision (LCDC) reported opium production and trafficking as largely stable compared to recent years. Opium produced in Laos is typically smuggled out of the country to be refined elsewhere and is not trafficked in significant quantities to the United States. Opium production data will be updated by a U.S.-funded survey conducted in cooperation with the Lao government that is scheduled to begin before the end of 2022. The opium survey will be followed by a drug use survey that will assess the prevalence of amphetamine-type stimulant (ATS) use among Lao citizens.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Laos' top policy-making body for drug control is the National Steering Committee to Combat Drugs (NSCCD), chaired by the prime minister. LCDC and the Counternarcotic Police Department (DCD), under the Ministry of Public Security (MOPS), are the main coordinating bodies for drug-related law enforcement activities. Police are organized into 18 provincial Counter Narcotics Units (CNUs), one for each province and the capital. Laos does not have a bilateral extradition or a mutual legal assistance agreement with the United States but has acceded to multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation. The United States is in communication with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to identify an appropriate agency to conclude a new Letter of Agreement (LOA) that would enable broader cooperation on law enforcement assistance. Laos has also been reluctant to approve an additional U.S. position that would facilitate assistance in the health sector that could enhance drug treatment in the country.

2. Supply Reduction

The United States is funding the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to perform an opium survey in 2022, but available data indicate the opium and heroin economies remained largely stable in 2022 with a possible small uptick in opium cultivation. Methamphetamine has captured the regional drug market and become the primary drug of concern. Methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs enter northwestern Laos from neighboring Burma and then transit to Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and China. One recent ATS seizure included methamphetamine production equipment, suggesting the continued development of clandestine drug labs in Laos that were reported in 2021. Precursor chemicals required for the manufacture of ATS flow in the opposite direction; originating in China and transiting Laos to drug labs in uncontrolled areas of Burma.

In the first six months of 2022, Lao law enforcement agencies processed 2,253 drug-related cases that resulted in the arrest of 3,302 people. Drug seizures in the first nine months of the year included 117.5 million tablets of ATS, 25 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 82 kg of opium, 3 metric tons (MT) of cannabis, 2 MT of crystal methamphetamine (ice), 3 kg of cocaine, and 26 kg of unidentified powders.

Effective investigation and prosecution of drug crimes is hampered by a general lack of capacity and resources. Challenges include disparate paper-based case filing systems, unclear roles and responsibilities, and lack of forensic capability. Cases against drug traffickers were regularly paused for a year or more to verify the nature of seized substances in lab tests that had to be processed in other countries.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Combating illicit drugs was one of two National Agenda priorities publicly announced in 2022. The government disseminated information to the public to raise civic awareness on the dangers of drugs through media, school workshops, village events, announcements on public loudspeaker systems, and public signage. On October 15, 2022, Laos marked the 20th National Day Against Drugs in a high-profile awareness raising event that featured the incineration of 4.3 tons of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals.

The Lao Government estimated there were 50,000 to 60,000 “high-risk” drug users in 2022, but anecdotal reports citing whole villages affected by methamphetamine use in various areas of the country suggested addiction rates were much higher. LCDC reported annual treatment and rehabilitation of 3,000 to 4,000 drug users through 13 government centers and 28 community-based treatment (CBT) clinics established in cooperation with UNODC. CBT clinics provided screening and counseling services according to evidence-based drug prevention and treatment protocols while treatment in government centers was often involuntary. UNODC is evaluating the potential for conducting a pilot methadone project for 2023, which would represent a significant step away from punitive treatment and toward evidence-based approaches.

The government has partnered with UNODC since 2016 on an alternative development program that assists farmers who in the past cultivated opium poppy to develop and sustain coffee plantations. The project also supports animal husbandry, the promotion of handicrafts, and limited microcredits. Focused on 38 villages in Houaphanh province, the initiative has become a model for alternative development that may be replicated in neighboring provinces in the future.

4. Corruption

The Government of Laos does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. The Prime Minister has publicly condemned corruption, and some senior and mid-level officials were dismissed for corrupt behavior from their government positions and from the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party – the founding, sole, and ruling party of the country. However, disciplinary action appeared highly selective and corruption remained endemic throughout the country.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The National Assembly's ninth legislature and the National Agenda on Drug Problems 2021-2023 introduced measures to counter illicit drug trafficking and use. The agenda articulates six priorities: awareness raising; creation and dissemination of laws and regulations; strengthening law enforcement agencies; improvement of drug control management and cooperation; improving the political system's capacity to address drug issues at the local and national level; and increasing international cooperation.

Stakeholders in the counternarcotics sphere – including Lao Customs Department, the Office of the Supreme People's Prosecutor, the People's Supreme Court; LCDC, and some police in MOPS – are receptive to bilateral cooperation in the form of capacity building and technical assistance, but cumbersome bureaucratic requirements regularly result in missed training opportunities and delayed delivery of other forms of assistance. The United States regularly provides direct bilateral assistance to support counternarcotics activities and supports long term projects implemented by UN agencies like UNODC and the International Organization for Migration. The United States remains a key supporter of the long running drug treatment and alternative development programs in Laos, and through INL is expanding criminal justice support to ensure accountability for drug trafficking and related offenses.

D. Conclusion

The Lao government has demonstrated its commitment to combat and prevent drug trafficking and has shown an increased willingness to cooperate with the United States to improve law enforcement capacity and border control. Efforts are constrained by lack of capacity in drug enforcement institutions, a dearth of technical and financial resources, and poor communication and coordination. These challenges can be reduced in part by streamlining overly bureaucratic processes that significantly hamper the delivery of law enforcement assistance, encouraging an improved interagency process, and stronger operational law enforcement cooperation in and beyond the region.

Liberia

A. Introduction

Liberia is not a significant transit country for illicit narcotics bound for the United States or Europe, nor is it a key producer of illicit drugs. However, the country's limited law enforcement capacity, inadequate border controls, and proximity to major drug transit routes contribute to trafficking, mostly of cocaine and heroin, to and through Liberia and onward to other West African countries. Local drug use, especially locally grown cannabis, is not uncommon. Other illicit drugs consumed within Liberia include heroin (mostly smoked), cocaine (snorted), and more recently kush (Cannabis Indica's type flower), mixed with different substances including heroin or synthetic DMT. Local authorities report a prevalence of amphetamine-type stimulants and intravenous drug use. Due to poor transportation and infrastructure, and a lack of capacity and interest on the part of the government, there is no reliable data on drug consumption or overall trends in the country. There is no evidence of synthetic opioids being trafficked through Liberia. Most locally consumed drugs produced elsewhere enter Liberia by foot and vehicle traffic across land borders, with commercial aircraft and maritime vessels also used. Drug use among the country's youth is a growing public concern.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA), Liberia National Police (LNP), Liberia Coast Guard (under the Armed Forces of Liberia), and National Security Agency (NSA) share responsibility for addressing drug trafficking in Liberia. Nigerian criminal networks are known to traffic drugs into and through Liberia. A recent seizure suggested a Guinea Bissau network may also be operating in Liberia and drug mules from multiple nations have been arrested in Liberia. Local authorities work with the United States and other international partners to combat transnational crime. The LDEA and LNP have coordination and information sharing capabilities with Interpol's West African Police Information System (WAPIS).

The LDEA continues to improve its operational capacity and professionalism through using confidential sources; work with private businesses; initiating controlled deliveries; investigation of international smuggling groups; and interagency coordination.

The U.S.-Liberia extradition treaty has been in effect since 1939. While no mutual legal assistance treaty between Liberia and the United States exists, both countries are nevertheless able to provide each other such assistance, and Liberia is a party to multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

Marijuana is the most widely available drug in Liberia. Little information is available on the extent of local cannabis cultivation and local trafficking networks, but the public does not view local cultivation as a major concern.

During the first nine months of 2022, the LDEA seized approximately 20 kilograms (kg) of heroin, an increase compared to the 5.3 kg seized in 2021, but still significantly lower than the 272 kg seized in 2019. The 4.2 kg of cocaine seized in 2022 is similar to the amount seized in 2021. The LDEA also seized 2.4 metric tons (MT) of marijuana and 8.7 kg of Kush. A seizure of 6 kg of DMT in May 2022, shipped from the UK via DHL, suggests the cutting of the “Kush” may be occurring locally. The LDEA referred 242 drug cases to the courts for prosecution, including 252 arrests.

On October 1, 2022, the LDEA and the NSA seized 520 kg of cocaine that arrived in a frozen goods container at the port of Monrovia. Tipped off by U.S. investigators, the LDEA and NSA arrested a Guinea Bissauan and are actively pursuing a Brazilian and a Portuguese national who are still at large. A fourth suspect, a Lebanese resident in Liberia, was arrested in Sierra Leone on October 2, 2022, while trying to escape. Authorities believe that the seized cocaine was produced in Colombia and loaded on a container in Brazil before making its way to Liberia. It is believed that Liberia was not the final destination for this shipment but the investigation into its final destination is ongoing. This seizure is the largest in Liberian history and, along with recent seizures in Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria, underscores that West Africa continues to grow as a transshipment point for drug trafficking.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

There are no recent data available on current drug use within Liberia, though anecdotal reports indicate that drug use has increased in the emerging middle class and is common in the expat and Lebanese communities.

Due to a lack of resources and capacity, the government has conducted very little drug prevention, rehabilitation, or treatment since the 1970s (pre-civil war). Persons with substance use disorders are referred to the only psychiatric hospital in Liberia or to one of the few nongovernmental organizations working in the field. The LDEA’s participation in the International Day Against Illicit Drugs-World Drug Day (June 26) is its largest annual awareness campaign activity and culminates with an annual drug burn attended by journalists and dignitaries. LDEA and civil society groups are still advocating for passage of amendments to the Drug Law to make trafficking a non-bailable offence.

4. Corruption

The Government of Liberia does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate the production or distribution of illicit drugs, but some politicians and government officials are believed to be beneficiaries of the drug trade in Liberia. Insufficient political will and resources, an ineffective judicial system, and inadequate salaries for government employees and law enforcement officials facilitate corruption. The United States supports programs aimed at curbing corruption in the judiciary and elsewhere, and over the last two years has sanctioned three Liberian government officials (2022) and two lawmakers (2021) for corruption under the Global Magnitsky Act.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States works with Liberia to address international drug trafficking and reduce local demand. Among ongoing initiatives, the United States is funding a \$2.5 million project through the UNODC to enhance Liberian law enforcement capacity to counter transnational crime and trafficking of drugs and other contraband. A drug demand reduction project is also under development. U.S. assistance seeks to build the Government of Liberia's capacity to develop criminal cases against international trafficking organizations active in the country and encourage judicial case processing and attorney understanding of anti-drug laws.

D. Conclusion

The Government of Liberia has stated its commitment to preventing transnational criminal organizations from gaining a major foothold in its territory but lacks the resources and capacity to do so. Despite significant constraints, the LDEA is also working with other regional drug enforcement entities to exchange intelligence and information – collaboration that has led to the successful arrest and prosecution of international traffickers within Liberia's borders. The United States will continue to support and assist Liberia's efforts to strengthen its law enforcement capacities and fulfill its international drug control commitments.

Malaysia

Malaysia is not a source country for illicit drugs bound for the United States but is a significant transit country for drugs primarily destined for Australia. Drugs smuggled into Malaysia include significant quantities of crystal methamphetamine and lesser quantities of MDMA (ecstasy), cannabis, heroin, and ketamine. There is a significant number of people with substance use disorders in Malaysia, especially involving methamphetamine.

The Malaysian government presented several amendments to abolish mandatory death penalties and provide increased discretionary sentencing for drug trafficking offences to Parliament in October 2022. The proposed amendments allow for the death penalty to remain in effect for illicit drug trafficking, although judges could alternatively sentence a defendant to life imprisonment. While the government of Malaysia is committed to addressing the public health aspects of drug use, it has not successfully prosecuted many cases against drug trafficking organizations, in part due to inadequate conspiracy laws and the high burden of proof required for a conviction. The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) reported that 19,707 persons were arrested between January and September 2022 for drug violations, and 4,736 were arrested for trafficking. The RMP also dismantled three clandestine laboratories from January to September 2022.

From January to September 2022, Malaysian law enforcement agencies seized 350 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 5,184 kg of methamphetamine, 2,818 kg of ketamine, 278 kg of MDMA, and 446 kg of cannabis. These amounts reflect a decline from the same period in 2021, when 1.2 metric tons of heroin and 7 MT of methamphetamine were seized.

In September 2022, the RMP seized a combined 1,204 kg of methamphetamine in Kuala Lumpur and in a neighboring district, Bentong, that originated in Jalisco, Mexico. Although Myanmar-manufactured methamphetamine remains more prevalent, these seizures, and a similar October 2021 seizure of 398 kg of methamphetamine that originated in Mexico/Guatemala, may indicate an attempt by Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations to establish a foothold in Malaysia.

The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission that receive \$50,000 or more in INL funding in Malaysia. Malaysia has extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States. Malaysia remains an active participant in multilateral drug control venues, including to implement commitments under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the three major United Nations drug control treaties. Malaysian authorities attended U.S.-funded virtual counternarcotic and drug/chemical diversion training. The RMP is successfully using its two Narcotics Nucleus Centers to enhance cross-border and maritime criminal investigations.

Mexico

A. Introduction

Mexico is a significant source and transit country for fentanyl, fentanyl-laced counterfeit pills, other synthetic opioids, cocaine from South America, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine destined for the United States. Over 90 percent of the heroin seized and analyzed in the United States comes from Mexico. Mexico is also a destination for synthetic drug precursor chemicals from China, India, and other countries. U.S.-Mexico bilateral cooperation prioritizes reducing drug production; inhibiting the illicit cross-border movement of drugs; and investigating, prosecuting, and denying revenue to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that traffic narcotics. However, senior Mexican government leaders have not officially acknowledged fentanyl production in Mexico nor shared data on seized precursor chemicals with the United States. Local and state security officials in Mexico report that conflicts over control of retail drug sales, especially of methamphetamine, cause regular spikes in violence and other criminal activity.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's administration committed to reduce crime and violence through social programs aimed at addressing poverty and social inequalities and through the National Guard, the federal security force created in 2019 to replace the federal police. In September 2022, Lopez Obrador formally transferred the National Guard to the army (SEDENA). Mexico's proposed 2023 budget for justice and national security increased 7.4 percent from 2022, largely to fund National Guard bases and stations. SEDENA will manage the National Guard's budget, which amounts to \$3.4 billion on top of SEDENA's proposed 2023 budget of \$5.6 billion, pending congressional approval. The proposed 2023 budget for the Mexican navy (SEMAR), which plays an increasingly significant role in Mexico's counternarcotics efforts, increased 10.9 percent from 2022. The proposal for the judicial branch is \$4 billion, an 8.5 percent increase over the 2022 budget. Nevertheless, underfunding of security and justice sector institutions at the federal and subnational levels remains a concern. An estimated 93 percent of crimes remain unreported or uninvestigated. To combat diversion of precursor chemicals used to produce synthetic drugs like fentanyl, Mexico established a chemical watchlist in 2021 to flag chemicals of concern for additional scrutiny, and in 2022 Mexico expanded this list from 14 to 69 chemicals. (The Mexican government controls 69 chemicals on its watchlist, however, some government reports cite 72 chemicals.)

The U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty has been in force since 1980. A bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in force since 1991 fosters a broad range of cooperation in criminal matters. Mexico engages with Canada and the United States in the North American Drug Dialogue (NADD) to foster international counternarcotics cooperation and in the North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI) to share information, improve response to transnational threats, and develop protocols for maritime interdictions.

2. Supply Reduction

According to U.S. estimates, Mexican poppy cultivation rose for the first time in three years in 2021, increasing by 23 percent to 28,600 hectares (ha) from 23,200 ha in 2020. Potential pure production of heroin rose by 22 percent, from 59 metric tons (MT) in 2020 to 72 MT in 2021.

According to Lopez Obrador's 2022 President's Annual Report, during the first six months of 2022, Mexico reported eradicating 436.2 ha of cannabis and 9,594 ha of opium poppy. Mexico seized 12.4 MT of cocaine (a 38.3 percent increase compared to the same time period in 2021), 35.5 MT of marijuana (17.4 percent decrease), 66.1 kg of opium gum (47.9 percent increase), 150.8 kg of heroin (6.6 percent increase) during the same time period. According to the President's 2022 Monthly Security Reports, in the first nine months of 2022, Mexico seized 27,658.6 kg of methamphetamine (a 30.2 percent decrease compared to the same time period in 2021), 193 clandestine laboratories (172 more than the first nine months of 2021), and 1,732.1 kg of fentanyl (33.6 percent increase).

Mexico also reported eradicating 1,040 ha of cannabis and 11,163 ha of opium poppy in 2021. Mexico reported seizures of 18.1 MT of cocaine (a 14.6 percent decrease from 2020), 91.3 MT of marijuana (51.6a percent decrease), 207 kg of opium gum (190 percent increase), and 388.1 kg of heroin (36 percent decrease) during the same year. The President's Monthly Security Reports indicated that in 2021, Mexico seized 1.8 MT of fentanyl (a 40.3 percent increase from 2020) from 26 clandestine laboratories (54 fewer than in 2020); and 46.6 MT of methamphetamine (89 percent increase).

According to a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on illicit crop data validation, Mexico engaged U.S. agencies to enhance its counternarcotics capabilities, but did not fully utilize a U.S.-funded illicit crop eradication validation project. The project aimed to strengthen data collection on illicit crops throughout Mexico. Challenges including staff turnover, the need for re-training on donated equipment, and reluctance to adopt new systems due to technology maintenance contributed to partial success. In the first six months of 2022, a U.S.-funded UNODC illicit crop eradication project resulted in 6,549 poppy eradication events, contributing to 850 ha of destroyed poppy fields in Mexico. The program featured 13,200 poppy eradication events and 2,208 ha of destroyed poppy fields from October 2019 to June 2022.

U.S.-donated canines contributed to significant seizures of illicit drugs in 2022, particularly fentanyl and its precursors. In the first nine months of 2022, U.S.-donated canines in Mexico assisted in the seizure of 413.2 kg of methamphetamine and 12,582 pills of the same drug, \$671,400, and 170 illicit firearms. Fentanyl seizures substantially increased in 2022. From January to September 2022, U.S.-donated canines led to seizures of 77,662 fentanyl pills (a 521 percent increase compared to the first nine months of 2021), and 121.3 kg of fentanyl powder (a 470 percent increase).

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Consumption of illegal drugs in Mexico has grown steadily since 2002, in large part driven by the popularity in drug consumption among adolescents aged 12-17. Although alcohol and

marijuana use has declined slightly, demand for and addiction to methamphetamine and synthetic drugs is on the rise. A survey of users at a government network of drug treatment centers saw an increase in addictions to methamphetamine from 15 percent of patients seeking treatment in 2016 to 36 percent in 2021, along with a growing number of drug-related overdose deaths. However, the extent of the problem is unknown, as Mexico does not regularly conduct a national survey on substance use.

U.S. support helped Mexico expand alternative sentencing programs for low-level drug offenders in its state courts. Six Mexican states have now adopted court models that refer these offenders to treatment. These models coordinate justice and public health efforts to decrease violence, criminal recidivism, and drug consumption in Mexico. Nine more states are planning to launch treatment courts. The United States is committed to working with Mexican agencies through a binational panel of experts to guide evidence-based policies and community-based care efforts to address mental health and substance use disorders based on drug use data and trends. The United States also works with Mexican agencies to certify drug counselors; train first responders, psychologists, and other medical professionals who treat substance use; train state officials on evidence-based policies for preventing and treating addictions; and establish a National Drug Observatory to collect and analyze information on drug use trends, including an early warning system to detect use of new substances and facilitate a rapid public health response. The United States and Mexico also committed to a joint information campaign on the risks of fentanyl and substance use prevention, treatment, recovery, and harm reduction services.

4. Corruption

President Lopez Obrador has taken legislative and political actions to combat Mexico's endemic corruption. Nevertheless, corruption continues to impede Mexico's drug control efforts.

Several high-ranking officials faced corruption-related charges since 2021, including former Tamaulipas Governor Francisco Cabeza de Vaca, who has an arrest warrant against him for charges of leading a money laundering network, embezzling state funds, and having links to organized crime. Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna is presently pending trial in the United States for charges of accepting bribes from the Sinaloa cartel. In March 2022, Nuevo Leon authorities detained former Governor Jaime Rodriguez for his alleged participation in a scheme to divert public funds. In 2021, security forces arrested former Nayarit Governor Roberto Sandoval for corruption, money laundering, and links to organized crime.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, launched by the United States and Mexico at the 2021 High Level Security Dialogue, established a comprehensive, innovative, and long-term approach to guide bilateral security cooperation. Over the course of 2021 and 2022, officials convened both a bilateral panel of public health experts to exchange best practices, improve surveillance tools, and monitor drug use trends and a narcotics and precursors working group focused on expanding cooperation to address fentanyl trafficking. Presidents Biden and Lopez Obrador established in July a bilateral law enforcement task force that has met regularly to share information on combatting the production and

trafficking of synthetic narcotics. At the High Level Security Dialogue in October 2022, U.S. and Mexican officials committed to establish benchmarks to assess progress under the Bicentennial Framework and to implement an action plan to increase cooperation to address the manufacture, distribution, and consumption of illicit synthetic drugs.

D. Conclusion

The volume and potency of dangerous drugs entering the United States from Mexico, and violent crime in Mexico fueled by TCOs, remains alarmingly high. Both countries acknowledge their citizens continue to suffer from drug trafficking and associated violence. The United States will continue to partner with Mexico to reduce drug production, trafficking, and associated violence and arms trafficking and to encourage Mexican partnership and global leadership to counter the production and trafficking of illicit fentanyl. Mexico needs to bolster its counternarcotics operations, increase information sharing, expand international cooperation and private sector engagement to prevent diversion of precursor chemicals, increase the effectiveness of justice sector institutions, strengthen cooperation to disrupt arms trafficking, and demonstrate measurable results.

Mozambique

Mozambique is primarily a transit country for large shipments of heroin and methamphetamine, which originate primarily in Afghanistan and are smuggled by sea from the Makran Coast in Pakistan and Iran on traditional sailing vessels used in the Indian Ocean, known as dhows. Their cargo is typically offloaded onto smaller fishing vessels before being brought to remote beaches in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia Provinces in northern and central Mozambique. From there the drugs are hidden in concealed locations before being transported by land, primarily to South Africa.

Corruption, a low budget, and lack of local and border law enforcement capacity make it difficult for the government to crack down on illicit drugs.

The United States partners with a vetted unit from the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC), including by providing training. Training courses in 2022 included intelligence collection and analysis, undercover operations, and airport and maritime interdiction.

Mozambican authorities undertook several successful operations in 2022. They included an interdiction operation in the Nacala region of Nampula Province resulting in the seizure of approximately 390 kilograms (kg) of methamphetamine and five kilograms of heroin and the arrests of two Mozambican nationals. Authorities also raided a clandestine “Mandrax” (Methaqualone) laboratory in Matola, Maputo Province, seizing 720 kg of Mandrax tablets and arresting two Chinese nationals and four Mozambican nationals. An interdiction in Matola resulted in the seizure of 28 kilograms of “Mandrax” tablets and the arrest of a South African national. A raid of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory in Katembe, Maputo Province, resulted in the seizure of 19 kg of methamphetamine and the arrests of four Mozambican nationals. A national of Cote d’Ivoire was arrested at Maputo International Airport after being found in possession of 11.8 kg of cocaine. Finally, an interdiction operation in Sofala Province resulted in the seizure of 732 kg of methamphetamine and the arrests of three Mozambican nationals.

In October 2022, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime hosted a Trilateral Planning Cell (TPC) meeting with Mozambican, South African, and Tanzanian officials designed to strengthen cooperation and information sharing among TPC drug enforcement agencies to effectively counter drug trafficking between the trilateral states. The talks were followed by trilateral maritime training on visit, board, search, and seizure operations for law enforcement personnel.

The Netherlands

The Kingdom of the Netherlands holds a significant position in the European and global illicit narcotics industry, particularly given the country's maritime infrastructure. It is a major transit hub for illicit substances, especially cocaine from South and Central America and methamphetamine from Mexico. Dutch authorities stepped up investigative cooperation with counterparts in Belgium during 2022 to address Netherlands-bound drug shipments out of Antwerp. The Ministry of Justice and Security (MOJS) is also investing \$12.7 million in the Netherlands' largest logistics hubs to upgrade security infrastructure and improve access controls. Dutch authorities seized a record 73 metric tons of cocaine from Dutch ports in 2021, a 73.8 percent increase from the 42 metric tons seized in 2020. Figures for 2022 will not be released until early in 2023.

Addressing homegrown synthetic drug makers and illegal chemical precursor manufacturers remains a priority for Dutch authorities, who are increasingly focused on combatting transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), which play a key role in the Netherlands' drug trade. The government views TCOs as a growing threat to public safety and the rule of law and is revamping the previous cabinet's approach to combatting organized crime by initiating a new National Alliance Against Subversive Crime (NASC). The NASC will concentrate on developing new methods for exposing and tackling criminal cash flows and underlying business structures that facilitate organized crime activity, including a specific focus on logistics infrastructure.

Criminal enterprises in the Netherlands use both online technology and domestic production facilities. U.S.-Netherlands parallel investigations into dark web and clearnet websites in 2022 revealed that Dutch sources are selling dangerous drugs, including synthetic opioids, via the internet to customers in the United States and worldwide. The Dutch High Tech Crime Unit remains a partner of choice for U.S. law enforcement authorities. The Netherlands is also a major contributor to global synthetic drug manufacturing and distribution including amphetamine substances. While the Netherlands lacks legislation criminalizing the online sale and distribution of most novel psychoactive substances (NPS), new regulations in the NPS law that will address some of these deficiencies have been introduced. Additionally, in cooperation with the Netherlands, the United States imposed sanctions in 2022 on two Dutch nationals and several Netherlands-based companies for supplying illicit fentanyl, synthetic stimulants, cannabinoids, and opioids to U.S. markets through internet sales and a host of shell companies.

The National Police of the Netherlands (NPN) and port police cooperate closely with U.S. authorities to exchange information and conduct joint operations. In 2022, DEA and counterparts from NPN specifically increased information exchange on emerging synthetic "designer drugs," new concealment and extraction methods, and novel drug production processes. The United States and the Netherlands have fully operational extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties.

Nicaragua

A. Introduction

Nicaragua is a transit route for illicit drugs originating from South America destined for the United States. Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) take advantage of the country's long coastlines and porous borders to move people and contraband through Nicaraguan territory. Security forces have difficulty providing adequate coverage, especially in the sparsely populated Caribbean region. Cocaine flows north from Costa Rica through Nicaragua's southwest department of Rivas via maritime and land routes, continuing toward El Salvador and Honduras. DTOs use similar tactics on Nicaragua's Caribbean coast but with smaller load sizes that typically range between 50 to 100 kilos.

Nicaragua's insufficient technical and logistical capacity impedes interdiction efforts. Nicaragua does not dedicate adequate resources to patrolling the sparsely populated parts of the Caribbean region, where traffickers operate freely. The Nicaraguan government's authoritarian tendencies, endemic corruption, and limited interdiction capacity reduce its effectiveness to combat drug trafficking. The government's practice of cracking down on political opposition, journalists, and civil society rather than drug traffickers diverts personnel and resources that limit its effectiveness in countering drug trafficking.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Nicaragua's ongoing socio-political crisis continues to hobble its institutional development. Recent Nicaraguan government actions have resulted in key donors, including the United States, curtailing foreign aid. In 2021, Nicaragua cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan, a source of financial support in prior years. Nicaragua re-established relations with the People's Republic of China in 2021 and maintains a close security partnership with Russia. Nicaragua touts Russian aid to combat narcotrafficking; although Russia maintains a counternarcotics police training center in Nicaragua, its support remains limited, and the center's actual purpose is unclear.

Nicaragua's Sovereign Security Law designates narcotrafficking and international criminal organizations as threats to the nation's security. The principal institutions responsible for combating drug trafficking are the Nicaraguan National Police and the Nicaraguan military, which implement a "Containment Wall Strategy" consisting of land-based, air, and maritime patrols from bases at key border crossings and along transit routes.

Nicaraguan cooperation with U.S. law enforcement is limited. There is no bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, but both countries are parties to the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. The United States and Nicaragua are parties to a bilateral extradition treaty, but the Nicaraguan constitution bars the extradition of Nicaraguan nationals, including, in practice, dual nationals. Despite policy restrictions on bilateral cooperation, the national police provide timely responses to requests for

security assistance related to U.S. embassy operations and some coordination on criminal investigations and narcotics and currency trafficking interdiction.

2. Supply Reduction

In the first nine months of 2022, Nicaragua reported seizing 3.6 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, a decrease from the 4 MT seized in the first eight months of 2021. Authorities reported seizing 1.1 MT of marijuana in the first nine months of 2022, down from the 4.7 MT seized in the first eight months of 2021. In addition, Nicaraguan authorities reportedly destroyed 428 marijuana plants, significantly less than the 15,380 in 2021 and 124,017 destroyed in 2020. Cash seizures increased 9 percent from \$7,438,632 million in 2021 to \$8,127,250 million in 2022. Nicaragua also reported seizing 30 weapons and the arrest of 42 people tied to various operations targeting international drug trafficking. Following trends from previous years, Nicaragua reported no arrests during the largest cash seizure operations conducted in 2022. Nicaragua does not share information regarding methods of destroying seized illicit drugs with any U.S. or other national or non-government entities.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

There are no reliable national statistics on drug consumption, hindering efforts to measure the impact of prevention and treatment programs in Nicaragua. Marijuana, cocaine, and crack are the drugs most used among Nicaraguan youth, according to an independent 2021 study. The study found a negative correlation between drug use and levels of education; the most frequent users are males living in urban areas with easy access to drugs. Rehabilitation services in Nicaragua are scarce and too expensive for most Nicaraguans. Prevention and treatment options are increasingly limited due to the government's arbitrary closure of many non-profit organizations. The government has closed NGOs that offered drug prevention services – part of its ongoing campaign to dismantle civil society.

In recent years, Nicaragua implemented national and local strategies to combat drug use through primary, secondary, and tertiary community-based activities. In June, Nicaragua launched the drug awareness campaign “My life free of drugs, free of violence.” Nicaragua has not reported the number of children and youth who participated in prevention-based activities in 2022.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the Government of Nicaragua does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, pervasive corruption limits the effectiveness of security forces and the Prosecutor's Office. The government drafts and implements relevant legislation arbitrarily to stifle political opposition and usually ignores corruption accusations against public officials.

In response to pervasive corruption in Nicaragua, the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2022 sanctioned ENIMINAS, the state-run entity that regulates gold mining through the issuance of land concessions to domestic and foreign companies, under Executive Order 13851. The United States amended the Executive Order to allow designation of sectors and entities that facilitate

corruption as well, identifying the gold sector as an area of particular concern. The Treasury Department also sanctioned seven officials in the Nicaraguan Army, an additional government entity linked with the gold sector, and the board of directors of various organizations, including the military pension system (IPSM), the state-owned oil company Petroleos de Nicaragua, and ENIMINAS. Since 2017, the Department of the Treasury has sanctioned 48 high-profile Nicaraguan individuals and 11 entities for complicity in illicit activities and human rights abuses. Also in 2022, the State Department imposed visa sanctions on more than 500 Nicaraguans for supporting corruption and undermining democratic institutions.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States provides support to Nicaraguan civil society through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which supports capacity building for security and judicial institutions in Central America. In Nicaragua, CARSI funds programs to strengthen citizen security and reduce the demand for illicit drugs through drug prevention awareness campaigns, capacity building, and youth and community leadership training.

A bilateral agreement remains in place to suppress illicit traffic by sea, which includes provisions addressing ship boarding, ship riders, pursuit, entry into territorial waters, overflight, order to land, and international maritime interdiction support. In recent years, U.S. foreign assistance to Nicaragua has decreased, resulting in less willingness from Nicaragua to participate in joint, proactive investigations, like those seen routinely between the United States and foreign counterparts throughout Central and South America.

The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission in Nicaragua.

D. Conclusion

In 2022, Nicaragua's authoritarian government failed to effectively combat drug trafficking and prosecute corrupt officials. Regime officials demonstrated a lack of will to address pervasive corruption, criminality, and drug trafficking. Despite the difficult bilateral relationship and high-level corruption, sharing information and best practices with Nicaragua's counternarcotics personnel on cocaine seizures can help remove at least some portion of illegal drugs from the market and increase long-term cooperation between U.S. and Nicaraguan counternarcotics personnel.

Niger

Niger is primarily a transit country for illegal drugs, which are routinely shipped through Niger to consumer nations in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Tramadol is the exception; Nigerien citizens and migrants crossing Niger consume significant quantities of this opioid, much of it entering the country from neighboring Nigeria. Cocaine, heroin, cannabis, and various synthetics arrive from South America at West African ports for transshipment through Niger to European and Middle Eastern markets. Hashish from Morocco is trafficked through Niger to Libya and Egypt, then onward to Europe and the Middle East.

The remote northern part of Niger is crisscrossed by trade routes used for centuries to connect West Africa's interior to the Mediterranean coast. Organized crime and extremist groups take advantage of the convergence of trade routes in Niger for trafficking narcotics, weapons, gold, wildlife, and people across the continent.

Niger's main agency to interdict drug traffickers is the Central Office for the Prevention of Narcotics Trafficking (OCRTIS), a multi-agency "task force" style organization with a staff of 375 posted throughout the country. It reported making arrests in 92 percent of its investigations from January-September 2022; however, there is no reliable data on how many resulted in successful prosecution.

OCRTIS conducted several major operations in the first nine months of 2022, including a record-setting seizure of 200 kilograms of cocaine valued at more than \$19 million. Available data for the period suggests that overall cannabis and cocaine seizures will be similar to those of 2021. Pharmaceutical trafficking trends indicate a slight decrease in tramadol and diazepam seizures from 2021, while "Exol" seizures will likely eclipse those of the previous year. Local laboratory analysis of "Exol" has identified methamphetamine as its primary component.

Drug-related corruption remains a problem in Niger. An OCRTIS investigation in early 2022 identified a local government official using his staff and government vehicle to transport significant quantities of cocaine, and OCRTIS reports seeing new actors from the political world in drug networks. OCRTIS also reported an increase in the number of women and minors arrested for possession or distribution of illicit drugs, a problem exacerbated by Niger's limited economic opportunities for youth and weak penal responses to violations.

U.S. support to Niger in 2022 included training in advanced narcotics investigations and trends in synthetic drug production and organizational development workshops focused on strategic planning and policy and procedure development. OCRTIS receives additional funds and training from the European Union, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

The United States and Niger have neither an extradition treaty nor a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty. Nevertheless, both countries can provide each other investigative assistance, and Niger is a party to multilateral conventions that enable cooperation in law enforcement matters.

Nigeria

A. Introduction

Nigeria is a significant source country for cannabis cultivation and methamphetamine production. Law enforcement seizures in 2022 of massive quantities of opioids, especially tramadol and captagon, demonstrated that Nigeria continues to be a major hub for transnational drug trafficking networks. Law enforcement also seized “crack” cocaine which traffickers converted locally from cocaine hydrochloride. Nigerian drug trafficking organizations are entrenched throughout the world and are active in supplying cocaine to Asia and Europe, heroin to Europe and North America, and methamphetamine to South Africa, Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. The COVID-19 pandemic, even in its waning stages, continued to affect drug trafficking in Nigeria and the government’s efforts to address it.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) is Nigeria’s dedicated counternarcotics agency. NDLEA’s mission is hampered by inconsistent funding by the Government of Nigeria, although its ability is improving through effective senior leadership. The Nigerian President appointed the current Chairman at the beginning of 2021.

Resource issues, including the government failing to disburse funds in a timely manner, hampers the effectiveness of NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies. The NDLEA instituted a new organizational structure in 2022 at the national, zonal, and state command levels. As part of this reorganization, NDLEA created a new Directorate of Forensic and Chemical Monitoring and approved construction of additional forensic laboratories. NDLEA also approved a new salary structure, including provisions for improved employee welfare, in its budget and committed to annual staff promotions. Among the welfare matters that NDLEA addressed were payment of insurance benefits to families of deceased officers and to those injured, approval of a severance package for officers, and approval and commencement of construction of NDLEA barracks.

In March 2022, NDLEA trained 650 members of the new “Strike Force” tactical unit it established in 2021 with specialized courses at the Nigerian Army School of Infantry in March. This unit supported NDLEA officers during tactical operations. U.S. and UK-sponsored vetted units totaled approximately 50 trained investigators in an agency of 10,000 officers.

2. Supply Reduction

NDLEA took several measures to enhance security at seaports, airports, land borders, and other operational areas. These efforts led to the arrests of mid- and high-level drug traffickers. New intelligence management and the establishment of the new Strike Force contributed to additional targeted enforcement efforts against transnational drug trafficking networks. During the first nine months of 2022, authorities seized nearly 220 metric tons (MT) of illicit drugs, including 2.1 MT of cocaine worth an estimated street value of \$300 million, and 23.3 million tramadol

pills. In addition, NDLEA discovered and dismantled two clandestine methamphetamine production laboratories in Lagos state. NDLEA detected and destroyed cannabis farms comprising approximately 324 hectares. NDLEA estimated cash and drug seizures were valued at over \$377 million. NDLEA also arrested 8,996 suspects, including ten major drug cartel leaders in Nigeria. Among those arrested were high-profile, high-worth business figures and senior police officers. Authorities secured the conviction of 1,499 drug offenders who were sentenced to various jail terms by the court. The NDLEA Directorate of Assets and Financial Investigations recorded interim and final forfeiture of 600 bank accounts, 37 properties, 249 luxury vehicles, and cash worth over \$1.6 million.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

In line with the National Drug Control Master Plan 2021 - 2025, the NDLEA has worked towards a balance in drug supply and demand reduction efforts. The pandemic affected NDLEA's delivery of anti-drug sensitization and education programs for People Who Use Drugs and vulnerable populations. In the first nine months of 2022, 919 clients were treated and rehabilitated in NDLEA facilities across the country, while 5,325 persons arrested during enforcement operations were offered brief intervention and referral services before release.

NDLEA conducted various training and capacity-building programs for drug demand-reduction staff, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations, and governmental staff to enable them to acquire knowledge and skills to perform more effectively. Following the introduction of the "War Against Drug Abuse" advocacy campaign in June 2021, NDLEA expanded the program to 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory in 2022. NDLEA also presented this campaign to "captains of industry" to gain their commitment of support. NDLEA established a 24/7 call center online with a toll-free helpline, providing counselling and teletherapy services to the public. The line is monitored by personnel speaking at least five different languages common to Nigeria.

4. Corruption

Nigeria does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, Nigeria does not consistently enforce its laws to investigate corrupt officials. The lack of adequate programs to ensure the welfare of personnel and adequate remuneration induces officers to receive bribes. NDLEA officers arrested a Deputy Commissioner of Police, and four officers under his command suspected of facilitating drug trafficking. At least one NDLEA officer accused of corruption was fired from the agency. The NDLEA reported that its Directorate of Internal Affairs and Provost Marshall handled disciplinary "work ethic" cases. In addition to the Directorate of Internal Affairs, the Special Monitoring Unit worked to ensure compliance with standard operating procedures on reporting drug seizures, arrests, care and custody of evidence, and prosecution of suspected drug traffickers.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiative

The United States provides equipment and training to the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) within NDLEA. The SIU, in collaboration with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and UK National Crime Agency, maintained its operational tempo with several noteworthy investigations, one of which mentioned previously culminated in the seizure of 2,140 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and arrest of six suspects - five Nigerians and one Jamaican citizen. Other NDLEA investigations netted seizures of cannabis (219.6 MT), methamphetamine (260 kg), and Tramadol (15.8 million tablets), with an additional 1,500 cartons of tramadol (7.5 million tablets) seized in a separate investigation. U.S. policy initiatives supported the NDLEA in its establishment of an Intelligence Data Center to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence for operational use.

A U.S. bilateral letter of agreement with Nigeria was signed in 2014, pursuant to which assistance from the United States included support to intelligence gathering and analysis, investigations, and operational support. In addition to the SIU, the U.S. sustains a counter-narcotics advisor position in the country to work with NDLEA. NDLEA participated in virtual meetings and trainings on investigations with regional and other international partners. The United States, Interpol, and UNODC trained NDLEA officers in combating organized crime and corruption and in regional investigative and analytical case training. France provided training to the Strike Force.

An extradition treaty is in force between Nigeria and the United States, as is a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, which facilitates formal cooperation in drug trafficking investigations and prosecutions.

D. Conclusion

Senior Nigerian leadership has driven important change in NDLEA leading to organizational reform and increased operational successes by the NDLEA and other Nigerian authorities. The Nigerian government should continue to provide increased resources to NDLEA to ensure the sustainability of this success and to address drug use in the country. A trend to more proactive and intelligence-driven investigations is yielding better results and enhancing professionalism of the NDLEA officer corps. The government should continue to improve welfare for officers, address other underlying causes of corruption, and strengthen intelligence-led investigations, prosecutions, and sanctions of individual drug traffickers and sophisticated networks.

Pakistan

A. Introduction

Pakistan is one of the world's top transit corridors for opiates and cannabis products trafficked across its poorly controlled borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Illicit drugs enter the country from manufacturing hubs in Afghanistan and are distributed to a global market through Pakistan's seaports, airports, postal and express consignment services, and unpatrolled coastal areas. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 40 percent of Afghan opiates are trafficked through Pakistan, in particular heroin, opium, and hashish. Traffickers have exploited the political and economic turmoil in Afghanistan to expand the scope of their transnational organized crime networks, exacerbating the challenges for Pakistani law enforcement to investigate and prosecute them.

The Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), Pakistan's lead drug enforcement agency, reports that the narcotics flow from Afghanistan into Pakistan increased in 2022 relative to the previous year, including a measurable increase in synthetic drug smuggling, primarily methamphetamine. The ANF predicts a further increase in synthetic drug smuggling in 2023 but anticipates a moderate decline in less lucrative opium smuggling from Afghanistan. The increased synthetic drug manufacturing in Afghanistan has elicited a corresponding increase in the smuggling of precursor chemicals and the diversion of legal, controlled precursors into Pakistan from India and the Arabian Sea coast, transiting routes through Pakistan back into Afghanistan.

Pakistan faces growing internal demand from drug users but lacks the capacity to provide effective and affordable non-residential treatment. A limited amount of opium poppy cultivation continues in the Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Government officials publicly express a commitment to drug prevention and narcotics interdiction efforts but in practice are impeded by government resource constraints and economic challenges.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Pakistan's National Anti-Narcotics Policy of 2019 outlines supply reduction, demand reduction, and interagency and international cooperation as its main objectives.

In September 2021, then Prime Minister Imran Khan tasked all federal and provincial agencies to present a comprehensive drug awareness and treatment policy by the end of 2021. However, this remained unfinished at the end of Khan's tenure in April 2022 and no subsequent action has been taken. The Ministry of Narcotics Control is currently pursuing the creation of a National Coordination Center to improve drug enforcement operational coordination among law enforcement agencies as well as a unified approach to substance use disorder treatment among provincial and federal stakeholders.

The ANF's annual budget of \$16.94 million in 2022 is insufficient to meet the interdiction challenges it faces. Approximately 69 percent of the ANF budget covers the salaries of its 3,653 employees deployed across 47 stations and field offices, a 17 percent increase in staffing from 2021. (Sixty four percent of the staff is dedicated to interdiction and 13 percent to investigations). The ANF chairs the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF), which includes 32 agencies; it met twice from July 2021 to June 2022. ANF coordinated 11 drug investigations/operations with the United States and the United Kingdom, arresting 28 persons in 2021-2022. Pakistan hosts drug liaison officers from 35 countries as part of its Paris Pact obligations. ANF cooperates with the United States and the UK's National Crime Agency to operate its Special Investigation Cells.

The United States and Pakistan do not have a bilateral treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. Pakistan acceded to the 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the UK following Pakistan's independence. Pakistan also is a party to relevant multilateral law enforcement conventions that have provisions requiring international cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

Insecurity prevents reliable ground surveying in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the newly merged districts (NMDs), Pakistan's primary areas for opium poppy growing. The United States' 2016 estimate indicated approximately 1,400 hectares of poppy were under cultivation. An ongoing U.S. government-contracted survey is working to provide an updated estimate of poppy cultivation using high-resolution satellite imagery and targeted field surveys, with results expected to be available by summer 2023. Pakistan depends heavily on foreign assistance to implement and monitor alternative livelihood and area development programs, which have successfully reduced poppy cultivation in some communities. The United States has dedicated more than \$84.9 million to these rural development programs since 1982, contributing to an estimated 87 percent decrease in poppy cultivation since that year.

Most drugs trafficked through Pakistan are destined for global markets. Pakistani security forces and law enforcement interdict only a small fraction of that traffic. From July 2021 to June 2022, Pakistan's law enforcement agencies reported they disrupted the operations of five international drug trafficking organizations through the arrests of 25 individuals connected to the organizations. National seizures included 4.6 metric tons (MT) of morphine; 8.2 MT of heroin; 18 MT of opium; 84 kilograms of cocaine; and 96.5 MT of hashish. Pakistani agencies reported no synthetic fentanyl seizures, 2.7 MT of seized methamphetamine, and 1.7 MT of seized amphetamine.

The ANF comprises less than one half of one percent of Pakistani law enforcement personnel. Other forces lack rigorous drug interdiction training and tend not to prioritize countering narcotics. ANF's own capacity to conduct complex drug investigations is limited. During the twelve months from July 2021 to June 2022, Pakistan registered 56,728 drug-related arrests, mostly of drug peddlers. ANF reported a conviction rate of 42 percent in drug trafficking cases between July 2021 and June 2022. Pakistan has a conspiracy law, but authorities have rarely used it to successfully prosecute leaders of criminal organizations.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to UNODC's Synthetic Drug Assessment 2021 study, the largest number of synthetic drug users are found in universities and approximately 50 percent are below the age of 25. Pakistan does not have adequate drug treatment facilities or support networks. Pakistan's fewer than 100 public, non-governmental, and private drug treatment facilities combined can offer drug treatment interventions for less than 2,000 people concurrently, while UNODC estimates that over four million Pakistanis suffer from drug dependency. Pakistan does not possess the data management capabilities required to record demographic traits of the drug-using population and drug treatment service providers; the type, nature, and capacity of drug treatment facilities; type of drugs being used; drug dependents in treatment; and information on drug-associated mental health issues and correlation with health factors such as HIV, hepatitis, and tuberculosis.

The government allocated \$79,160 towards substance use disorder awareness and prevention from July 2021 to June 2022. ANF conducted 7,315 public awareness-raising activities, including school lectures, between July 2021 and June 2022. For more than a decade, the ANF has managed four drug treatment centers with a total bed capacity of 218 and has provided free treatment to 1,640 individuals as of June 2022. Nongovernmental organizations operate most detoxification centers, serving mostly male patients, who make up an estimated two-thirds of the drug user population.

4. Corruption

The Government of Pakistan does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is there evidence of its involvement in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs, but corruption remains a key concern. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is Pakistan's main agency responsible for eliminating corruption. The NAB claims to have recovered more than \$4.8 billion since it was established in 1999, but the consequences for convicted perpetrators are rarely severe. Corruption undermines the government's ability to address illicit drugs, as bribed public servants may facilitate the movement of contraband or otherwise interfere with arrests and prosecutions. Media sources regularly report that police officers are involved in drug trafficking or the selling of seized drugs.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States is committed to a comprehensive approach to countering narcotics trafficking networks and transnational organized crime in Pakistan. U.S. support through training, advanced equipment, and targeted infrastructure is working to improve Pakistan's drug interdiction capabilities along the Afghan border, at seaports, and in the maritime domain. United States assistance has also helped increase collaboration among agencies and enhanced the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct more effective and sophisticated intelligence-driven interdiction operations, conduct controlled deliveries, investigate financial crimes, and screen containers. As of 2022, the United States continued to provide targeted assistance to agencies with counternarcotics mandates, including Pakistan Customs, ANF, Coast Guards, the Ministry of Narcotics Control, the Excise, Taxation, and Narcotics Control Agency of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the Excise, Taxation, and Anti-Narcotics Agency of Balochistan.

The United States also continues to support multi-year area development programs to promote alternative livelihoods to poppy production in rural areas along the Afghan border, with a particular focus on female farmers, and disadvantaged communities. U.S. support also provides training for drug prevention and treatment professionals and promotes adoption of nationally standardized substance use disorder treatment standards.

D. Conclusion

Pakistan faces fiscal, economic, and security challenges that often supersede drug trafficking in national priorities. Pakistan could more effectively reduce drug trafficking by sharing information and coordinating operations across law enforcement agencies, particularly in the maritime domain, by targeting the illicit finances of drug trafficking organizations and high-level kingpins rather than lower-level couriers and possession cases. Greater mobilization of provincial institutions, in cooperation with federal law enforcement and interdiction agencies, could provide a multiplier effect for efforts on interdiction, prevention, and delivery of public services. Pakistan should continue to strengthen anti-narcotics cooperation among federal and provincial agencies and with neighboring countries and the international community.

Panama

A. Introduction

Panama is a capable partner in limiting the transit of illegal drugs. Panamanian security forces set a record for narcotics seizures in 2021, surpassing 100 metric tons (MT) for the first time in history, with a record 145 MT seized. For the second year in a row, Panama exceeded 100 MT in narcotics seizures in 2022.

Panama is not a major consumer or producer of illicit drugs, but its over 1,500 miles of coastline with nearly 500 rivers, the Panama Canal, and its proximity to Colombia make it a prime sea and land passage for drugs, primarily cocaine, flowing from South America to North America and Europe. Up to 40 percent of northward-bound cocaine produced in neighboring Colombia passes through Panama's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), transported by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and their associates off both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Less than five percent of Colombian cocaine flows overland across the border due to the dense jungle and lack of roads. Drug traffickers also take advantage of the millions of shipping containers passing through the Panama Canal each year to smuggle drugs to North America and Europe.

In 2021, Panama shattered its previous 2019 seizure record, due in part to increased container seizures from the U.S.-mentored Port Task Force (PTF), sustained high operations tempo in the maritime environment, and increased inter-service collaboration through the U.S.-supported Joint Regional Air and Navy Operations Center (CROAN). Many Panamanian government agencies, including the Ministry of Security, experienced significant budget reductions in 2021 due to economic contractions related to the COVID-19 pandemic and global economic turmoil in 2022.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Addressing narcotrafficking is a priority for Panamanian President Laurentino "Nito" Cortizo's administration. Panama has no standing military; the Ministry of Public Security (MINSEG) oversees counternarcotics efforts through its three principal law enforcement agencies: the Panamanian National Police (PNP); the National Air and Navy Service (SENAN); and the National Border Service (SENAFRONT).

In May 2022, MINSEG inaugurated the CROAN, a U.S.-supported initiative to strengthen Panama's maritime security. MINSEG is taking steps to operationalize the CROAN, including by further developing the Joint Maritime Force (JMF-Panama), a concept based on the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), through curriculum standardization and training. U.S. law enforcement agencies cooperate with PNP, SENAN, and SENAFRONT in support of Panama's counternarcotics missions. SENAN and the United States also collaborate on maritime interdictions under the 2002 Salas-Becker Agreement. In 2022, Panama and the United States further strengthened bilateral relations through mutual legal assistance and extraditions.

2. Supply Reduction

Preliminary figures show Panamanian authorities seized at least 128 MT of narcotics in 2022, the same preliminary figure as 2021. Cocaine or cocaine base seizures comprised 75 percent of all seizures by weight; the rest was marijuana. From January to October 2022, SENAN conducted 70 percent of Panamanian seizures (an estimated 49 MT of cocaine seized), followed by the PNP with 25 percent (an estimated 23 MT of cocaine seized), and SENAFRONT with five percent (an estimated 3.5 MT of cocaine seized). SENAN's higher interdiction numbers are due to its maritime mission and asset capabilities, but both SENAN and PNP increased cocaine seizures over the same period in 2021, primarily driven by maritime and port operations. SENAN was responsible for 90 percent of Panamanian marijuana seizures in the period, due primarily to a significant flow of marijuana from Colombia to Costa Rica that crosses Panama's EEZ.

More than four million containers are transshipped (transferred from one vessel to another) at Panamanian ports each year, where they are vulnerable to use in drug smuggling. The PTF seized over 23 MT of illicit drugs in the first ten months of 2022, compared to 28 in all of 2021.

From January to April 2022, the United States and Panama collaborated to complete a third unmanned aircraft system deployment to interdict the illicit flow of narcotics across various transit zones, resulting in the seizure of 13 MT of cocaine, 3 MT of marijuana, and the arrest of 56 suspects.

The heavy flow of Colombian-originated drugs has led Panama to be an aggressive, and with U.S. support, highly capable partner for counternarcotics operations. Panama has a high response rate and solid track record of successful prosecutions. Despite Panama's robust counternarcotics efforts, sustained high drug production in Colombia and Panama's geographic position are constant challenges for the security services.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a disruptive effect on regional drug flows in 2020 and 2021, and the trendline for Panama and the region will likely normalize to a degree in 2022. Following a five-year low for suspected cocaine shipments through Panama in 2020, such shipments in 2021 increased on par with global and hemispheric trends to a level similar to that in 2019.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Drug use in Panama is not as common as it is in other Central and South American countries. According to the Organization of American States 2019 Report on Drug Use in the Americas, its most recent, Panama has the third-lowest rate of marijuana consumption and the lowest rate of cocaine consumption of the 15 Central and South American countries studied. Panama has not updated its strategy on demand reduction since 2012 and has not conducted a drug demand study since 2015.

The United States supports anti-drug initiatives such as the Drug Awareness and Resistance Education (DARE) and the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) programs. In 2022, 25,085 students participated in GREAT and 12,700 students in DARE.

4. Corruption

The government of Panama does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Law enforcement has not identified anyone within the current administration or other senior officials involved in any such activity. In April 2021, Minister of Security Juan Pino introduced an asset forfeiture bill to the National Assembly. The Assembly continues to debate the bill in 2022.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Panama shares U.S. national security goals, including dismantling transnational criminal organizations. Panama is JIATF-S's top partner in terms of interdictions.

The United States supports law enforcement cooperation, combating corruption, and strengthening rule of law in Panama and the region. The United States supports capacity building for Guatemala's security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which supports the United States' Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration in Central America by tackling the underlying security and governance factors driving such migration. CARSI funding is aimed at fighting illicit drug production and trafficking and combatting corruption and transnational criminal organizations, which are among the key such drivers, complementing other U.S. efforts such as those focused on assisting vulnerable populations displaced by drug trafficking, violence, and crime.

Panama has fully integrated U.S.-developed interdiction processes on maritime standard operating procedures into its own procedures and operations, with the result that in the first nine months of 2022 SENAN has seized over 65 MT of illicit substances in the more than 95 maritime interdiction operations it has conducted.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) performed an in-country assessment to identify capacity building gaps in maritime operations in 2022 and formalized a training program for maritime components operating in the region.

Panama and the United States are parties to an extradition treaty that entered into force in 1905.

D. Conclusion

Panama's foremost priority should be 1) passing the asset forfeiture law through the National Assembly to deter drug trafficking, money laundering, and corruption and to sustain future law enforcement activities. Other recommendations include: 2) increasing anticorruption efforts to promote the rule of law and transparency; 3) developing a citizen security strategy that expands community policing programs and provides a whole-of-government response to reduce violence in crime-ridden communities by using prevention programs; and 4) budgeting to sustain security-related assets, both national and donated, in order to maintain and increase its capacity to defeat TCOs and deter narcotics trafficking throughout Panama.

Peru

A. Introduction

Peru remains the world's second-largest producer of cocaine and coca (after Colombia), with approximately 84,400 hectares (ha) under cultivation in 2021, the most recent year data is available. In 2021, cultivation and production decreased slightly, a reversal from the steady annual increase in recent years. Potential pure cocaine production in Peru decreased by approximately 3.5 percent in 2021, to 785 MT. Peruvian cocaine is trafficked throughout South America for shipment to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, and the United States. Peru is also a major importer of precursor chemicals for cocaine production and faces a growing domestic drug consumption problem.

The government of Pedro Castillo signaled interest in new approaches to combating coca cultivation, focused on environmental concerns, economic equality, and rural development, but implemented few major policy changes before Castillo was removed from office on December 7, 2022, for his attempt to dissolve congress and rule by decree. For instance, in April 2022 the government proposed the state-owned National Coca Company increase annual purchases of coca but did not implement the plan. Peru reported eradicating 21,627 ha of coca in 2022, including 1,202 ha in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) where more than half of Peruvian coca is cultivated. The Peruvian Armed Forces and National Police (PNP) anti-narcotics unit (DIRANDRO) conducted joint interdiction operations throughout the country. Remnants of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) remain active in the VRAEM, producing and trafficking cocaine shipments. In 2022 the Sendero Luminoso group killed three civilians (one in July and two in August) and injured five civilians. Although Castillo's replacement, President Dina Boluarte, signaled an interest in returning to a more traditional counternarcotics policy emphasizing supply reduction, widespread political unrest prevented implementation of any major policy changes in the final weeks of 2022.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Peru's 2021-2030 Drug Control Strategy includes goals for interdiction, eradication, alternative development, and drug demand reduction. It also addresses precursor chemicals, rule of law, and public infrastructure. In 2022, Peru's counter narcotics budget was \$100 million, a reduction over the previous year (\$113 million). In 2022, Peru's anti-drug agency (DEVIDA) budgeted \$22.67 million for eradication and aviation support, a slight decrease from 2021 (\$23.2 million).

The United States and Peru enjoy a strong extradition and mutual legal assistance relationship.

2. Supply Reduction

DIRANDRO's budget was \$11 million in 2022, \$2.1 million more than 2021. DIRANDRO reported seizing 84.98 MT of drugs in 2022, including 28.02 MT of cocaine paste and 28.48 MT of cocaine hydrochloride. DIRANDRO also destroyed 452 labs, 395 of which produced cocaine

base, 45 of which processed hydrochloride, and three of which recycled chemicals. The United States estimates cultivation of 84,400 ha of coca in Peru in 2021, a decrease of approximately 4.3 percent from 2020 (88,200 ha). The U.S. estimate for pure cocaine production potential also decreased by approximately 3.5 percent, from 814 MT in 2020 to 785 MT in 2021. DEVIDA published its own coca cultivation numbers in 2021, showing a net increase in coca cultivation from 2020 to 2021—though totals remain lower than U.S. numbers.

Peru's 2022 eradication goal was 18,000 ha, but with the arrival of additional Peruvian funding, the Peruvian eradication agency CORAH requested the goal be revised to 21,600 ha; the proposed change will take effect when a ministerial resolution is passed. In 2022, Peru eradicated a total of 21,627 ha. Of note, as part of this, Peru also eradicated in the VRAEM in 2022 for the first time since 2019.

VRAEM cocaine seizures totaled 20.82 MT in 2022, up from 17.69 MT in 2021. In the first nine months of 2022, PNP and Customs officials at air and seaports and other strategic checkpoints seized 68.13 MT of narcotics, up from 53.47 MT in 2021. Authorities reported destroying 63 clandestine runways in 2022, as compared to 70 in 2021.

Traffickers ship Peruvian cocaine to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, the Caribbean, the United States, and other Western Hemisphere countries. Small aircraft moving cocaine to Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil remain a significant concern, and the size of clandestine airstrips have grown over the past year, allowing for larger cocaine shipments. Additionally, fishing vessels at smaller ports are increasingly smuggling large amounts of cocaine. Peru and the United States undertake joint maritime operations that permit U.S. authorities to board Peruvian-flagged vessels in the high seas but have no formal agreements between their navies for ship riders. The governments are currently negotiating such an agreement. Peru and the United States also conduct joint maritime operations and exercises, including counternarcotics operations.

With U.S. assistance, DEVIDA allocated \$37.5 million in 2022 for alternative development efforts. From October 2020 to September 2021, U.S.-supported alternative development efforts generated \$118.6 million in sales of licit products, a \$35.6 million increase from 2020 sales over the same period.

Peru is not a significant source of synthetic drugs. As in many countries, ketamine and fentanyl are legal for medical use, though highly controlled with strict protocols for their accountability and the filling of prescriptions. However, there is some evidence that these substances may be diverted at times from legal to illicit uses, as Peruvian authorities have seized ketamine shipments destined for the United States.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Peruvian Center for Information and Education for Drug Abuse Prevention noted in 2022 that consumption of drugs and alcohol in Peru grew by 15 percent since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The most widely used drugs included cocaine, cocaine paste, and marijuana.

DEVIDA's online drug counseling program served 14,579 people in 2022. In 2022, the United States began a national project to expand substance use treatment and alternatives to incarceration for juvenile offenders, which will formally launch in 2023.

DEVIDA's 2022 budget for drug use prevention was \$5.7 million. However, the Health Ministry continued expanding community mental health centers, which include treatment for substance use disorders, from 206 in 2021 to 221 in 2022. The United States supports drug demand reduction through the Guiding the Recovery of Women (GROW) and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) training programs to provide substance use treatment for women, adolescent girls, and the LGBTQI+ community. Since 2015, 1,914 healthcare professionals have received GROW or SOGI training, providing services to 66,326 persons.

4. Corruption

The Peruvian government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production and distribution or the laundering of proceeds of illicit drugs. Nevertheless, public corruption remains a significant problem. Corruption investigations ensnared many political figures, including the president and his family and, in surveys, Peruvians regularly rank corruption as their top concern. Peru has a special court system for corruption-related crimes, and the 2022 America's Society's Capacity to Combat Corruption Index ranked Peru fourth out of 10 in the region. Peru, however, was downgraded to 105 out of 180 on Transparency International's 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. As of October 2022, Peru's anti-money laundering police unit successfully seized the equivalent of \$40 million in illicit proceeds associated with drug trafficking.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports Peru's drug control strategy through technical assistance, capacity building, information sharing, and provision of equipment. The United States and Peru jointly finance coca eradication, interdiction, and alternative development efforts. The United States provides aviation support to eradication and interdiction. The United States, in partnership with the Colombian National Police, provided trainings on tactical operations, aviation, criminology, and citizen security to 354 PNP officials during 2022. All courses have a human rights component incorporated into the curriculum.

D. Conclusion

To facilitate further decreases in Peru's coca cultivation and cocaine production, Peru should continue to increase coca eradication operations in high-yield areas such as the VRAEM and ensure immediate provision of alternative development assistance to farmers following eradication. Peru should also continue to expand access to treatment centers to address the country's growing rate of drug use.

Philippines

A. Introduction

The Philippines faces challenges in combating the illegal drug trade, including insufficient capacity to conduct complex investigations and inability to trace the origins of interdicted drugs and uncover syndicate leadership. Agencies also lack effective means to securely transmit case data. Law enforcement agency rules requiring memoranda of understanding prior to sharing information significantly delay collaboration. Processes, including case documentation, remain largely paper-based, which hampers law enforcement ability to search records or identify trends.

President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., inaugurated in June 2022, publicly stated his administration will place greater emphasis on rehabilitation for drug users; however, the agencies delivering those services have not received budget increases to reflect this. The new administration also desires expanded information sharing with the United States on counterdrug efforts.

Illegal drugs, including methamphetamine hydrochloride (or "shabu," as generally known in the country), cannabis, and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, or "ecstasy") enter the Philippines from the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos, and Burma). Drugs entering the Philippines are used locally and transported to other countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania. The Philippines' lack of capacity to effectively monitor its porous borders facilitates the activities of Chinese transnational organizations, the principal supplier of methamphetamine. The Philippines is not a significant source or transit country for drugs entering the United States.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

By Executive Order in June 2021, Former President Duterte devolved many basic services (including health care, local infrastructure, agriculture, education, livelihood, and social welfare) to local government units (LGUs), with a goal of bolstering local autonomy. This was based on a 2018 Supreme Court ruling requiring 28 percent of national taxes to be distributed back to LGUs for local projects. According to the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, LGUs were already required to appropriate a "substantial portion of their respective annual budgets" to assist in enforcement of the Act, giving priority to prevention programs and treatment of drug users. Community anti-drug use coalitions report, however, that LGUs have not offered sufficient resources, as the term "substantial amount" is not clearly defined in the regulation. These officials are therefore doubtful that the 2018 Ruling or the 2021 Executive Order will result in additional resources for drug demand reduction efforts.

In September 2022, Benjamin Abalos, Jr. took office as the new Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which oversees the Philippine National Police (PNP). Abalos launched a program in October that aims to strengthen institutions in the implementation of drug reduction activities, encourage multi-sectoral participation, and raise awareness through information, education, and communication materials. Likewise, new PNP Chief General Rodolfo Azurin said he plans to address drug challenges in a holistic manner, working with local

communities, supporting rehabilitation programs, and increasing coordination with maritime agencies and customs to mitigate the influx of drugs.

The Philippines has extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States, through which requests are frequently coordinated. The Philippines continues to cooperate with foreign partners, including the United States, on drug interdiction. The Philippines has expressed interest in pursuing a bilateral ship-rider agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard, which would allow for greater U.S. support for Philippine at-sea law enforcement operations.

2. Supply Reduction

The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) conducted 24,530 counternarcotics operations during the first eight months of 2022, resulting in the arrest of 35,024 individuals. PDEA made a significant increase in seizures compared to the same period in 2021 – three metric tons (MT) of shabu and eight kilograms (kg) of cocaine from January to August 2022 (1.7 MT of shabu and .17 kg of cocaine from January to August 2021). PDEA attributes the increase in interdictions to more operations due to relaxation of COVID-19 restrictions; an increased number of international cargo flights with illicit goods; and the receipt of more actionable intelligence from interagency partners. PDEA is increasing information exchanges and cross-border law enforcement operations with international partners, as well as e-commerce and courier services, to ensure packages containing illegal drugs are intercepted before delivery.

As of August 2022, authorities filed 33,398 cases for drug-related crimes with the courts. Regional trial courts are experiencing significant backlogs due to the high volume of cases, insufficient staff to handle cases, and lack of adequate technology to efficiently adjudicate cases. The Barangay Drug Clearing Program – PDEA’s program that aims to ensure communities (“barangays”) remain drug-free through supply and demand reduction initiatives – reported that as of August 2022, 25,917 barangays or 61.6 percent of barangays nationwide are drug-cleared (last August, 22,858 or 54.37 percent of the barangays were drug-cleared).

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Dangerous Drug Board (DDB), responsible for the formulation of Philippine drug policies, continued its prevention campaign with the training of at-risk populations, including youth and indigenous people. DDB offered seminars on drug-free workplaces to government offices and private companies. DDB also assisted the Department of Health (DOH) with training of provincial health office physicians on best practices for the assessment and management of persons with substance use disorders. In partnership with international donors, including the United States, PDEA facilitated staff training on anti-drug advocacy, focusing on drug preventive education in schools, workplaces, and communities. PDEA continued its development of informational materials, such as flyers and infomercials, which the agency shares in community settings to raise awareness. PDEA also launched a monthly online show to promote demand reduction.

The DOH developed Administrative Orders to enhance services provided by the 22 residential drug treatment and rehabilitation centers in the country including: Guidelines on the Integration

of Drug Abuse Treatment and Rehabilitation within the Health Care Provider Network and the Resource Stratified Framework for Drug Abuse Treatment and Rehabilitation Facilities. Community treatment centers supported by the United States, Japan, and local and international NGOs are an increasingly popular model due to accessibility of services and low operational costs. However, additional funding is needed to ensure sustainability of these facilities.

4. Corruption

Despite the existence of legal mechanisms to address corruption, including the Philippine Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019 (defines corrupt practices), and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, corruption remains a pervasive challenge. The Philippines ranked 117 (out of 180 countries) in Transparency International's 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Government officials and elected politicians are occasionally linked to the illegal drug trade. Allegations that law enforcers offer protection to drug syndicates exist; however, criminal cases are rarely brought against suspects due to inability to secure court-admissible evidence and ineffective internal investigation procedures. Penalties for government employees and security officials participating in drug trafficking are outlined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Act. During anti-drug operations in 2022, 16 elected officials, five uniformed officers, and 25 government workers were arrested.

In December 2021, the United States hosted an Anticorruption Forum for 22 law enforcement agencies that highlighted a need for enhanced interagency collaboration on mitigation measures. Agencies crafted action plans to amplify existing anti-corruption measures within their respective organizations, and they plan to reconvene to discuss progress in early 2023.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States partners with the Philippines on drug control initiatives through bilateral letters of agreement, interagency agreements, and grants, which are designed to facilitate capacity-building and advisory services for law enforcement, treatment and rehabilitation professionals, educators, and policy makers. The United States supports conferences and programs for prevention and treatment professionals and the recovering community, and continues to offer training to law enforcement agencies on the science of addiction and best practices in reducing the demand for illegal drugs. U.S. consultations with Philippine partners are ongoing to further develop drug prevention, aftercare, and gender-inclusive programming.

D. Conclusion

Philippine agencies, including DOH, DDB, DILG, PDEA, and the Department of Social Welfare and Development remain committed to implementing evidence-based programs to reduce the demand for illegal drugs. With the new administration's emphasis on a national approach that incorporates rehabilitation, Philippine agencies will need to further develop capacity for delivering effective treatment and rehabilitation services. Law enforcement agencies also recognize a need for closer collaboration and increased information-sharing with other countries in the region, through existing or expanded information fusion centers to better support interdiction efforts.

Senegal

Senegal is a transit point on the cocaine route from South America to Europe. In the first nine months of 2022, the National Police Counternarcotics unit (OCRTIS) seized 4 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 2 kg of cocaine, and 264 grams of crack cocaine. Law enforcement reports also reflected seizures of large quantities of substandard, falsified, and counterfeit medical products. Cannabis accounts for the largest quantity of drugs seized in Senegal. Most production is in the southern Casamance region, but some enters Senegal from neighboring countries. The police anti-drug unit reported seizures of close to 2 metric tons of cannabis in 2022. Authorities also seized pharmaceutical opioids, khat, methamphetamine, and key precursor chemicals for methamphetamine such as ephedrine. Arrests for drug-related offences increased in 2022; authorities arrested a total of 531 persons for drug related offences compared to 514 in 2021 and 435 in 2020.

The 2022 World Drug Report indicated that Senegal faces major drug-related health and social challenges, mainly caused by the high use of cannabis, crack cocaine and to a lesser extent heroin. In 2019, data from the “Centre de Prise en charge Intégrée des Addictions de Dakar” (CEPIAD) showed a sharp increase in the use of drugs, particularly cannabis (57 percent), heroin (3 percent) and cocaine (2 percent) with the highest incidence among people aged 24-34. The markets for synthetic drugs and for nonmedical uses of pharmaceutical drugs, especially tramadol, have also expanded. Limited resources and the lack of a reliable data collection system on drug use hinders both the monitoring of emerging trends and responses to drug use.

Senegal’s national strategic plan to combat drug trafficking (2021-2025) aims to strengthen the legal and institutional framework to address substance abuse and drug trafficking, reduce the supply of illicit drugs, improve communication on the national plan, and build stakeholder capacity. The previous plan achieved only partial success due to resource limitations.

Senegal is working to improve its law enforcement capacity and professionalism by participating in multilateral efforts with partners from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to combat cross-border drug trafficking. Due to a memorandum signed in 2018, cooperation and information sharing between Senegalese law enforcement and their Gambian and Bissau Guinean counterparts have been further strengthened in recent years. In 2022 the United States continued to assist Senegal in strengthening the capacities of the gendarmerie, the navy, and the national police to monitor, detect, and interdict drug traffickers in Senegal’s maritime approaches and territory.

The United States and Senegal do not currently have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty or an extradition treaty. However, Senegal can extradite non-Senegalese nationals to the United States and is a party to multilateral law enforcement conventions that enable providing mutual legal assistance to the United States.

Senegal has the political will to fight drug trafficking but lacks modern equipment, forensic capacity, adequate training, and has minimal coordination mechanisms and cross-border information sharing. Incremental improvement is taking place, but continued support from the United States and other international partners remains critical.

Spain

Spain is a primary European transit point for cocaine originating from South America and for hashish from Morocco. Cocaine enters Spain in large, containerized shipments and in lower-volume shipments via recreational boats, parasitic devices attached to the hull of cargo ships, unmanned submersibles, and semi-submersibles. Transnational criminal organizations frequently ship cocaine in raw or liquid form mixed within cargo to avoid detection. Drug traffickers also chemically alter cocaine so it can be included in legitimate loads or materials that render it difficult to detect. Chemists in Spain then extract and reconstitute the cocaine, preparing it for distribution within Europe. Traffickers also ship methamphetamine through Spain via containerized shipments. Some amphetamine enters Spain through its land borders. Domestic drug production is minor. There are a small number of marijuana cultivation operations along with illegal labs involved in cutting, mixing, and reconstituting cocaine. U.S. and Spanish law enforcement have seized synthetic drugs, including ketamine, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and MDMA transiting from Spain to the United States.

Spanish law enforcement's counternarcotics efforts have resulted in significant drug seizures, utilizing strong border control and coastal monitoring, sophisticated geospatial detection technology, domestic police action, internal affairs investigations, and international cooperation. In 2021, the most recent year for which data is available, drug seizures totaled 98 metric tons (MT) in international waters and an additional 91.3 MT of hashish and 28.4 MT of cocaine on land. This is the largest quantity of drugs seized within the last 10 years and represents a 30 percent increase over 2020. Spanish analysts note the surplus in production is likely due to the supply chain disruption caused by the restrictions on maritime traffic in 2020 and 2021 resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Spanish government continues to implement its 2017-24 national strategy to fight addiction. The strategy prioritizes treatment for minors, women, and the elderly. In the 2022 report on alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs, Spanish health authorities estimate that 10.5 percent of Spaniards aged 15 to 64 consumed cannabis and 2.1 percent consumed cocaine over the last year. Authorities estimated 2 percent of the population consumed synthetic drugs like ketamine and synthetic cannabinoids.

Spain continues to enjoy excellent bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation with international partners. Cooperation on EU operations in the Mediterranean continues, and U.S. law enforcement agencies maintain strong working relationships with Spanish authorities, which have led to significant drug seizures and arrests. For example, in October, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Madrid, in collaboration with DEA Special Operations and offices in Rome, Sofia, and Lisbon, worked closely with Spanish law enforcement and security agencies, the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre, and United Kingdom and Italian authorities to intervene in international waters of the Atlantic to seize approximately 6,000 kilograms of narcotics and arrest three crew members on a vessel bound for Spain from Morocco. Spanish National Police also seized countersurveillance technology, including a drone and radio equipment. This marked the culmination of an investigation that began in early 2021 targeting Bulgarian and Spanish criminal organizations.

Suriname

A. Introduction

Suriname is a transit country for South American cocaine destined mostly for Europe. Most illicit drugs are smuggled in cargo containers through Suriname, but commercial and private air transport and human couriers also conceal smuggled cocaine. Suriname's weak border controls and infrastructure make illicit drug detection and interdiction efforts difficult in the country's sparsely populated coastal region and isolated jungle interior. Corruption continues to be a challenge for Suriname; however, the Santokhi Administration has signaled recent commitment to improve transparency and combat drug-related corruption.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Government of Suriname is officially opposed to illicit drug trafficking, but its ability to apprehend and prosecute drug traffickers is inhibited by drug-related corruption, bureaucratic hurdles, and the lack of financial and material resources. The Suriname Police Force (KPS) is responsible for the detection and combating of drug-related activities with four units having specific drug control responsibilities. The KPS Narcotics Brigade investigates and arrests individuals involved in trafficking illicit drugs. At the airport, the Combating International Drug Trafficking Unit (BID) screens airport passengers on outbound flights. The canine unit (Honden Brigade) assists the BID team through luggage inspection.

The UNODC-supported Container Control Program (CCP) has specific drug-control responsibilities at Suriname's shipping ports. It uses risk analysis and other proactive techniques to systematically target high-risk containers. The Unit's operating protocol requires permission and oversight of Surinamese Customs authorities during inspections.

In October 2021, the Office of the Attorney General established the Judicial Intervention Team (JIT), which falls under the supervision of Suriname's Acting Attorney General (AG). On September 6, 2022, the JIT arrested three suspects and seized an aircraft, weapons, and one metric ton (MT) of cocaine, based on gathered intelligence. The investigation is ongoing. The AG's office ordered the illegal landing strip to be destroyed. Based on the maximum payload of the aircraft, the AG's office surmises the destroyed landing strip was being used frequently. On October 6, 2022, a second illegal airstrip was destroyed by order of the AG's office.

The Commander of the Surinamese Armed Forces has made the elimination of international criminal organizations a priority, identifying border protection as the military's greatest challenge. The vast, sparsely populated interior together with the small size of security forces makes the area difficult to monitor. The Commander stated, "This has resulted in, amongst other things, illegal immigration and human trafficking, which is put in place through international organizations and is usually drawn to the illegal gold mining." The criminal organizations also use irregular migrants to bring mercury, illegal drugs, and weapons into the country. The

Commander has also expressed concern over the large-scale currency and gold smuggling out of Suriname.

Suriname's government has shown renewed interest and willingness to work with the United States on combating transnational crime. The Drug Enforcement Administration left Suriname in 2016 after the son of former President Bouterse was arrested in Panama by undercover agents for drugs, illegal weapons, and providing possible terrorist groups with Surinamese passports.

Suriname is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and Migrant Smuggling and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Since 1976, Suriname has shared drug-related information with the Netherlands as part of a mutual legal assistance agreement among former Dutch colonies to exchange crime-related data. Suriname has also signed bilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking with Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia. In 1999, the United States and Suriname completed a comprehensive bilateral maritime counternarcotics enforcement agreement that remains in force.

2. Supply Reduction

Suriname is not a source country for illegal drugs or precursor chemicals but continues to be a transshipment point for illicit drugs. A police spokesperson told the press that under the Attorney General's Office's strict supervision, the Narcotics Brigade destroyed 1,092 kilograms (kg) of cocaine, which was packaged in 950 blocks, as well as 35 kg of powdered cocaine, 2,220 milliliters of liquid cocaine, 54 kg of marijuana, 3 kg of hashish, 359 Ecstasy tablets, and 13 grams of methamphetamines confiscated in raids between April and September 2022.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Minister of Health warned the public in late September 2022 that SNUS, a type of tobacco product popular in Europe, could find its way to Suriname. He described it as highly addictive and targeted to children. It is an oral smokeless tobacco product which is usually placed behind the upper lip either in loose form or portioned sachets that resemble miniature tea bags.

4. Corruption

The Government of Suriname does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. However, widespread, and credible allegations suggest that drug-related corruption pervades many government institutions, including the police. The lack of arrests and convictions in large drug cases supports this premise.

Following recent seizures of drugs within and originating from Suriname, Justice and Police Minister Kenneth Amoksi met with security agencies and ordered them to produce operating procedures to share information. During the meeting, security agencies shared that, for example, the Attorney General's office had agreements to share information with the police and customs, but they have not been implemented. Scanners at Paramaribo's Jules Sedney Port and the Johan Adolf Pengel International Airport were in place but were not used because staff had not been trained to analyze the scanned images. Customs has scanner images from containers at the port

but did not allow other agencies to analyze the images. Officials explained that a camera system to oversee the port was purchased but has yet to be installed, and security officials lacked a procedure to share and analyze scanned images.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a range of efforts designed to address crime and violence in Suriname, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and Caribbean nations that seeks to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice. CBSI assistance to Suriname includes capacity-building training and equipment – primarily to the National Police Force (KPS), justice sector, and National Security Directorate (DNV) – to prevent and interdict drug trafficking, bolster border enforcement capabilities, enhance law enforcement professionalization, and combat money laundering and corruption. In addition, the United States provides training and assistance to the Government of Suriname to combat wildlife trafficking, illegal gold mining, and trafficking in persons.

The United States does not support vetted or specialized law enforcement units with a counternarcotics mission that received \$50,000 or more in INL funding.

D. Conclusion

Suriname continues to be a transit country for illicit drugs originating in South America. The Santokhi administration's public statements on this topic are encouraging, and the Government of Suriname should be incentivized to continue its efforts to combat corruption and take further steps to increase the effectiveness of drug interdiction, investigations, and prosecutions. The United States' law enforcement and judicial assistance to Suriname supports this positive trend.

Syria

The United States remains concerned about increasing drug trafficking from Syria, particularly the synthetic stimulant known widely as Captagon, which can be a mixture of various amphetamines, methamphetamine, and/or other stimulants. Captagon smuggling from Syria continues to threaten regional security, negatively affects public health across the Middle East, and undermines efforts to resolve the Syrian conflict.

Elements affiliated with the Assad regime and Hizballah reportedly have been associated with the production of illicit synthetic stimulants marketed under the “Captagon” name and other illicit drugs in Syria and along the border with Lebanon. According to several open-source reports, the Syrian Army’s Fourth Armored Division, led by Maher Assad, is involved in Syrian drug smuggling operations, including smuggling of counterfeit pills stimulant pills sold as Captagon and precursor chemicals used in Captagon production in neighboring Lebanon. Local Syrian factions linked to the Assad regime and Hizballah reportedly produce the pills in areas dominated by the Assad regime and then traffic the pills to destination markets primarily in the Gulf. Many of these pills are shipped from Syrian ports such as Latakia and then through transit hubs in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa. An increasing number, however, are smuggled across the Jordanian and Iraqi borders by narcotics traffickers backed by armed groups. Jordanian authorities estimated around 160 groups operating in southern Syria were involved in Captagon smuggling as of April 2022.

The scale of Captagon trafficking increased significantly in the first nine months of 2022, despite repeated seizures and interdictions of Captagon shipments by regional authorities. According to media reports, an estimated 250 million Captagon pills were seized worldwide as of August 2022. In May 2022, a Jordanian official estimated there were at least thirteen smuggling attempts a day by Syria-based narcotics traffickers, who were supported by members of the Syrian Army. Lebanese and Saudi Arabian authorities also reported several seizures of millions of Captagon pills.

The United States continues to cooperate with regional partners to strengthen local port and border security and reduce narcotics smuggling through information sharing and capacity building. The United States also works to identify the extent of Syrian-origin Captagon production; coordinates with international law enforcement partners to disrupt the drug trafficking infrastructure directly and indirectly; and uses additional tools, such as financial sanctions that target individuals and entities associated with the Syrian narcotics infrastructure and technical assistance programs that enhance forensic laboratory testing capabilities in Jordan.

Tajikistan

A. Introduction

Tajikistan's 835-mile poorly controlled border with Afghanistan positions it as the primary transit country along the "Northern Route" for Afghanistan-sourced opiates and cannabis destined for the Russian and Eastern European markets and beyond. As the poorest of the Central Asian states, domestic recreational drug use is minimal but increasing; the bulk of illicit drugs transit the country.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Counternarcotics and border security agencies have benefited from years of international donor support. They are reasonably equipped and regularly receive training from donor-funded international organizations and the United States aimed at building sustainable capacity. Tajikistan lacks the ability and resources to sustain training, maintain donor-provided equipment, and support investigative and enforcement operations in a meaningful way. This is compounded by a lack of political will and commitment by some officials to pursue investigations that may disrupt the interests of corrupt officials and possibly their own. As a result, enforcement at the working level is restrained and biased, authorized only at the highest levels. Tajikistan's relatively low drug seizures do not reflect its position as a major transit country between Afghanistan, the world's largest opiates (heroin) supplier, and the large consumer market in the Russian Federation.

Tajikistan's national budget for the overall counternarcotics effort is unknown; however, since 1999 the Drug Control Agency (DCA) has received salary supplements from both the United States and the Russian Federation. INL terminated salary supplements to DCA in October 2022, including to the DCA Vetted Unit. Due to the move of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from Tajikistan in 2019 to a regionally based presence in Almaty, Kazakhstan, direct operational oversight of the DCA Vetted Unit is not currently possible, although U.S. and Tajik officials remain in contact.

There is neither a mutual legal assistance treaty between Tajikistan and the United States nor a formalized extradition agreement, although Tajikistan is party to multilateral conventions that allow for law enforcement cooperation. Tajikistan is a member of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center for Combatting Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and their Precursors (CARICC). This regional body allows for the exchange of information and law enforcement intelligence and the pursuit of collaborative joint investigations.

2. Supply Reduction

According to statistics provided by the DCA, in the first half of 2022 Tajik law enforcement agencies seized 2.8 metric tons of illicit drugs, a 52 percent increase from the same period in

2021. A comparative analysis shows a 38 percent increase in heroin seizures, 33 percent increase in hashish seizures, and a 32 percent increase in opium seizures. Cannabis seizures declined by 25.4 percent. Tajik law enforcement agencies seized 2,934 tablets, 44,910 capsules, and 84.5 kilograms of psychotropic substances, almost doubling seizures made in the same period in 2021. This supports anecdotal reporting indicating an increase in domestic consumption. In the first half of 2022 Tajik law enforcement agencies also destroyed 807,646 cannabis plants, a 24 percent decline from 2021.

No seizures of fentanyl or its precursors or other synthetic opioids or analogues have been reported.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Based on data provided by the Tajik Ministry of Health, during the first six months of 2022 4,437 drug addicts were registered (4,337 men and 100 women), showing an 11 percent decline from 2021. There are 48 people suffering from substance abuse disorders per 100,000 people in Tajikistan, consistent with 2021 figures. The Ministry of Health data showed no persons under the age of 18 were reported. People may elect to register for five years, allowing them to receive methadone through internationally-funded HIV prevention projects. However, registration denies the drug user government employment, a driver's license, and, because a marriage permit requires a drug test, the ability to marry. The consequences of registration likely lead to an undercount of the actual illicit drug users in the country.

International donors including the United States fund drug demand reduction programs throughout Tajikistan. Educational campaigns increase awareness of the harmful effects of drug use by using media, newspaper articles, sporting events, and information dissemination campaigns that focus on Tajikistan's youth, students, military personnel, and populations living in remote areas.

4. Corruption

In stated policy, the Tajik Government does not encourage nor facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. Tajikistan has enacted anti-corruption legislation. However, enforcement is selective and, generally, ineffective. There were no reports of significant arrests, prosecutions, or convictions related to corruption involving illicit drugs in 2022.

Corruption is endemic in Tajikistan. State government employees receive extremely low salaries in Tajikistan, to include senior level officials and agency heads. The profitability of narcotics transactions; the ability to exercise control over cross-border commerce through imports and exports; and other lucrative opportunities in the control of law enforcement, the judiciary, and government officials, provide opportunities for corruption. The United States provided salary supplements to the DCA to counter these corrupt influences until October 1, 2022. The United States has also funded and supported a Vetted Unit in the DCA, whose members are screened, drug tested, and polygraphed. This unit, originally under DEA oversight and mentorship, is tasked to focus on high level traffickers and organizations, but in the absence of an in-country DEA presence is currently largely ineffective.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

In 2022, the U.S. government provided \$1.2 million in assistance to Tajikistan's counternarcotics efforts in the form of training, equipment, infrastructure and institutional development, salary supplementation, operational support, and other expenses. Much of the assistance has focused on the DCA, the principal counternarcotics organization in the country, although recently significant funding has gone toward border security forces and supporting reactive forces within the Ministry of Interior, due to threats resulting from a destabilized Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. While the DCA is a competent, willing, and professional investigative body, its effectiveness is limited by a lack of resources and modern investigative tools.

A Letter of Agreement between the United States and Tajikistan outlines U.S. support for security assistance focused on enhancing the counternarcotics and law enforcement capability of the DCA and the Border Guard Service through the provision of training, equipment, and institutional development activities.

Tajikistan's cooperation on investigations with U.S. counternarcotics agencies is limited to significant cases, but there may be opportunities for expanded partnership. A recent successful prosecution of a U.S. case out of the Southern District of New York working in conjunction with the DCA demonstrates that cooperation can be successful. The Drug Control Agency under the President of Tajikistan is widely viewed as the best counternarcotics agency in Central Asia. For the first time, in 2022, the counternarcotics unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) requested U.S. government assistance to develop institutional capacity and in support of investigations. The United States presented the MoIA a draft Memorandum of Understanding for review in 2022, in the hopes of furthering this relationship.

D. Conclusion

Malign actors use the same smuggling routes, methodologies, and financial networks for drugs as for arms and human trafficking. Tajikistan remains resolute in its unwillingness to recognize or engage in significant cooperation with the interim Taliban government, unlike most other countries in the region. Since 2021, the Tajik government has repeatedly noted an increase in illicit drug trafficking and expressed concerns about the potential for extremists to cross into Tajikistan from Afghanistan.

Corruption is pervasive in Tajikistan and negatively influences the nation's counternarcotics efforts. In recent years, however, the Tajik government has charged senior counternarcotics officers with corruption, reflecting the government's readiness, in some cases, to tackle high-level corruption.

Tanzania

Tanzania is a significant transit country for illicit drugs in East Africa. International drug trafficking organizations and courier networks transport illicit drugs via maritime vessel through Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania for destinations in Europe and North America. The most significant threat Tanzania faces is the illicit trafficking of heroin and, increasingly, methamphetamine, transported via the Makran Coast from Afghanistan. Tanzania cultivates cannabis and khat for domestic consumption and regional and international distribution. Porous borders and inadequate port security present considerable challenges to drug interdiction efforts.

In April 2021, Tanzania's Drug Control and Enforcement Authority (DCEA) seized 494 kilograms (kg) of heroin and 355 kg of methamphetamine from a flagless dhow (traditional sailing vessel), arresting seven Iranian nationals. The seizure was one of the largest in Tanzania's history, and the expediency and effectiveness of the response underscored the Tanzanian government's commitment to the operation. In June, the DCEA seized 85 kg of heroin and approximately 75 kg of methamphetamine from a land-based stash cache. Six individuals were arrested. These DCEA-led investigations remain active and ongoing.

Domestic drug use continues to increase, including methamphetamine use. In September 2021 the DCEA opened the most recent methadone clinic in Songwe region, which borders Zambia and Malawi. The tenth methadone clinic in Tanzania, it serves a growing number of people suffering from substance use disorders, the increase resulting from traffickers who pay employees in drugs instead of cash.

The United States promotes improved interdiction operations through law enforcement cooperation and encourages the Tanzanian government to further pursue its commitment to drug interdiction, combatting corruption, and improving criminal justice and rule of law. The DCEA, Tanzania Police Force, Tanzanian People's Defense Force, and Tanzanian Maritime Police contribute to Tanzania's fight against illicit drug trafficking. These agencies work with U.S. and other international law enforcement partners. Regional cooperation on drug interdiction is improving. Extradition between Tanzania and the U.S. is governed by the 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty and implemented pursuant to Tanzania's domestic Extradition Act. There is no U.S.-Tanzania bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, though both countries are parties to various multilateral conventions with provisions for assistance and Tanzania has a domestic law on mutual assistance in criminal matters.

The Tanzanian government does not encourage or facilitate the production or trafficking of illicit drugs as a matter of policy. However, drug traffickers use financial incentives to influence politicians, law enforcement, and others in positions of power.

Thailand

Thailand does not cultivate or produce significant quantities of opiates, methamphetamine, or other illicit drugs, nor is it a significant source or transit country for drugs entering the United States. However, transnational narcotics traffickers smuggle a significant quantity of illegal drugs through Thailand, bound for markets in the Indo-Pacific region. Thailand's foremost drug control challenge is addressing the flows of methamphetamine from neighboring Burma, most of which transits through Thailand to other markets, but is also consumed domestically. Heroin, also largely from Burma, continues to threaten Thailand and the region as well.

In June 2022, Thailand removed most forms of cannabis (marijuana and hemp) and their extracts containing no more than 0.2 percent tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) from the list of controlled substances in the Narcotics Act. Cannabis extracts sold must contain less than 0.2 percent THC, but there is no THC limit on the sale of cannabis flowers. Cannabis cannot be sold to pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers, and persons under 20 years of age, or be smoked in public places, consumed for recreational purposes, or imported. A new bill is under discussion in Parliament that would provide a new legal framework surrounding the sale and use of cannabis.

During the first eight months of 2022, Thai authorities seized approximately 33 metric tons (MT) of methamphetamine tablets, 7 MT of crystal methamphetamine, 788 kilograms of ketamine, 397 kilograms of heroin, 297 kilograms of ecstasy, and 45 kilograms of cocaine.

Criminal penalties vary by narcotics classification, ranging from monetary fines to life imprisonment. The death penalty exists but is rarely imposed.

Substance use has been a significant social and public health problem in Thailand for decades. "Yaba," a tablet containing methamphetamine, caffeine, and other stimulants, is the most widely abused drug in Thailand. Thailand carries out demand reduction, drug treatment, and rehabilitation programs.

Thailand's Office of the Narcotics Control Board oversees the prevention and suppression of illegal drug use and works with the Royal Thai Police and Narcotics Suppression Bureau to enforce drug laws.

The United States and Thailand enjoy a close relationship on law enforcement, including through bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties. With U.S. assistance in facilitating and enhancing cooperation, Thailand is an effective and cooperative partner. The United States works closely with Thai counterparts on investigations and provides specialized training and equipment through DEA, the International Law Enforcement Academy, and other programs.

Trinidad and Tobago

A. Introduction

Trinidad and Tobago (TT) is a transshipment point for drugs destined for Europe, North America, and the rest of the Caribbean. Transnational criminal organizations exploit the country's proximity to Venezuela, its poorly controlled borders, vulnerabilities at ports of entry, a lack of law enforcement capacity and resources, and corruption in border security entities and law enforcement. Weak enforcement and pervasive corruption in border security units remain key vulnerabilities and impede efforts to combat the drug trade in TT. Nevertheless, TT has advanced in its efforts to investigate, interdict, and dismantle drug networks.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies and Trends

1. Institutional Development

TT's drug control institutions are challenged by deficiencies in staffing, interagency coordination, and funding. The judicial system suffers from lengthy delays and drug-related prosecutions that can take years to resolve. Nonetheless, the TT government is making strides to improve coordination and interdiction, primarily at ports of entry.

The National Drug Council (NDC), the body responsible for coordinating TT's anti-drug policy, received \$200,000 in the 2022-2023 budget. In 2022, the NDC continued implementing its cabinet approved Operational Plan 2021-2025, which focuses on strengthening institutions and international cooperation, supply reduction, control measures, research, and demand reduction. In the reporting period, the NDC placed significant emphasis on a communications strategy targeting at-risk teens and young adults.

In September 2022, Trinidad and Tobago signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and launched an Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP). AIRCOP aims to strengthen the enforcement and interdiction efforts at TT's two international airports.

Trinidad and Tobago also participates in the European Union-funded Seaport Project (SEACOP), which provides funding for training and interdiction exercises at seaports in TT. The fifth phase of the SEACOP project began in November 2021.

Trinidad and Tobago has mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties with the United States. The country is also party to several agreements with the United States, including a drug control and law enforcement letter of agreement, a maritime law enforcement agreement that enables the United States to patrol TT waters and detain vessels suspected of trafficking drugs, a ship rider agreement that allows U.S law enforcement detachments aboard TT Coast Guard vessels, and a customs mutual assistance agreement.

2. Supply Reduction

The Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU) is a U.S.-supported unit that supports the TT Police Service (TTPS) through the collection of information and actionable intelligence to counter transnational organized crime. Through the TOCU, TT law enforcement has seized 5.13 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 378 kg of marijuana during the first nine months of 2022, compared to seizures of 177.35 kg and 2.2 metric tons (mt) respectively over the same period in 2021. While figures for internal seizures show a significant decrease, regional seizures due to interagency collaboration have increased. Through the TOCU, the TTPS supported a Barbados Police Service operation that led to the seizure of 481 kg of marijuana in Barbados that originated in TT with an estimated value of \$10.6 million. Other regional operations led to the seizure of 430 kg of cocaine in Martinique. TT also participated in Operation Trigger VII, which was a joint firearms operation between INTERPOL and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS). This operation, executed in September 2022, led to the seizure of 350 weapons, 3,300 rounds of ammunition, 10.1 MT of cocaine, and 2.5 MT of marijuana.

Marijuana is the only locally produced illicit drug in TT and law enforcement periodically eradicates cannabis, but it is not a significant area of focus. There has been a decrease in the number of arrests for the possession of marijuana due to the decriminalization of the possession of quantities equal to or less than 30 grams.

3. Public Information, Prevention and Treatment

Information about drug use in TT remains limited and largely anecdotal. However, beginning in 2021, Trinidad and Tobago has been working in collaboration with the University of the West Indies to undertake a national household consumption study that seeks to obtain empirical data on drug use to allow for evidence-based policy making on drugs in TT. The study will aid the development of valid, reliable, and timely research on drug consumption and its consequences.

There are several drug treatment programs in TT – primarily the Ministry of Health – as well as programs administered and privately funded by nongovernmental organizations, religious groups, and hospitals. In collaboration with the Organization of American States, Trinidad and Tobago launched the U.S.-funded Case Care Management Program in October 2021. This program is in its second year of a two-year pilot focused on addressing substance use disorders and provide alternatives to incarceration for individuals referred from the drug treatment courts, as well as persons on community service orders and probationers.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, Trinidad and Tobago does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking or the laundering of proceeds from illicit drug transactions. Nonetheless, there are persistent reports of drug-related corruption in the ranks of law enforcement, border security entities, and the postal system, which facilitates the transshipment and distribution of illicit drugs. Trinidad and Tobago has passed several laws to address

corruption, including passing a Proceeds of Crime Act and the partially adoption of a Civil Asset Forfeiture Law. However, TT has not yet operationalized a civil asset management agency.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S Policy Initiatives

The United States and TT law enforcement maintain a cooperative relationship, including collaborating closely on improving security at legal ports of entry and helping to expand the role of TT law enforcement in regional narcotics interdiction efforts.

The United States supports a wide range of efforts designed to address crime and violence affecting TT citizens, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Through CBSI, the United States provides counternarcotics training and capacity building for relevant institutions.

The United States and Trinidad and Tobago maintain a bilateral agreement to suppress illicit traffic by sea, which includes ship boarding, expedited operations center communications, ship rider operations and operations within territorial seas.

D. Conclusion

Cooperation between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago on drug trafficking and transnational crime was productive overall in 2022. Trinidad and Tobago should continue to develop strategies to strengthen border security, including expanding the use of technology to aid interdiction efforts at ports of entry. It should also increase its efforts to combat public corruption that facilitates transnational crime, including the establishment of strong oversight and accountability mechanisms within the TT Customs and Excise Division.

Turkiye

Turkiye is a significant transit country for illicit drug trafficking, in part due to its location at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and its inadequate controls for addressing illicit finance. Turkish National Police (TNP) and Customs Enforcement assessed there was an increase of heroin and methamphetamine seizures along the Turkiye-Iran border in 2022, which they attributed to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan recorded a large decrease in seizures along the Caucasus route, corroborating TNP's analysis. In 2022 the Turkish government identified methamphetamine as the greatest narcotics threat to Turkiye; according to official data, Turkish security forces throughout the country seized 4.4 metric tons (MT) of methamphetamine in the first four months of 2022. In September 2022, the Turkish Minister of Commerce stated that Customs Enforcement seized more than 12.1 MT of narcotics and 5.1 tons of chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs since the beginning of 2022.

Syrian drug traffickers played a significant role in Turkiye's drug trade. Illegal drug use in Turkiye was relatively low compared to countries in the region, although cannabis was imported or grown domestically for local consumption.

Turkiye strictly controlled licit opium poppy cultivation and pharmaceutical morphine production, with no apparent diversion into the illicit market. Turkiye's drug policy placed less emphasis on treatment and prevention in favor of aggressive drug seizures. The government's prioritization of counterterrorism undermines interdiction and prosecution efforts against large Turkish criminal organizations.

Turkiye's arrest, conviction, and continued imprisonment of a local U.S. government staff member on spurious charges in 2017 has impeded U.S.-Turkish counternarcotics cooperation to some extent to this day, although U.S.-supported training and equipment that strengthened Turkish border enforcement and the participation of Turkish customs officers has had a positive effect on seizures.

There were no U.S. government-supported law enforcement units funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in 2022.

Ukraine

Ukraine is predominantly a transit country for non-domestically produced drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, which are most frequently bound for consumer markets in the European Union and Russia. While identifiable overland corridors for the movement of these drugs exist, Ukraine's southern ports on the Black Sea, notably Odesa and Pivdennyi, have served as the primary points for the transit of illicit drugs. This traditional trafficking model was dramatically disrupted following the February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, which stopped all shipping traffic in and out of Ukraine's Black Sea ports.

The war created an environment of unacceptable risk for international illicit trafficking activities due to denied transit through northern, eastern, and southeastern Ukraine. Further, Ukraine remained under martial law for all but less than eight weeks of 2022. This included the establishment of numerous security checkpoints throughout the country and greater scrutiny applied to the movement of overland cargo. In response, transnational criminal organizations shifted illicit trafficking activities through nearby countries.

Ukrainian officials have long assessed domestically produced amphetamine, methamphetamine, methadone, alpha-PVP, and new psychoactive substances (NPS) as the gravest threats to Ukrainian society. The production and consumption of cannabis remains significant in Ukraine.

The Russian Federation's war against Ukraine caused the displacement of large segments of Ukraine's population. This societal disruption temporarily curtailed production and distribution for domestically produced illicit drugs; however, as Russia's territorial advances stagnated in late spring 2022 and the displacement of persons lessened, clandestine laboratory activity increased alongside a renewed demand for synthetic drugs. Domestic clandestine drug production is trending toward the establishment of more numerous, although smaller scale, operations with distribution activities supported by internet-based sales and delivery through the postal system.

The United States enjoys strong bilateral cooperation with the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) Investigative Activities Department and the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) Counternarcotics Department, despite lingering concerns related to systemic corruption outside these direct partnerships. During the January-September 2022 reporting period, NPU seized approximately two metric tons (MT) narcotic drugs, approximately 24 MT precursor chemicals, 1.67 MT cannabis, 160.6 kilograms (kg) Alpha PVP, and 41 kg methadone. SBGS seized an additional 65.7 kg cocaine, 35.8 kg cannabis and lesser quantities of other illicit drugs.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) is a major consumer and transshipment point for illicit drugs, though not a source country. UK authorities estimate that 117 metric tons of cocaine and 38 tons of opiates are consumed in the UK per year, which places the UK with cocaine and heroin consumption rates among the highest in Europe. Cocaine and heroin purity levels are high; however, there have been some reports of decreased heroin purity in parts of England. The prices for cocaine and heroin increased during the COVID-19 pandemic, but have appeared to decrease significantly during 2022, which experts attributed to an oversupply in the market and lower wholesale prices in Europe. Crack cocaine remains a problem, as long-term heroin users are also using crack cocaine due to rising production and purity of cocaine and much more aggressive marketing of both substances together.

The Scottish government reported 1,330 drug-related deaths occurred in 2021, a .67 percent decrease from 2020. While this is the first year since 2013 in which drug-related deaths have not increased in Scotland, it is still the second highest annual total on record. In 2022, authorities reported 69 percent of drug-related deaths in Scotland in 2021 resulted from street benzodiazepine. Figures published in 2022 by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency indicate that 23 percent of the 218 drug-related deaths in 2020 resulted from diazepam abuse.

Cannabis is one of the largest drug markets in the UK, where the annual consumption is approximately 240 tons. The UK continues to receive cannabis via mail, fast parcel, and air freight shipments. During the first quarter of 2022, there was a significant increase in cannabis seizures via fast parcel at the UK border. Cannabis edibles continue to be consumed in the UK and have been linked to over 35 hospitalizations. Criminal organizations often use the income generated from cannabis trafficking to fund other illicit activities, including the purchase of cocaine and heroin.

In the summer and fall of 2021, the UK saw an increase in overdoses and deaths resulting from the use of isotonitazene, a potent synthetic opioid classified as a benzimidazole-opioid (commonly referred to as a nitazene), that was being used as an adulterant in heroin. Nitazene potency can be equal to or greater than fentanyl. Public Health England (PHE) issued a National Patient Safety Alert in August 2021, and the National Crime Agency (NCA) began to liaise with PHE and local police forces to monitor the situation, which appeared to decrease by the end of 2021. In 2022, nitazenes surfaced again in the UK, and authorities are working to determine if this is an emerging trend, or possible indication that drug trends are moving away from traditional heroin and toward synthetic opioids.

The United States and the UK work closely bilaterally and multilaterally on drug enforcement efforts. The United States continues to conduct coordinated drug trafficking and money laundering investigations with the NCA, Metropolitan Police Service, UK Border Force, Police Scotland, Police Service of Northern Ireland, and other UK law enforcement agencies. The United States has provided the UK with lead information on drug shipments bound for the UK, including couriers, parcels, and containerized cargo.

Uzbekistan

A. Introduction

Uzbekistan is a transit country for bulk heroin, opium, and hashish smuggled from Afghanistan through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Kazakhstan, Russia, and Europe. Cannabis and opium poppy are grown in rural households for personal use and sale. Drug seizures at the Afghan and Tajik borders have more than doubled since the Taliban took power in 2021. While local media's frequent reports on small-amount seizures of cannabis, hashish, opium, and synthetic drugs in 2021-2022 might imply the growth of internal consumption, the country lacks reliable data to verify it.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The State Commission on Drug Control chaired by the Prime Minister leads the government's counternarcotics policy. The Commission is an interagency body which consolidates government agencies' efforts in developing, coordinating, and implementing anti-drug measures. The National Information-Analytical Center on Drug Control (NCDC) operates as the Commission's working body and performs coordination functions but has no law enforcement authority. The primary law enforcement entities overseeing seizures and field operations are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Service, including the State Border Troops, and the State Customs Committee.

Although law enforcement accomplished more drug seizures in 2022 than in previous years, the country's counternarcotics strategy concentrates on outreach and prevention. The authorities implement prevention, drug demand, and supply reduction activities based on the 2021-2025 Program for Comprehensive Measures to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. Uzbekistan did not adopt any significant counternarcotics legislation in 2022.

The country faces challenges from smuggling of Afghan drugs, internet sale and use of synthetic narcotics and prescribed medications, lack of operational cooperation, and hesitation to share drug investigation data with foreign counterparts regardless of current agreements.

The scope of international counternarcotics cooperation with the United States and other partners is limited. In 2022, the United States funded the opening of the Air Cargo Control Unit in Tashkent International Airport and the Port Control Unit (PCU) at the Ayritom Border Checkpoint near the Uzbek-Afghan border through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization's Global Container Control Program (CCP). The United States also funds UNODC's drug demand reduction survey aimed at understanding illicit drug use patterns among high-risk drug users to inform evidence-based anti-drug policies and strategies in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan does not have agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance with the United States, although it is a party to multilateral conventions that enable law enforcement cooperation.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) maintains a largely dormant Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, NCDC, and the Prosecutor General Office's Financial Intelligence Unit. Uzbekistan is a member of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre which coordinates regional efforts in combating transnational drug trafficking.

2. Supply Reduction

The increase in seized drugs in 2021 and the first half of 2022 indicates growing trafficking of Afghan narcotics via the northern route, including Uzbekistan. Traffickers smuggled smaller hashish and opium packages of up to 20 kilograms from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan and larger bulk consignments, which also included heroin, from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan, via the Amu Darya River in the south of Uzbekistan. There were instances of smuggling hashish and Tramadol from Kazakhstan. The sale of synthetic drugs via messengers and drug stashes is rising.

During the first six months of 2022, law enforcement agencies seized a total of over 1.3 metric tons (MT) of various narcotics, 3.7 times more compared to the same time frame in 2021. Seized narcotics had the following breakdown: 274 kilograms (kg) of heroin; 320 kg of opium; 435 kg of hashish; 199 kg of marijuana; 114 kg of poppy straw; 15 kg of synthetic drugs; and 13 kg of medications containing narcotic substances. In the largest seizure of 2022, customs and border officials seized 230 kg of heroin heading to Russia in a freight truck at Oybek border crossing point at the Uzbek-Tajik border.

Law enforcement authorities annually conduct the anti-drug operation Black Poppy to eradicate illegally cultivated drug plants and seize other trafficked drugs. In the first phase of the operation from May 30 to June 30, law enforcement agencies conducted field operations and detected 1,688 drug-related cases, seized 189 kg of narcotics, and eradicated 4,422 square meters of narcotic plants.

In the first half of 2022 the quantity of seized heroin rose almost 16-fold, opium and hashish quadrupled, poppy straw and synthetic drugs doubled, and cannabis increased by 28 percent compared to the same period in 2021. Also, the authorities reported a 40 percent increase in the number of drug-related crimes, from 3,235 in the first half 2021 to 4,522 in the same period of 2022. These large increases correspond to the increased trafficking from Afghanistan following the United States' 2021 withdrawal from that country. Law enforcement detained 49 foreign nationals for drug-related crimes, mainly citizens of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkey.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Uzbekistan lacks current data on drug use among the general population since no survey has been conducted. Trends in seizures indicate that consumption of cannabis, hashish, opium, and synthetic narcotics is growing.

According to the latest available drug consumption data, the number of registered drug users decreased by 219 totaling 5,035 in 2021. During the same period, the number of individuals registered with clinics for non-medical use of psychoactive substances decreased by 201 and totaling 6,254. The Republican Center for Narcology operates around 20 drug treatment and rehabilitation centers across the country, which are underfunded and have limited capabilities. Drug users avoid treatment in government rehabilitation centers.

Government agencies annually implement a plan of activities to identify cases of drug use, psychotropic substances, and strong medications as well as preventing offences related to substance trafficking. The impact of these awareness-raising and prevention activities has not been evaluated.

4. Corruption

Uzbekistan does not encourage or facilitate illicit narcotic activities, nor is there evidence of senior government officials' engagement in such activities. Although there is pervasive public corruption at multiple levels, high-profile convictions of senior officials have typically not involved drug-related crimes. Corruption cases are handled in closed court hearings with little information made public.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

There is minimal bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics. The United States collaborates with Uzbekistan based on the 2001 Agreement on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Assistance, which contains a provision for a DEA-mentored Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU). Uzbekistan has repeatedly requested the United States to re-launch the SIU but it is not possible due to the lack of a DEA office in Tashkent.

Uzbekistan does not have INL-funded law enforcement units engaged in counternarcotics activities.

D. Conclusion

Overall, Uzbekistan is willing to report on in-country and border seizures and implements widespread awareness raising and prevention activities among the youth and in educational facilities. However, law enforcement's reluctance to exchange operational information with foreign counterparts and the lack of verified drug use data make it challenging to develop international counternarcotics cooperation and evaluate the seriousness of its drug use situation. Closer working-level collaboration, direct exchange of operational information, and joint investigations with foreign law enforcement will help strengthen its counternarcotics efforts and increase drug seizures.

Venezuela

A. Introduction

Venezuela remains a major drug-transit country and preferred trafficking route in the Western Hemisphere for illegal drugs, predominately cocaine. Given ongoing economic crises, the Maduro regime increasingly depends on rents from narcotrafficking, along with other illicit activities, to maintain its illegitimate grip on power. The regime's lack of international drug control cooperation; usurpation of the judicial system, military, and security services for illicit ends; public corruption; and cooperation with non-state armed actors and criminal elements provided ideal conditions for drug trafficking operations and associated violence. Growing evidence of coca cultivation and cocaine production in domestic drug laboratories suggests Venezuela is now an illicit drug-producing country as well as a transit country.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Since 2005, the President of the United States has determined annually, including on September 15, 2022, that Venezuela has failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts during the previous 12 months to both adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the required measures to counter narcotics trafficking.

Venezuela and the United States have had a Bilateral Counter-narcotics Memorandum of Understanding since 1978, but the regime refused to sign a negotiated addendum to this agreement in 2005. There was no cooperation with the regime on extradition and mutual legal assistance in 2022. The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution bars the extradition of Venezuelan nationals. Venezuela is not a member of the Cooperative Situational Information Integration System through which countries predetermine information to share automatically with the United States. Regime actors do not share information on counternarcotics activity with U.S. officials.

In February 2021, Maduro created the National Anti-Drug Superintendency (SUNAD) via the Organic Drug Law of 2010, replacing the National Anti-Drug Office (ONA). The regime appointed Major General Richard López Vargas as the first National Anti-Drug Superintendent. Lopez Vargas was previously the head of the ONA and a former Commander General of the Bolivarian National Guard. The regime stated the reform of the Organic Drug Law was to reinforce the control mechanisms against illicit drug trafficking in the national territory, as well as to prevent the consumption and misuse of drugs, but reports of regime actors' direct involvement in both trafficking and misuse continued throughout the year.

2. Supply Reduction

Venezuela remains a major transit country for cocaine shipments via aerial, terrestrial, and maritime routes. Most originates in Colombia and transits through Venezuela, with shipments then trafficked north through Central America or the Caribbean islands - eventually ending up in the United States - or southeast to Brazil, Guyana, or Suriname, either for consumption in South

America or transit to Europe. In March 2020, the United States estimated that between 200 and 250 metric tons (MT) of cocaine were trafficked through Venezuela each year, representing roughly 10 to 13 percent of estimated global production. In May 2022, InSight Crime reported evidence of coca cultivation and cocaine processing in Zulia and Apure states by Colombian guerilla groups.

As of September 2022, the regime claimed it had achieved “the largest seizures and confiscations in history,” amounting to more than 36.5 MT, up 29.2 percent compared to the same period in 2021. It highlighted the eradication of 31 hectares of coca in two operations in the state of Zulia and the destruction of 17 cocaine production laboratories in the state of Apure during the first four months of 2022 – further evidence of new narcotics cultivation and production activity in Venezuela. In September, the Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela (FANB) claimed the largest marijuana bust in the past 10 years, having allegedly seized 2.9 MT of marijuana. Experts were unable to independently verify these claims. Regime statistics remained unreliable, and experts assessed apprehensions were often aimed at those who failed to bribe or work with regime, military, and state officials.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to a 2022 report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the use of narcotics in Venezuela claimed around 107,000 lives in 2021. On September 8, 2022, regime attorney general Tarek William Saab, in coordination with SUNAD, launched a campaign called “Drugs destroy your family” to raise public awareness of the risks and consequences of using drugs. The regime also denounced micro-traffickers, and television series and social media that glorify narcotics activities.

4. Corruption

Corruption, including among senior regime officials, judicial, military and security services, is endemic in Venezuela, facilitating drug-trafficking organizations’ operations. Regime-allied armed “colectivos” (pro-regime armed groups), armed Venezuelan-origin gangs, and Colombian guerilla factions dominate drug trafficking routes inside Venezuela. While these criminal organizations move most of the cocaine, it is actors within the state that shape and control the world they operate in.

Along the border region with Colombia, the regime allowed safe havens for U.S.-designated terrorist groups including National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP), and Segunda Marquetalia, which dominate the drug trafficking routes in the border region and maintain close ties to the Venezuelan regime.

Tren de Aragua, the largest criminal organization in Venezuela with about 3,000 members, originated in Venezuela’s prison system as a result of corruption and lack of regime control, and has since become influential both within and outside the prison system, continuing to recruit new members and carry out criminal operations including drug trafficking. The group has recently leveraged the exodus of Venezuelans due to the country’s crisis to expand its operations to Peru, Chile, and Ecuador, among others.

The regime took no action against officials, individuals, and companies designated as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers or indicted by the United States for playing a significant role in international drug trafficking. Since 2017, the United States has made over 350 Venezuelan-related designations, pursuant to various Executive Orders (E.O.), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. In March 2020, the United States charged Maduro and 14 other current and former Venezuelan officials with offenses related to narco-terrorism, corruption, and drug trafficking, and other criminal charges. By July 2022, at least 12 investigations had been opened in U.S. courts for drug trafficking cases in which Venezuelan officials were allegedly involved.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Drug control cooperation between Venezuela and the United States has been limited since 2005. The United States works with Interim President Guaidó and his team on areas of mutual concern, including counternarcotics initiatives and reestablishment of the rule of law.

D. Conclusion

Despite the Maduro regime's alleged efforts in countering drug trafficking, the country's role in the global supply chain of illicit drugs has expanded from being a drug transit zone to becoming a cocaine-producing nation. The Maduro regime has failed to meaningfully prosecute corrupt officials or suspected drug traffickers, and Venezuela's use as a transit and origin point for illegal drugs has continued to grow.

Vietnam

Vietnam is a transshipment and destination country for illegal drugs of all types, although most transshipments are destined for other Asian countries rather than the United States. Significant heroin enters Vietnam from the Golden Triangle countries of Thailand, Laos, and Burma for both local use and re-shipment to other countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania. Large quantities of methamphetamine and amphetamine type stimulants also enter Vietnam for local consumption, predominantly from Burma. Cocaine from South America is also consumed in Vietnam and distributed throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania.

Transnational Criminal Organizations smuggle drugs into and through Vietnam, taking advantage of borders with Laos, Cambodia, and China that are insufficiently guarded and have thousands of small roads and mountain passes. In addition, counternarcotics police in Vietnam's land, air, and sea entry points are poorly trained and lack capacity and resources to conduct complex investigations. Heroin and methamphetamine travel overland into Vietnam from Laos both for domestic use and transshipment to Taiwan and China. Smugglers move cocaine by air and sea, using shipping containers, air shipments, and human couriers to transit Vietnam en route to higher profit markets in Australia and Japan.

According to data from the Government of Vietnam, from January to October 2022 Vietnamese law enforcement investigated 19,754 drug-related cases, arrested 29,934 offenders, and seized 677 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 4.6 metric tons of methamphetamine, 256 kg of cannabis, 104 kg of opium, 184 firearms, and unknown quantities of vehicles and assets. Additionally, Vietnam's Counternarcotics Police Force arrested more than 100 wanted criminals in related drug crimes. This represents a slight increase in investigations (approximately 3000 cases), and almost double the amount of methamphetamine seized in 2022 compared to 2021. Seizures of cannabis and other drugs remained the same or decreased in that period, with marijuana seizures decreasing almost 75 percent (from 990 kg to 256 kg).

The United States helps build the capacity of Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security through training, equipment, information sharing, and coordinated operations. In 2022 the United States completed repairs on an international training facility for counternarcotics police and trained 98 police, customs, coast guard, and border guard officers in tactical medicine, drug identification, and drug demand reduction. The United States also launched a program in cooperation with the International Narcotics Control Board that has trained more than 40 officers on precursor chemicals and new psychoactive substances.

LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS (2022)

**Law Enforcement Units Funded by the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961**

Consistent with Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by section 5102 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY 2022 NDAA), the following identifies vetted or specialized law enforcement units funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) that have a counternarcotics purpose and that received \$50,000 or more in INL funding for calendar year 2022. It also identifies any U.S. agency(ies) that mentored, trained, or advised those units.

For the purposes of reporting under this provision, the term “unit” means a vetted or specialized armed police or other law enforcement unit that has counternarcotics functions and powers to investigate, arrest, and detain suspects in connection with drug-related crimes. The term “United States Government-supported units funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement” relates to INL’s obligation of INCLE funding for equipment, costs associated with USG law enforcement advisors or other mentors/trainers and with other provision of training, and items such as lodging and travel expenses for such units, where the total INL funding amounted to at least \$50,000 in the calendar year being reported, regardless of the fiscal year of origin of the funds. The purpose of the \$50,000 minimum is to exclude units where INL provided only de minimis funding.

INL is not able to generally or consistently track foreign law enforcement operations, although it does provide funding for capacity building, equipment, and other activities that enhance the ability of partner law enforcement entities to engage in law enforcement activity including that which could be characterized as operations.

Abbreviations of the U.S. agencies that mentor, advise, or train the units listed below refer to the following agencies:

CBP – Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
DEA – Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD – Department of Defense
DOJ – Department of Justice
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
HSI – Homeland Security Investigations
ICITAP – International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, DOJ
ILEA – International Law Enforcement Academy
INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Department of State
LEGATT – Legal Attache, FBI
ODC - Office of Defense Cooperation, Department of Defense
OPDAT - Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training, DOJ
USMS – U.S. Marshalls Service

Albania

Albanian Law Enforcement Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Specialized Anticorruption Body (SPAK) --National Bureau of Investigations (NBI)	DEA, ICITAP
SPAK - Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO)	OPDAT
Ministry of Interior, Police Oversight Agency (POA)	ICITAP

Bahamas

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
RBPF Marine Service Support Unit	DEA, INL
RBPF Drug Enforcement Unit	DEA, INL
Bahamas Customs	HSI, INL
RBDF Naval Forces	ODC, INL

Belize

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Anti-Narcotics Unit	DEA
Mobile Interdiction Team	INL, ILEA, DEA
Belize Customs & Excise	INL, CBP

Colombia

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Colombian National Police, Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN)	DEA
Colombian National Police, Criminal Investigation Directorate (DIJIN)	DEA
Colombian National Police (DIJIN)	FBI, HSI, DEA
Colombian Prosecutors Office (CTI)	DEA
Colombian Army (COLAR)	DEA
Customs and National Taxes Directorate (DIAN)	HSI
Colombian Navy (COLNAV)	DEA
Colombian National Police, Tax and Customs Management Directorate (POLFA)	HSI

Costa Rica

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Coast Guard Marine Interdiction Unit	DOD, DEA, INL

Dominican Republic

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD) Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU)	DEA
Joint Dominican National Police (DNP), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and General Customs Directorate (DGA) Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU)	HSI
DNCD Fugitive Investigative Unit (FIU)	USMS
DNP Organized Crime Special Investigative Unit	FBI LEGATT
DNCD	INL
DNCD National Training Academy and K9 Training Center	INL
General Migration Directorate (DGM)	CBP
Dominican Armada (Navy) Maritime Interdiction Operations Center (MOC)	DOD
Specialized Airport and Civil Aviation Security Force (CESAC)	INL
Specialized Seaports Security Force (CESEP)	INL

Ecuador

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, fund, advise, or train the unit
Ecuador National Police Antinarcotics National Directorate (DNA)	INL, DEA, and HSI
Sub-Units of the Ecuador National Police Antinarcotics National Directorate (DNA):	
Antidrug Investigations Unit (UIAN)	DEA and INL
Ports and Airports Investigations Unit (UNIPA)	INL, DEA, and HSI
Chemical Investigations Unit	INL and DEA
Investigations Unit against Drug Trafficking for Internal Consumption (UCTCI)	INL
Narcotics Money Laundering Vetted Unit	INL and DEA

El Salvador

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Sensitive Investigative Unit	DEA, DOJ
Mobile Electronic Surveillance Team	INL
Tactical Maritime Operations Response Section (STORM)	INL
Naval Task Force Trident (FTNT)	U.S. Embassy Maritime Work Group

Guatemala

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) – PNC/SGAIA	DEA
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) – PNC, Public Ministry (MP)	FBI/DOJ
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) – PNC, customs (SAT), migration (IGM), national registry (RENAP), MP	DHS/HSI
Mobile Tactical Interdiction Unit (MTIU) – SGAIA, border police (DIPAFRONT)	DHS/CBP
Narcotics and Money Laundering Prosecutors Unit (UNILAT) – MP, PNC	DEA
Maritime Intelligence Center (MIC) – PNC	DEA
Naval Special Forces (FEN) – Guatemalan Navy	DEA, DOD, CBP

Haiti

Host Country Units	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Haitian National Police Counternarcotics Unit (BLTS)	INL
POLIFRONT (Border Police)	INL
Haitian Coast Guard (HCG)	INL, DOD

Honduras

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
HNP Anti-Drug Directorate (DNPA)	INL
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU)	DEA, INL
HNP Special Operations Command (COE)	INL
Honduran Naval Special Forces (FEN)	USCG, INL

Joint Interagency Operations Center (JIOC)	DOD, INL
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU)	HSI, INL
Special Operations Tactical Group (GOET)	INL/CBP
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Unit	FBI, INL

Indonesia

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
BNN Directorate of Enforcement and Pursuit	INL, DEA

Jamaica

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Jamaica Constabulary Force Narcotics Division	DEA

Kenya

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Kenya National Police Service, Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Anti-Narcotics Unit, Sensitive Investigations Unit	DEA

Laos

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Lao Customs Department	CBP

Mozambique

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
National Criminal Investigation Service (SERVIC)	DEA

Niger

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Central Office for the Prevention of Narcotics Trafficking (OCRTIS)	INL

Pakistan

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Anti-Narcotics Force / Special Investigative Cell	DEA

Panama

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Sensitive Investigations Unit	DEA
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit	HSI
National Border Service Anti-Narcotics Directorate	DEA
Port Task Force	DEA, HSI, CBP

Peru

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Peruvian National Police Aviation Unit	INL
Peruvian National Police Money Laundering Unit	INL
Peruvian National Police Antinarcotics Unit	INL

Philippines

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Philippine National Police, Directorate for Human Resources and Doctrines Development	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine National Police, Directorate for Police Community Relations	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine National Police, Directorate for Plans and Operations	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine National Police, Training Service	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Preventive Education and Community Involvement Services	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program

Bureau of Corrections, Behavioral Modification Program	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Bureau of Corrections, Directorate for Reformation and Rehabilitation	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine National Police, Anti-Cyber Group	HSI
Philippine National Police, Anti-trafficking in Persons Division	HSI
Philippine National Police, Operations Management Division	HSI
Philippine National Police, Admin and Resource Management Division	HSI
Philippine National Police, Luzon Field Unit	HSI
National Bureau of Investigations, International Operations Division	HSI
National Bureau of Investigations, Cyber Crime Division	HSI
National Bureau of Investigations, Digital Forensics Lab	HSI
Philippine National Police, Internal Affairs Service	ICITAP

Tajikistan

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Drug Control Agency (DCA) Vetted Unit	DEA

Tanzania

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Drug Control and Enforcement Agency (DCEA)	DEA

Thailand

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Royal Thai Police, Narcotics Suppression Bureau	DEA
Office of the Narcotics Control	DEA

Trinidad and Tobago

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU)	DEA
Special Investigations Unit (SIU)	DEA

Vietnam

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Ministry of Public Security, Counternarcotics Police Department	DEA, INL

LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS (2021)

**Supplement to the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Law Enforcement Units Funded by the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement in 2021
Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961**

Consistent with Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by section 5102 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY 2022 NDAA), this supplement to the 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report identifies vetted or specialized law enforcement units funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement that had a counternarcotics purpose and that received \$50,000 or more in INL funding in calendar year 2021. It also identifies any U.S. agencies that mentored, trained, or advised those units.

For the purposes of reporting under this provision, the term “unit” means a vetted or specialized armed police or other law enforcement unit that has counternarcotics functions and powers to investigate, arrest, and detain suspects in connection with drug-related crimes. The term “United States Government-supported units funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement” relates to INL’s obligation of INCLE funding for equipment, costs associated with USG law enforcement advisors or other mentors/trainers and with other provision of training, and items such as lodging and travel expenses for such units, where the total INL funding amounted to at least \$50,000 in the calendar year being reported, regardless of the fiscal year of origin of the funds. The purpose of the \$50,000 minimum is to exclude units where INL provided only de minimis funding.

INL is not able to generally or consistently track foreign law enforcement operations, although it does provide funding for capacity building, equipment, and other activities that enhance the ability of partner law enforcement entities to engage in law enforcement activity including that which could be characterized as operations.

Abbreviations of the U.S. agencies that mentor, advise, or train the units listed below refer to the following agencies:

CBP – Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
DEA – Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD – Department of Defense
DOJ – Department of Justice
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
HSI – Homeland Security Investigations
ICITAP – International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, DOJ
ILEA – International Law Enforcement Academy
INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Department of State
LEGATT – Legal Attache, FBI
ODC - Office of Defense Cooperation, Department of Defense
OPDAT - Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training, DOJ
USMS – U.S. Marshalls Service

Afghanistan

Note: Assistance to the following units ceased as of August 15, 2021, after which the United States did not have a presence in Afghanistan.

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Counternarcotics Justice Center	None
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU)	DEA
National Interdiction Unit (NIU)	DEA

Albania

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Specialized Anticorruption Body (SPAK) --National Bureau of Investigations (NBI)	DEA, ICITAP
SPAK - Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO)	OPDAT
Ministry of Interior, Police Oversight Agency (POA)	ICITAP

Armenia

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Armenia State Revenue Committee	INL, DEA

Bahamas

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
RBPF Marine Service Support Unit	DEA, INL
RBPF Drug Enforcement Unit	DEA, INL
Bahamas Customs	HSI, INL
RBDF Naval Forces	ODC, INL

Belize

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Anti-Narcotics Unit	DEA
Mobile Interdiction Team	INL, ILEA, DEA
Belize Customs & Excise	INL, CBP

Colombia

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Colombian National Police, Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN)	DEA
Colombian National Police, Criminal Investigation Directorate (DIJIN)	DEA
Colombian National Police (DIJIN)	FBI, HSI, DEA
Colombian Prosecutors Office (CTI)	DEA
Colombian Army (COLAR)	DEA
Customs and National Taxes Directorate (DIAN)	HSI
Colombian Navy (COLNAV)	DEA
Colombian National Police, Tax and Customs Management Directorate (POLFA)	HSI

Costa Rica

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Coast Guard Marine Interdiction Unit	DoD, DEA, State

Dominican Republic

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD) Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU)	DEA
Joint Dominican National Police (DNP), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and General Customs Directorate (DGA) Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU)	HSI
DNCD Fugitive Investigative Unit (FIU)	USMS
DNP Organized Crime Special Investigative Unit	FBI LEGATT
DNCD	INL
DNCD National Training Academy and K9 Training Center	INL
General Migration Directorate (DGM)	CBP
Dominican Armada (Navy) Maritime Interdiction Operations Center (MOC)	DOD
Specialized Airport and Civil Aviation Security Force (CESAC)	INL
Specialized Seaports Security Force (CESEP)	INL

Ecuador

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, fund, advise, or train the unit
Ecuador National Police Antinarcotics National Directorate (DNA)	INL, DEA, and HSI
Sub-Units of the Ecuador National Police Antinarcotics National Directorate (DNA):	
Antidrug Investigations Unit (UIAN)	DEA and INL
Ports and Airports Investigations Unit (UNIPA)	INL, DEA, and HSI
Chemical Investigations Unit	INL and DEA
Investigations Unit against Drug Trafficking for Internal Consumption (UCTCI)	INL
Narcotics Money Laundering Vetted Unit	INL and DEA

El Salvador

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Sensitive Investigative Unit	DEA, DOJ
Mobile Electronic Surveillance Team (GETi2)	INL
Tactical Maritime Operations Response Section (STORM)	INL
Naval Task Force Trident (FTNT)	U.S. Embassy Maritime Work Group

Guatemala

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) – PNC/SGAIA	DEA
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) – PNC, Public Ministry (MP)	FBI, DOJ
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) – PNC, customs (SAT), migration (IGM), national registry (RENAP), MP	DHS, HSI
Mobile Tactical Interdiction Unit (MTIU) – SGAIA, border police (DIPAFRONT)	DHS, CBP
Narcotics and Money Laundering Prosecutors Unit (UNILAT) – MP, PNC	DEA
Maritime Intelligence Center (MIC) – PNC	DEA
Naval Special Forces (FEN) – Guatemalan Navy	DEA, DOD

Haiti

Host Country Units	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Haitian National Police Counternarcotics Unit	INL
POLIFRONT (Border Police)	INL
Haitian Coast Guard	INL, DOD

Honduras

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
HNP Anti-Drug Directorate (DNPA)	INL
Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU)	DEA, INL
HNP Special Operations Command (COE)	INL
Honduran Naval Special Forces (FEN)	USCG, INL
Joint Interagency Operations Center (JIOC)	DOD, INL
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU)	HSI, INL
Special Operations Tactical Group (GOET)	INL, CBP
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Unit	FBI, INL

Indonesia

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
BNN Directorate of Enforcement and Pursuit	INL, DEA

Jamaica

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Jamaica Constabulary Force Narcotics Division	DEA

Kenya

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Kenya National Police Service, Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Anti-Narcotics Unit, Sensitive Investigations Unit	DEA

Laos

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Lao Customs Department	CBP

Mozambique

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC)	DEA

Niger

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Central Office for the Prevention of Narcotics Trafficking (OCRTIS)	INL

Pakistan

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Anti-Narcotics Force / Special Investigative Cell	DEA

Panama

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Sensitive Investigations Unit	DEA
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit	HSI
National Border Service Anti-Narcotics Directorate	DEA
Port Task Force	DEA, HSI, CBP

Peru

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Peruvian National Police Aviation Unit	INL
Peruvian National Police Money Laundering Unit	INL
Peruvian National Police Antinarcotics Unit	INL

Philippines

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or trains the unit
Philippine National Police, Internal Affairs Service	Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
Philippine National Police, Directorate for Human Resources and Doctrines Development	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine National Police, Directorate for Police Community Relations	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine National Police, Drug Enforcement Group	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program
Philippine National Police, Anti-Cyber Group	HSI
Philippine National Police, Anti-trafficking in Persons Division	HSI
Philippine National Police, Operations Management Division	HSI
Philippine National Police, Admin and Resource Management Division	HSI
Philippine National Police, Luzon Field Unit	HSI
National Bureau of Investigations, International Operations Division	HSI
National Bureau of Investigations, Cyber Crime Division	HSI
National Bureau of Investigations, Digital Forensics Lab	HSI
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Preventive Education and Community Involvement Services	INL, through agreement with the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program

Tajikistan

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Drug Control Agency (DCA) Vetted Unit	DEA

Tanzania

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Drug Control and Enforcement Agency (DCEA)	DEA

Thailand

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Royal Thai Police, Narcotics Suppression Bureau	DEA
Office of the Narcotics Control	DEA

Trinidad and Tobago

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU)	DEA
Special Investigations Unit (SIU)	DEA

Vietnam

Host Country Unit	U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit
Ministry of Public Security, Counternarcotics Police Department	DEA, INL

